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Abstract 
Beck and Rush (1978) have proposed that depressives possess a 
negative self-schema. This led to Derry and Kuiper (1981) f inding that 
depressives' incidental recal l patterns reveal a clear preference fo r 
depressed content. Beck has also proposed that a negative self-schema 
is present in anxious individuals also. This study was designed to 
determine i f these proposals hold true f o r c l i n i c a l l y depressed 
out-pat ients , c l i n i c a l l y anxious out-patients and c l i n i c a l l y 
agoraphobic out-patients , compared with controls . 
In the f i r s t experiment, a cognitive task was used involving free 
recal l of three 20 item word l i s t s , the f i r s t consisting of 10 
depression and 10 neutral words, the second of 10 anxiety and 10 
neutral words, the t h i r d of 10 agoraphobia and 10 neutral words. They 
were presented in 4 t r i a l s each. 
The results showed that a l l groups - including controls - had a 
s imi lar pattern of recal l on the anxiety l i s t ; agoraphobics, anxious 
and controls had a s imi lar pattern of recal l on the agoraphobia l i s t 
and depressives and controls a s imilar pattern of recall on the 
depression l i s t . 
Anxiety subjects were less l i k e l y to recal l the depression l i s t 
and the most experimental words were clustered on the anxiety l i s t . 
However, only in cluster ing scores, on t r i a l one, both groups (subjects 
including controls and subjects without controls) showed greater 
c luster ing overal1. 
I t was concluded that c l i n i c a l l y depressed out-patients do not 
possess a stable negative self-schema and that c l i n i c a l l y anxious and 
agoraphobia out-patients do not possess a stable self-schema though 
agoraphobics seem to be, in a way, drawn to agoraphobic items and 
reca l l these better than depression, anxiety and neutral items. 
The second experiment tested the view that anxious patients would 
show superior recal l f o r and subjective organisation of personal 
adjectives with an anxious content, a depressed content or a combined 
anxious and depressed content ("both"). Three adjective l i s t s 
containing ten of one type of emotional adjectives and ten neutral 
adjectives were used. Patients ' memory f o r each l i s t was tested in a 
f ree recal l paradigm over two t r i a l s . A se l f - r a t i ng (describes you?) 
task was then carried out on a l l the adjectives. Superior recal l was 
shown f o r anxious, depressed and "both" content self-reference 
adjectives - especially f o r anxious - compared to neutral content 
adjectives (of Derry and Kuiper, 1981). 
Superior subjective organisation was only shown f o r depressed and 
"both" content adjectives compared to neutral adjectives. Results were 
discussed in terms of a f a i r l y weak self-schema (Beck, 1976) containing 
both elements of anxiety and depression, but with anxiety dominant. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Review of the Li terature 
I t is very obvious that we are influenced not by 
"facts" but by our in terpreta t ion of f ac t s . 
Al f red Adler 
This thesis w i l l begin with de f in i t ions of the main terms that are 
used. When the word "cognition" is used i t is a general term which 
covers a l l the various models of knowing, such as perceiving, 
remembering, imagining, conceiving, judging, reasoning. According to 
H.J. Eysenck's (1968) view, cognition consists of the general 
i n t e l l ec tua l level and of thought processes. Moreover, cognition 
depends on the v a r i a b i l i t y of human performance, the test content and 
the type of problems. 
A more modern d e f i n i t i o n of 'cogni t ion ' would cover a l l the 
various models of perception, a t ten t ion , memory, language and th inking. 
S imi la r ly in philosophy, as in psychology as w e l l , the cognitive 
func t i on , as an ultimate mode or aspect of the conscious l i f e , is 
constructed wi th the a f f e c t i v e and conative modes - fee l ing and 
w i l l i n g , or Plato's d i s t i nc t i on of noesis and orexis. 
Furthermore, a b r i e f look should be had of what neurotic disorder 
can be. F i r s t l y , the two-word term can be replaced by the one-word 
term : 'neurosis ' . Neurosis, then, is defined as a functional 
disorder, psychogenic in o r i g i n , of the nervous system (the tenm 
'psychoneurosis' is also used meaning the same th ing ) . Also in 
psychoanalysis, a neurotic disorder is regarded as a c o n f l i c t 
phenomenon, involving the thwarting of some fundamental ins t inc t ive 
urge. 
In accordance with most psychologists' opinions, neurosis is 
considered to take three main forms : anxiety neurosis, phobic neurosis 
and neurotic depression. 
Anxiety is mainly defined as a complex emotional state with 
apprehension or dread as i t s most prominent component. Anxiety is 
considered as a character is t ic of various nervous, mental and emotional 
disorders. Also anxiety is usually regarded as an i r ra t iona l fear . 
However, th i s d e f i n i t i o n applies s t r i c t l y only to phobic anxiety (we ' l l 
make i t clearer below), which seems to be evoked by objects and 
si tuat ions such as open spaces (agoraphobic anxiety) , closed spaces 
(claustrophobic anxie ty) , heights, spiders, snakes, thunder, t r ave l , 
crowds, strangers, etc. to an extent which is out of a l l proportion to 
t he i r actual danger. 
Freud has three theories of anxiety. The f i r s t was that i t is a 
manifestation of repressed l i b i d o , the second was that is represented a 
r epe t i t ion of the experience of b i r t h (Freud 1915), while the t h i r d , 
which can be regarded as the d e f i n i t i v e psychoanalytical theory of 
anxiety, is that there are two forms : primary anxiety and signal 
anxiety, both of which are responses of the ego to increases of 
i n s t i n c t i v e or emotional tension. Signal-anxiety, in accordance with 
psychoanalytic theory, is considered as an a le r t ing mechanism which 
foi^warns the ego of an impending threat to i t s equil ibrium; primary 
anxiety is regarded as the emotion which accompanies dissolution of the 
ego. The funct ion of signal-anxiety is to ensure that primary anxiety 
is never experienced by enabling the ego to i n s t i t u t e defensive 
precautions and i t can be regarded as an inwardly directed form of 
v ig i lance . Primary anxiety represents a f a i l u r e of defence and occurs 
in Nightmares (Freud 1926, Hoch and Zubia 1950, Rycroft 1968, Rosenberg 
1949). 
In general other forms of anxiety described in the psychoanalytic 
l i t e r a t u r e are: a) Castration anxiety, provoked by real or imagined 
threats to the sexual func t ion , b) Separation anxiety, provoked by the 
threat of separation from objects conceived to be essential f o r 
su rv iva l , c) Depressive anxiety, provoked by fear of one's own 
h o s t i l i t y towards 'good objects ' d) Paranoid (persecutory) anxiety, 
provoked by fear of being attacked by 'bad objects ' e) Objective 
anxiety, fear provoked by r e a l , external danger. 
The term 'phobia' is usually used to define a dread, or 
uncontrollable fea r , generally of a morbid or even pathological 
character, of some object or s i t ua t ion . Also, phobia is regarded as 
the symptom of experiencing unnecessary or excessive anxiety, in some 
spec i f ic s i tua t ion or in the presence of some specif ic object. So, 
agoraphobia is considered as an anxiety in open spaces, claustrophobia 
an anxiety in an enclosed space, spiderphobia an anxiety when 
confronted with a spider, snakephobia an anxiety when confronted with a 
snake etc. S imi la r ly a phobic neurosis is defined as a par t icular kind 
of neurosis in which phobia, in the sense we've given above, is the 
predominant sympton. In th is sense phobic neurosis is synonymous with 
phobic i l lness and anxiety-hysteria. 
Another thing we should do about def in i t ions is to see what most 
psychologists mean, when they use the term 'depression', or more 
specifically, 'neurotic depression.' 
In general, 'depression' is considered as an emotional a t t i tude . 
However, when psychologists say 'neurotic depression', they usually 
mean a pathological aspect in depression; also depression involves a 
f ee l ing of some inadequacy and hopeless anxiety, sometimes 
overwhelming, accompanied by a general lowering of psychophysical 
a c t i v i t y ; addi t iona l ly 'neurotic depression' usually refers to the 
symptom complained of by many people, especially neurotics; in most 
cases i t refers to a mixture of anxiety, aggression, despair, apathy, 
g u i l t and a sense of i n h i b i t i o n . 
The term 'emotion' is d i f f e r e n t l y described and explained by 
d i f f e r e n t psychologists, but most of them agree that i t is a complex 
state of the organism, involving bodily changes of a widespread 
character - in breathing, pulse, gland secretion etc. - and, on the 
mental side, a state of excitement or perturbation, marked by strong 
feel ings and usually an impulse towards a d e f i n i t e form of behaviour. 
I f the emotion is intense there is some disturbance of the in te l lec tua l 
functions and of the tendency f o r act ion. We can say that beyond this 
general description anything else would mean an entrance into the 
controversial f i e l d . 
From the psychoanalytic point of view, the term 'emotion' mainly 
means a state of both body and mind consisting of a subjective fee l ing 
which is e i ther pleasurable or unpleasant but never neutra l , which is 
accompanied by expressive behaviour or posture and by physiological 
changes. Furthermore, psychoanalytical theory tends to assume that 
emotions are a f f e c t s , i . e . that they are quanta (a term which is taken 
from physics) of energy attached to ideas, that the i r presence 
indicates a disturbance in physic^equilibrium, and that they interfere 
with adaptation. 
Another term to be defined is 'mood'. Psychologists usually use 
th is term when they want to refer to an a f fec t ive condition or 
a t t i t ude , enduring f o r some time, characterized by part icular emotions 
in a condition of sub-excitat ion, so as to be readily evoked, e.g. an 
i r r i t a b l e mood, or a cheerful mood. However, psychiatry only 
recognized two moods - e la t ion and depression. In addi t ion, especially 
in accordance to psychoanalytic theory, disturbances of mood 
characterize the a f f e c t i v e disorders. 
The las t term to be defined is 'memory'. As we mentioned above, 
memory - as one of the various models of knowing - is mostly regarded 
as one of the main sub-categories or components of ' cogn i t ion ' . We 
should also mention that 'memory' in re la t ion with anxiety, agoraphobia 
and depression w i l l be the par t icu lar interest of th is project . In the 
abstract and most general sense 'memory' can be considered as that 
character is t ic of l i v i n g organisms in v i r tue of which, what they 
experience leaves behind e f fec t s which modify fu ture experience and 
behaviour, in v i r tue of which they have a h i s tory , and that history is 
recorded in themselves; memory can also be considered as that 
character is t ic which underlies a l l learning, the essential feature of 
which is re tent ion; in a narrow sense the term 'memory' covers terms 
such as ' r e c a l l ' and ' recogni t ion ' - what we ca l l remembering. 
However, i t is easi ly understood that there may be learning without 
remembering. 
From the psychoanalytic point of view, memory f u l f i l s the 
biological funct ion of enabling organisms to respond to present 
circumstances in the l i g h t of past experience and thereby to replace 
simple, automatic, ' i n s t i n c t u a l ' reactions by complex, selective, 
learned responses. Freud's theory of memory seems to be in r e a l i t y a 
theory of f o r g e t t i n g . I t assumes that a l l experiences, or at least a l l 
s i g n i f i c a n t experiences, are recorded but that some cease to be 
available to Consciousness as a resul t of repression, this mechanism, 
being activated by the need to diminish anxiety. 
I t seems l i k e l y that there is no doubt that anxiety is highly 
related to depression, or not only can anxiety be replaced by 
depression, but depression is usually accompanied by anxiety as w e l l . 
According to C. Stavrakaki's and B. Vargo's (1986) opinions, there 
are current ly two opposing conceptual models, as well as a t h i rd 
intermediary pos i t ion , def in ing how anxiety and depression are related. 
These focus on anxiety and depression as: (a) variants of the same 
disorder d i f f e r i n g quant i ta t ive ly (uni tary model); (b) d i s t i n c t 
disorders d i f f e r i n g qua l i t a t i ve ly and (c) a mixture of the two 
syndromes, phenomenologically d i f f e r e n t from either primary anxiety or 
primary depression (anxious depressive posit ion) 
But now l e t me come to our main point : How cognition is related 
with neurotic disorders or with mood. Recently there has been a great 
deal of in teres t and l i t e r a t u r e , as well in the re la t ion between mood 
and cogni t ion, with most research fol lowing on depression. 
Also, a f t e r a l o t of research, i t seems that at tention is highly 
affected in neurotic disorders (e .g . MacLeod et a l , 1986). S imi la r ly , 
i t is suggested that there is not only an attentional reduction in 
people who su f fe r from these disorders, but also attentional bias, 
which means that so called 'neurotics ' have the tendency to attend 
(remember and use, as wel l ) more to those words that are more close to 
t he i r feel ings or to aspects of the i r disorder; f o r example, there are 
more p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r a 'neurotic ' to r e c a l l , select and use 
emotionally threatening words than any other word. E.g. some of the 
category of the soc ia l ly threatening words are : c r i t i c i z e d , 
inadequate, lonely, r i d i c u l e d , hated, f a i l u r e etc; some of the category 
of the physically threatening words are : emergency, disease, harm 
violence, unwell , f a t a l and so on (MacLeod et a l , 1986). 
From MacLeod et a l ' s point of view, according to Bower's network 
model of memory (1981), anxious subjects should display recal l biases 
that para l le l those already demonstrated in depression. A second 
predict ion by Bower was that selective at tention would be biased toward 
the encoding of mood-congruent mater ial . There i s , also, a good deal 
of empirical evidence to support such a re la t ion between selective 
a t tent ion and s i tua t ional or phobic anxiety. 
Thus, Burgess et al (1981) found that individuals experiencing 
phobic anxiety showed an increased a b i l i t y to detect fear-relevant 
words presented to the unattended channel in a dichotic l i s tening task. 
However, because these words were ind iv idua l ly selected f o r each 
subject, f a m i l i a r i t y or expectancy may account f o r these resul ts . 
Mathews and MacLeod ( i n press) conducted a related study concerned with 
generalized anxiety, where the unattended message was too quiet to 
enable detection. 
For the anxious, but not f o r the control subjects, threat-related 
material in th i s unattended channel was found to draw 
disproportionately on processing resources, as evidenced by 
d i f f e r e n t i a l impairment on a simultaneous, simple reaction-time task. 
S i m i l a r l y , Nunn, Stevenson and Whalan (1984) organized two 
experiments tes t ing the view that agoraphobic patients would show 
superior recal l f o r phobic-related material re la t ive to neutral 
mater ia l . In Experiment 1, subjects were required to recal l a series 
of f i v e passages; three contained potent ia l ly phobic information and 
two contained neutral information. The results showed that phobic 
patients recalled more propositions from the phobic passages than did 
controls . In Experiment 2, subjects completed four study-test t r i a l s 
wi th a l i s t of 20 words: 10 phobic words and 10 neutral words. The 
results showed that the patients recalled more phobic than neutral 
words while the reverse was the case f o r controls. The results are 
discussed in terms of the cognitive organization of phobic patients and 
are related to Beck & Rush's (1975) proposal that phobics have a 
cognitive organization of si tuations labelled as dangerous. The 
possible sources of these selective memory effec ts are also considered 
(see Nunn, Stevenson, and Whalan, 1984). 
Other current studies have c lear ly demonstrated that anxious 
subjects s h i f t a t tent ion toward emotionally threatening st imuli in 
t he i r visual environment. Normal control subjects, on the other hand, 
tend to s h i f t a t tent ion away from such s t imul i (MacLeod et a l , 1986). 
Furthermore, Neisser (1976) has characterized perception as a 
cyc l ic process. The f i r s t stage involves the passive intake of par t ia l 
information from the environment. This is then mapped onto internal 
representations or schemata, which both accommodate the information and 
d i rec t processing resources during the next intake cycle toward 
par t icu lar elements of the stimulus array. The functioning of such 
schemata appears to d i f f e r in anxious and non-anxious subjects, when 
th i s array includes elements that are emotionally threatening. 
MacLeod et a l ' s (1986) study c lear ly supports the i r or ig inal 
hypothesis that high anxiety leads to a bias in selective attention 
that favours the pick up of emotionally threatening information. The 
same study has also demonstrated that whereas in the anxious subjects 
they operate in a manner that f a c i l i t a t e s the encoding of threatening 
s t i m u l i , in the case of non-anxious subjects, they act ively i n h i b i t 
such encoding (MacLeod et a l , 1986). 
Let us now have a look at a b r i e f review of the l i t e r a tu re about 
the three main emotional disorders (anxiety, agoraphobia and 
depression) in re la t ion to cognit ion. As we have already seen, 
agoraphobia, in b r i e f , is the fear of open spaces. In accordance with 
Beck's point of view, Westphal (1872) coined the term agoraphobia, 
which l i t e r a l l y means "fear of the market place". In his monograph 
"Die agoraphobie", he describes the fol lowing symptoms: " . . . 
imposs ib i l i ty of walking through certain streets or squares, a 
p o s s i b i l i t y of doing so only with the resultant dread of anxiety . . . 
agony was much increased in those hours when the par t icular streets 
dreaded were deserted and the shops closed. The patients experienced 
great comfort from the companionship of men, or even an inanimate 
object l i k e a vehicle or a cane". Marks (1969) includes in th is 
syndrome mul t ip le phobias such as fear of f a i n t i n g in public , of 
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crowded places, large open spaces, and crossing bridges or streets. 
When questioned, the person with agoraphobia t y p i c a l l y expresses a fear 
that some calamity w i l l be fa l l him away from the security of his home 
and that nobody w i l l help him. Consequently, he is comforted by the 
presence of somebody he knows can obtain aid i f he has an acute 
physical problem. In general, the fur ther the individual is from 
spec i f i c medical assistance, the greater his phobia. Some patients 
express a fear of intense loneliness or of being l o s t , as though being 
alone in a strange place might permanently separate them from the i r 
f r iends and fami ly . Others have a fear of streets crowded with 
strangers. They fear loss of con t ro l , which would lead to social 
humi l ia t ion . The patient may be a f r a id that he w i l l f a i n t , s ta r t 
shouting insanely, or invo lun ta r i ly defecate and consequently make a 
spectacle of himself. The fear of loss of personal control is 
interwoven wi th the fear of social disapproval (Beck, 1976). 
In addi t ion , according to Mathews et al (1981), in Bandura's 
(1977) view, a l l behavioural change fol lowing the treatment of fear 
depends on changes in s e l f - e f f i c a c y expectations; that i s , individuals 
come to believe that they are capable of performing successfully the 
previously avoided behaviour. In th is account, e f f i cacy expectations 
are distinguished from outcome expectations, which are defined as 
be l i e f s about the consequences of the newly acquired behaviours, and 
which are not accorded a crucial role in the treatment process. The 
application of th i s model to agoraphobia is made d i f f i c u l t by the 
vagueness of these de f in i t i ons and of the d i s t i nc t ion between the two 
concepts (Mathews, Gelder and Johnston, 1981). Mathews et al suggest 
that cognition is highly affected not only in agoraphobia i t s e l f but 
also in the treatment of th i s neurotic disorder. S imi la r ly , i t would 
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appear that there is a mutual influence between cognition and 
agoraphobia, since agoraphobia implies cognitive changes and cognitive 
changes - par t ly caused by treatment - may enable the patient to cope 
in an improved way, wi th his agoraphobia. 
According to Mathews et a l , in a s t r i c t l y behavioural sense, 
agoraphobic patients know that they are able to go out but do not do so 
because of the r i sk of panic. Given s u f f i c i e n t incentive, however 
(e .g . a real threat to su rv iva l ) , patients quickly show themselves 
capable of going out. Before treatment, panic may be regarded as being 
beyond the control of the ind iv idua l , while afterwards i t is seen as 
control lable by anxiety management techniques. In th i s case, i t i s 
possible to argue that patients have actual ly acquired new behavioural 
s k i l l s in the control of panic and that th is is the crucial change. 
A l t e rna t i ve ly , patients may simply become aware that as they practice 
going out , the fear they experience becomes less. In this case, rather 
as Borkovec (1978) has argued, any change in expectancy seems more 
explicable as a consequence of behaviour change rather than i t s cause. 
However, i t seems l i k e l y that a two-way interact ion may come to exist 
between expectations and self-exposure practice (Mathews, Gelder and 
Johnston, 1981). 
The only obvious way of tes t ing whether or not cognitive changes 
are causal rather than merely secondary to self-observation of 
behaviour would be to develop treatments that a l t e r expectations 
d i r e c t l y . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , we need to know i f exposure to the feared 
s i tua t ion is always necessary before phobic anxiety can be eliminated, 
or whether p r io r cognitive change can produce equivalent e f f ec t s . 
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Since there is a t r i v i a l sense in which behavioural change cannot be 
observed in the absence of exposure, the l a t t e r term is taken to refer 
to systematic pract ice in s i tuat ions previously avoided because of 
ant ic ipated anxiety. The nearest approach to answering th is question 
would seem to be provided by investigations of the ef fects of cognit ive 
or other non exposure treatments on agoraphobia (Mathews et a l , 1981). 
One approach to treatment that does not necessarily involve 
exposure is cognit ive res t ruc tur ing. As used by Emmelcamp et al 
(1978), cognit ive restructur ing consists of three cognitive 
modif icat ion procedures. The f i r s t is the provision of a rat ional 
explanation fo r the pat ient 's fear ; the second is discussion of 
underlying i r r a t i ona l be l i e f s ; and the th i rd is practice in replacing 
negative self-statements with more posi t ive ones. In a comparison of 
f i ve sessions of cognit ive restructur ing and in vivo exposure (each 
given for one week in a crossover design), exposure was found to be by 
far the more e f fec t i ve treatment. However, in a subsequent study 
(Emmelcamp, 1980) of eight sessions of cognit ive rest ructur ing, in vivo 
exposure, or both combined, the resul ts were more complex. Immediately 
a f te r treatment, outcome resembled that of the ear l ie r study; that i s , 
cogni t ive rest ructur ing apparently had l i t t l e e f f e c t . However, one 
month a f te r treatment, there was much less difference between the 
groups because fur ther improvement had taken place in those who had 
received the cognit ive restructur ing treatment; th is e f fec t was seen 
pa r t i cu la r l y in rat ings of phobic anxiety. Unfortunately, the 
treatment that combined exposure wi th cognit ive restructur ing was no 
better than e i ther alone. Thus i t is not clear that cognitive 
rest ructur ing adds to exposure treatment, but again, there are 
indicat ions that exposure may not always be necessary for improvement. 
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I t is of in teres t that the ef fects of cognit ive restructur ing were not 
always immediately obvious; perhaps time is required, ei ther to 
consolidate the cognit ive changes induced, or to allow them to be 
t ranslated in to behaviour. This poss ib i l i t y leaves unresolved the 
question of whether cognit ive change may in some way reduce anxiety, as 
implied by the suggestion that phobics may add to the i r experience of 
anxiety by f r ighten ing thoughts. A l te rna t i ve ly , cognit ive modification 
may be e f fec t ive for a d i f f e ren t reason: because i t acts as an 
incent ive, motivating patients to tes t themselves out in phobic 
s i tuat ions (see Mathews et a l , 1981). 
We have already noted that a thinking disorder is at the core of 
agoraphobia. We have also seen through Mathews et a l ' s opinion that 
the cognit ive structure of pat ient 's thought is interfered with by his 
agoraphobic disorder. Let me then come to another important point of 
that b r ie f review : the re la t ion of general anxiety neurosis with 
people's cognit ive structures and cognit ive disorders. 
Moreover, I suppose i t would be very helpful for us to take into 
account Lazarus' (1967) opinion about cognit ive disorders caused by 
s t ress. Lazarus has studied cognit ive and personality factors 
underlying threat and coping. He believes that what we must do in 
psychological stress analysis is to iden t i f y the cognitions that 
underl ie threat and the speci f ic appraisals that lead to each form of 
coping, with i t s observable behavioural and physiological pattern. 
Par t icu lar appraisals underl ie attack which is expressed behaviourally, 
somewhat d i f f e ren t appraisals underlie the impulse to attack which is 
i nh ib i t ed . S t i l l d i f f e ren t appraisals underlie f l i g h t patterns. The 
same might be said fo r each form of defense as we l l . I t should be 
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noticed that th is is only a general approach to Lazarus' opinions, but 
conditions do not permit me to do more than present Lazarus' general 
point here. So, coming to th is point , these appraisals are, in tu rn , 
shaped by the stimulus configuration and personality as they in teract . 
Also, two fundamental assumptions are made in Lazarus' work: 
F i r s t , the observed pattern of reaction depends on intervening 
psychological a c t i v i t i e s , such as the coping process. Secondly, 
underlying each type of coping is a par t icu lar kind of appraisal in 
which the consequences of cues are interpreted. This appraisal leads 
to the selection of a coping process that is appropriate to i t , though 
not necessarily to what is required for good adaptiveness or r ea l i t y 
t es t i ng . Lazarus also believes that research on the conditions that 
determine the coping process and the observed patterns of stress 
reaction would proceed faster and more f r u i t f u l l y i f we sought to 
conceptualize the appraisals involved in each type of coping. Research 
would also proceed faster and more f r u i t f u l l y i f we ceased to fear 
phenomenological terms and concepts and used them to the f u l l e s t extent 
to locate the empirical conditions accounting fo r var iet ies of stress 
reaction (see Appley and Turnbul l , 1967). 
S im i la r l y , according to Beck's (1976) point of view, in the case 
of anxiety neurosis, the thinking of the anxious patient is dominated 
by themes of danger to his domain; that i s , he anticipates detrimental 
occutjgnces to himself, his fami ly , his property, or to his status and 
to other valued intangib les. In contrast to the phobic patient who 
experiences anxiety in avoidable s i tua t ions , the anxiety-neurotic 
perceives danger in s i tuat ions he cannot avoid. A person who is 
continuously a f ra id of developing a serious or fa ta l i l lness may 
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in te rpre t any unusual physiological symptom as a sign of such i l l ness . 
Shortness or breath may arouse the idea that he/she is having a heart 
at tack; diarrhoea and constipation or a vague pain may lead to him to 
believe he has cancer. Frequently, the fears envelop external s t imu l i . 
Any unexpected sound may be interpreted as a signal of disaster. 
Noises in his house arouse fears of burglars breaking i n ; automobile 
backf i re suggests gunshots; a youngster's shout stimulates visions of 
physical violence. 
Many anxious patients are af ra id predominantly of psychological 
harm. The anxious person is often concerned that other people, 
strangers as well as f r iends, w i l l r e jec t , humil iate, or depreciate 
him. Ant ic ipat ion of physical or psychological harm is chained to 
anxiety; consequently, when such expectations are formed, anxiety is 
stimulated (Beck, 1976). 
We have already noted (see above) that a thinking disorder is at 
the core of anxiety neurosis. The interference with r ea l i s t i c thinking 
is readi ly observed by the anxious patient h imsel f /hersel f . The 
character is t ic manifestations are: 1 . Repetit ive thoughts about 
danger. The pat ient has continuous verbal or p i c to r i a l cognitions 
about the occurence of harmful events (" fa lse alarms"). In these cases 
of anxiety neurosis, as Beck says in one of his chapters' t i t l e s , "the 
alarm is worse than the f i r e " which means that anxiety in most cases is 
worse than the real danger about which anxiety is supposed to warn. 2. 
Reduced a b i l i t y to "reason" wi th the fear fu l thoughts. The patient may 
suspect that his anxiety-producing thoughts are not reasonable; 
however, his capacity fo r object ively evaluating and reappraising is 
impaired. Even though he may be able to question the reasonableness of 
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his anxiety-producing thoughts, he believes predominantly in the i r 
v a l i d i t y . 3. "Stimulus general izat ion". The range of anxiety-evoking 
s t imul i increases so that almost any sound, movement, or other 
environmental change may be perceived as a danger. 
For example, a woman in an acute anxiety attack has these 
experiences: She heard the siren of a f i r e engine and thought, "My 
house may be on f i r e " . At the same t ime, she visualized her family 
trapped at home in the f i r e . Then she heard an airplane f l y ing 
overhead and had a p i c t o r i a l image of herself in the airplane and the 
a i rp lane's crashing. As she imagined the crash, she experienced 
anxiety (Beck, 1976). 
Beyond a l l th is I should underline that most of the l i t e r a t u r e , 
re fe r r ing to cognit ion and neurotic disorders, has been wr i t ten 
spec i f i ca l l y about depression. However, theories advanced have not yet 
provided a durable solut ion to the problem of depression. But l e t ' s 
discuss now some of the main cognit ive aspects of depression. In 
accordance with psychoanalytic l i t e r a t u r e , melancholic depression is a 
pathological form of mourning, the los t object being an ' in ternal 
object ' not an actual person. This internal object was ambivalently 
invested so that the depressed person f e l t dependent on an object to 
which he was none the less hos t i l e . In depression he imagines that he 
has destroyed th is object (hence the depression). This view of 
melancholic depression assumes that persons subject to i t are, even in 
heal th , in a state of precarious balance, since the i r s t a b i l i t y is 
based on a complex, ambivalent re lat ionship towards an internal object 
(Rycrof t , 1968). 
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In add i t ion , according to A.T. Beck's point of view, the thought 
content of depressed patients centers on a s ign i f i cant loss. The 
pat ient perceives that he has los t something he considers essential to 
his happiness or t r a n q u i l i t y ; he anticipates negative outcomes from 
any important undertaking; and he regards himself as def ic ient in the 
a t t r ibu tes necessary fo r achieving important goals. This theme may be 
formulated in terms of the cognit ive t r i a l : a negative conception of 
the se l f , a negative in terpretat ion of l i f e experiences, and a 
n i h i l i s t i c view of the fu tu re . 
The sense of i r revers ib le loss and negative expectation leads to 
the typical emotions associated with depression: sadness, 
disappointment, and apathy. Furthermore, as the sense of being trapped 
in an unpleasant s i tuat ion or of being enmeshed in insoluble problems 
increases, spontaneous constructive motivation dissipates. The 
pa t ien t , moreover, feels impelled to escape from the apparently 
in to lerable condit ion via suicide (Beck, 1976). 
According to Beck, motivational change and the reversals in major 
object ives are among the most puzzling character ist ics of the seriously 
depressed pat ient . He not only desires to avoid experiences that 
formerly g r a t i f i e d him or represented the main stream of his l i f e , but 
he is drawn toward a state of i n a c t i v i t y . He even, sometimes, seeks to 
withdraw. 
To understand the l i nk between the changes in motivation and the 
pat ien t 's perception of loss, i t is valuable to consider the ways in 
which he has "given up". He no longer feels at t racted to the kinds of 
enterprizes he o rd ina r i l y would undertake spontaneously. In f ac t , he 
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f inds that he has to force himself to engage in his usual a c t i v i t i e s . 
He goes through the motions of attending to his ordinary a f fa i rs 
because he believes he should, or because he knows i t is "the r igh t 
thing to do", because others urge him to do i t - but not because he 
wants t o . He f inds he has to work against a powerful inner resistance, 
as though he were t ry ing to drive an automobile with the brakes on or 
to swim upstream. 
In the most extreme cases, the patient experiences "paralysis of 
the w i l l " : He is devoid of spontaneous desire to do anything except to 
remain in a state of i n e r t i a . Nor can he mobilize "w i l l power" to 
force himself to do what he believes he ought to do. 
From th is descr ipt ion of the motivational changes, one might 
surmise tha t , perhaps, some physical ly depleting disease has 
overwhelmed the pat ient so that he does not have the strength or 
resources to make even a minimal exert ion. An acute or deb i l i t a t ing 
i l l ness such as pneumonia or advanced cancer would conceivably reduce a 
person to such a state of immobil i ty. The physical-depletion notion, 
however, is contradicted by the patients own observation that he feels 
a strong drive to avoid "construct ive" or "normal" a c t i v i t i e s . His 
i ne r t i a is deceptive in that i t is derived not only from a desire to be 
passive but also from a less obvious desire to shrink from any 
s i tua t ion he regards as unpleasant. He may feel repelled by the 
thought of performing even elementary functions such as gett ing out of 
bed, dressing himself and attending to personal needs. 
In contrast , the physical ly i l l person generally wants to be 
ac t ive . I t is often necessary to enforce bedrest in order to keep him 
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from taxing himself. The depressed pat ient 's desire to avoid ac t i v i t y 
and to escape from his current environment are the consequences of his 
pecul iar construct ions: the negative view of his fu ture , his 
environment and himself. 
Everyday experiences - as well as a number of well-designed 
experiments - demonstrate that when a person believes he cannot succeed 
at a task, he is l i k e l y to give up. He adopts the a t t i t ude , "there is 
no use t r y i ng " and does not feel any spontaneous drive to work at i t . 
Moreover, the be l ie f that the task is pointless and that even 
successful completion is meaningless, minimizes his motivation. Since 
the depressed pat ient expects negative outcomes, he does not experience 
any internal st imulat ion to make an e f f o r t ; he sees no point in t ry ing 
because he believes the goals are meaningless. People generally t r y to 
avoid s i tuat ions they expect to be pa in fu l ; because the depressed 
patient perceives most s i tuat ions as onerous, boring or pa in fu l , he 
desires to avoid even the usual amenities of l i v i n g . These avoidance 
desires are powerful enough to override any tendencies toward 
const ruct ive, goal-directed a c t i v i t y . 
The set t ing for the pat ient 's powerful desire to seek a passive 
state is i l l u s t r a t e d by th is sequence of thoughts: " I am too fatigued 
and sad to do anything. I f I am active I shall only feel worse. But 
i f I l i e down, I can conserve my strength and my bad feelings w i l l go 
away". 
Unfortunately, th is attempt to escape from the unpleasant feel ing 
by being passive does not work; i f anything, i t enhances the 
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dysphoria. The patient f inds that far from obtaining any respite from 
his unpleasant thoughts and fee l ings , he becomes more preoccupied with 
them (Beck, 1976). 
So, l e t us now come to another point of our discussion: the 
motivational and vo l i t i ona l determinants of depression. 
According to Kuhl's (1986) information processing model of 
depression, the chronic i ty of depressive mood states is maintained by 
so-cal led degenerated ( u n f u l f i l l a b l e ) intentions that claim working 
memory capacity needed to enact new ( f u l f i l l a b l e ) intent ions. The 
resul ts of an experiment are reported, in which an attempt was made to 
induce a degenerated intent ion in a group of depressive patients as 
well as in several control groups. But l e t us ta lk f i r s t about the 
degenerated-intention hypothesis i t s e l f . 
According to Kuhl and Helle (1986) one of the most sal ient 
character is t ics of depression is the perseverance of depressive a f fec t . 
When a person enters an acute depressive episode, depressive mood 
t y p i c a l l y perseveres for several days or even weeks. Normally, 
emotional states are rather t ransient ( Izard , 1977), and cognit ive 
memory structures even require continuous rehearsal to stay active for 
more than a few seconds (Anderson, 1983). What could be a 
psychological mechanism accounting for the extraordinary s t a b i l i t y of 
depressed mood associated with depression? One possible answer may be 
found in motivation theory. Motivational states seem to have an 
i n t r i n s i c property of perseverance (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Freud, 
1915/1949; Kuhl and Blankenship, 1979; Lewin, 1935). The 
perseverance of wishes, needs, and intentions seems to be supported by 
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many mechanisms on d i f f e ren t levels of processing. Even a subcortical 
mechanism seems to be involved in the maintenance of intentional states 
(see Kuhl, 1985, fo r a detai led summary of the evidence supporting th is 
c la im) . 
The central hypothesis of Kuhl and Hel le, then, is that the 
psychological mechanism common to a l l types of severe depression 
involves one or several persevering motivational states, especially 
in tent ional s ta tes, which are the most self-committing and persistent 
motivational states (Kuhl, 1984). According to Kuhl and Hel le, a 
d is ta l antecendent of depression such as separation, object loss, or 
loss of control does not resul t in a depressive disorder unless i t 
leads to a persevering intent ional state (which may or may not be 
represented on a conscious level of awareness). Normally, unattainable 
goals are renounced a f te r a certain number of f u t i l e attempts to attack 
them (Atkinson and Feather, 1966; Kl inger, 1975). The antecendent 
event is expected to lead to a depressive disorder only i f the 
indiv idual is unable to el iminate the in ten t ion . Several recent 
resul ts from experiments based on the learned-helplessness paradigm 
(Seligman, 1975) suggest that overmaintenance of intent ional states is 
a funct ion of a s i tua t iona l l y produced degeneration of one or several 
components of the mental structure encoding the persevering intent ional 
state (Kuhl, 1981; Kuhl and Weiss, 1984). An interest ing overlap 
exists between Kuhl and Hel le 's model and Kl inger 's (1975) incentive 
theory of current concerns. By th is account, a current concern refers 
to an in tent ional structure s imi lar to what Kuhl and Helle cal l an 
in ten t ion , that i s , a motivational tendency to which an organism has 
become committed. According to Kl inger, depression may be an adaptive 
process because i t helps the organism disengage from unattainable 
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goals. Kuhl and Hel le 's theory is an accordance with th is view and 
goes beyond i t by specifying information-processing mechanisms 
under-lying depressive symptoms, that i s , the degeneration of the 
cognit ive structure encoding intentions and the blocking of working 
memory by various act ion-control mechanisms that mediate the 
maintenance of the current ly activated in ten t ion . 
Kuhl and Hel le 's experiment was designed to test the two 
assumptions of the model central to the preceding discussion. F i r s t , 
do hospital ized depressives - as compared to other c l i n i ca l and 
non-c l in ica l subjects - have an increased tendency to maintain 
unrea l i s t i c in tent ions, even a f te r the i r acute depressive symptoms have 
been reduced as a resu l t of treatment? Second, do patients who report 
a considerable amount of depressive symptoms (as assessed by the Beck 
Depression Inventory [BDI ] ; Beck, 1967) have a reduced memory capacity 
a f te r an unrea l is t i c goal has been suggested to them? Kuhl and Helle 
suspect that the short-term memory de f i c i t s expected fol lowing the 
induction of a degenerated intent ion may be associated with the degree 
of acute depressive symptoms (as assessed by c l i n i ca l diagnosis) 
because recovery from a depressive episode may restore the a b i l i t y to 
shie ld short-term memory from degenerated intent ion even i f 
depressives' tendency to encode too many action tendencies in an 
intent ional format remains (see Heckhausen & Kuhl, 1985, and Kuhl, 
1985, fo r theoret ical support fo r th is assumption). 
Spec i f i ca l l y , in Kuhl and Hel le's study, these predictions were 
applied to the degeneration of one component of an in tent ion, the 
context component specifying the conditions under which the intended 
action is to be executed (see Kuhl, 1984, fo r a discussion of other 
components). 
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To understand bet ter , Kuhl's and Hel le 's degenerated-intention 
hypothesis i t would be very useful to take into account other studies, 
such as, fo r example, Akiskal and McKinney's model. This model and 
other research leads have focused on the d is ta l determinants of 
depression [such as negative thinking (Beck, 1967), learned 
helplessness (Seligman, 1975), loss of reinforcement (Lewinsohn, 1974), 
and separation (Bowlby, 1969; Spi tz , 1945)], but the proximal 
psychological processes that could be d i rec t l y related to the 
neurophysiological mechanisms involved have as yet rarely been the 
subject of systematic studies. Moreover, there is s t i l l a considerable 
gap between d is ta l psychological determinants of depression such as 
separation, object loss, behaviour-outcome noncontingency, and so 
f o r t h , and the neurophysiological de f i c i t s speci f ied. 
Af ter presenting Kuhl's and Hel le 's overview of the i r method used 
below, we ' l l discuss, then, the results of the experiment that examines 
a model of depression specifying the " f i na l common pathway" of the 
psychological determinants of depression (Kuhl, 1985a). So f i r s t l y , to 
tes t the two assumptions regarding overmaintenance of degenerated 
intent ions and impaired select ive inat tent ion to them, Kuhl and Helle 
confronted the i r experimental subjects with a messy table and asked 
them to clean i t up. Subsequently, they to ld them that they could not 
s t a r t immediately because other tasks had to be done f i r s t . I t would 
be up to them to decide when there would be an opportunity to clean up 
the tab le . This part of the inst ruct ion was designed to induce a 
degeneration of the context component of the in ten t ion , which specifies 
the conditions under which the intended action is to be performed. The 
experiment contained a control group of subjects who were not 
instructed to clean up the messy tab le. 
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Kuhl and Hel le 's assumption was that subjects having a history of 
depressive episodes ( i r respect ive of the in tens i ty of acute depression) 
would tend to encode th is inst ruct ion in an intent ional format, thus 
highly committing themselves to i t . The extent of intent ional encoding 
was assessed by an interference measure: Subsequent to the 
experimental manipulation, an attempt was made to induce an executable 
in tent ion that could easi ly be forgotten ("Number each sheet when 
f i n i sh ing each of the fol lowing tasks") . Because cognitive 
interference between a pair of elements and the degree of forget t ing 
them increases with increasing s im i l a r i t y between the elements 
(Anderson, 1976), subjects who encode the experimental instruct ion in 
an intent ional format should be more l i k e l y to " forget" a further 
ins t ruc t ion encoded in a s imi lar format ( i . e . in an intent ional format) 
than subjects who encode the experimental inst ruct ion in a format that 
d i f f e r s from the intent ional format of subsequent instruct ions (e .g . , a 
wish format: " I might clean up the table i f the opportunity a r ises" ) . 
Some of the tasks administered subsequent to the experimental 
manipulation assessed short-memory capacity. I t was expected that 
subjects who had not f u l l y recovered from a depressive episode (as 
indicated by a high score on the Beck Depression Inventory) would show 
a reduction of short-term memory capacity in the experimental condition 
(containing the clean-up-table inst ruct ion) as opposed to depressive 
subjects in the control condit ion (no clean-up-table ins t ruc t ion ) . 
Discussing the resu l t s , then, we ' l l f i nd that a l l of them confirm 
Kuhl and Hel le 's hypotheses regarding the functional signif icance of 
perseverating intent ional states in depressive disorder. Because the 
c l i n i c a l diagnosis of depression was based on a personal history of two 
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or more severe depressive episodes ( i r respect ive of the degree of acute 
depressive symptoms), Kuhl and Helle were able to d i rec t l y check the 
d i f f e r e n t i a l e f fects of a history of depression (as assessed by the 
c l i n i c a l diagnosis) in contrast to those of an acute depressive episode 
(as assessed by the BDI). 
The degree of acute depressive symptoms does not seem to increase 
the tendency to encode unrea l is t ic instruct ions in intent ional format 
as assessed by the degree to which subjects forgot to enact a r ea l i s t i c 
i n ten t ion . As hypothesized, the tendency to encode unreal is t ic 
inst ruct ions in an intent ional format seems, however, to be associated 
with a personal h is tory of depressive episodes. 
However, the i n a b i l i t y to keep cognitions related to an 
unrea l i s t i c in tent ion from intruding into working memory seems to 
depend on the degree of acute depressive symptoms (BDI score). These 
resul ts are especial ly important because previous studies fa i led to 
f i nd any consistent main e f fec t regarding short-term memory de f i c i t s in 
depressives (M i l l e r , 1975). 
The present resu l t suggests that short-term memory de f i c i t s 
spec i f ic to acute depressive disorder (as opposed to schizophrenia and 
alcoholism) can be found under the condit ion specif ied in Kuhl's model 
(Kuhl, 1985). 
Furthermore, a f te r tha t , i t would be useful to refer to Byrne et 
a l ' s (1986) experiment which studied e f f o r t f u l and automatic cognitive 
processes in depression. So in th is experiment, ten patients with 
major depression and ten age - and sex - matched normal controls were 
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presented with two contrast ing cognit ive tasks: one requires sustained 
e f f o r t and information processing, and the other required only 
super f ic ia l information processing that could be accomplished 
automat ical ly, with l i t t l e e f f o r t . According to the resu l ts , depressed 
patients performed more poorly only on the effort-demanding cognitive 
task. Thus depressed patients are impaired on a speci f ic type of 
cognit ive operat ion, one that requires e f f o r t and presumably involves 
d i f f e ren t mechanisms than those used for automatic and more superf ic ia l 
information processing. 
In add i t ion , Newman et al (1984) administered levodopa to normal 
e lder ly controls and found an improvement in the normal baseline level 
of free recal l ( e f f o r t f u l processing) without any change in automatic 
processing (remembering how often an event occurred). 
S im i la r l y , Weingartner et al (1984), in studying patients with 
Parkinson's disease, showed a select ive d e f i c i t in effort-demanding 
learning and memory s imi lar to that seen in depressed pat ients, but no 
impairment for tasks that require superf ic ia l information processing 
and can be accomplished automatical ly. 
The s i m i l a r i t i e s between the cognit ive impairment seen in 
Parkinson's disease and that in depression are also consistent with 
recent suggestions that the "pseudodementia" of depression most closely 
resembles the "subcort ical dementias" and wi th theories that anatomic 
connections between parts of the l imbic system and basal ganglia may 
play a crucia l ro le in integrat ing mood and motivat ion. 
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Furthermore, the select ive impairment of effort-demanding learning 
in depressed patients suggests that the neurochemical and neuroanatomic 
mechanisms mediating these cognit ive processes may also play an 
integral ro le in the pathophysiology of depression. 
Working in th is frame of reference, which is l imi ted by the 
de f i n i t i on given above, Eysenck (1968) found that neurotic disorders 
produce very l i t t l e deter iorat ion of the general level of cognit ive 
a b i l i t i e s . A small amount of impairment was however found on the 
Babcock t es t . 
Furthermore, Eysenck found that psychiatr ic groups, both neurotic 
and psychotic are no more variable in the i r test performance than 
normals. Also, differences in v a r i a b i l i t y cannot explain the general 
cognit ive abnormalities so far dealt w i th . 
About the content of the tests : Eysenck found that there is no 
evidence that any psychatric group f inds any par t icu lar sort of test 
content especial ly d i f f i c u l t , while unequivocal studies are lacking. 
The differences in tes t scores discussed can be explained more easi ly 
in other ways. 
About the thought processes i t was found that : 
1. Some neurotics may have perceptual d i s a b i l i t i e s which might be 
related to anxiety. I t is tempting also to relate perceptual 
abnormalities to feel ings of unreal i ty in neurot ics, although no 
studies appear to have been done. 
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2. Neurotics are less f l uen t than normals, and psychotics are less 
f luent than neurot ics. Manics may be an exception in being more 
f luent than normal. I t is d i f f i c u l t to account for many cognitive 
differences in terms of differences in fluency. I t is conceivable 
that fluency might be related to the general level of ac t i v i t y 
although speci f ic studies are lacking. 
3. There is no evidence that any abnormal groups have a specif ic 
d i s a b i l i t y fo r tests involving deductive reasoning. 
About cognit ive processes, Eysenck found: 
A. Speed : 1. Motor and mental slowness can account for a good deal 
of the general deter iorat ion noted in d i f f e ren t groups and can part ly 
explain the subtest order produced on many tests of general 
i n te l l i gence . 2. There is probably a curv i l inear relat ionship between 
cognit ive speed and neuroticism; moderately neurotic individuals being 
faster than extremely stable or extremely neurotic indiv iduals. 3. 
Extraverts tend to be faster than in t rover ts on cognit ive speed 
measures. 4. Cognitive slowness can probably be produced in a number 
of d i f f e ren t ways, and d i f f e ren t abnormal groups may be slow for quite 
d i f f e ren t reasons. 
B. Persistence : 1 . There is no evidence about in te l lec tua l 
persistence in neurot ics, but there is no reason to believe them 
abnormal in th is respect. 2. There is some s l i gh t evidence that 
in t rover ts may be more persistent than extraverts on cognit ive tes ts . 
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C. Error : Extraverts are more careless and impulsive, and tend to 
make more er rors . This can in part explain why they perform tests of 
general level more poorly. 
D. D i s t r a c t i b i l i t y : 1 . Distract ion probably af fects timed tests 
much more than untimed tes ts . 2. A great deal of the deter iorat ion 
found in cases of a f fec t ive disorder on cognit ive tests may be due to 
d i s t r ac t i on . Individuals whose main symptom is profound depression, 
with feel ings of g u i l t and unworthiness from which they cannot free 
the i r minds, may obtain low test scores largely because they are unable 
to attend and concentrate. 3. Distract ion may be the main cause of 
abnormal cognit ive slowness in many depressed pat ients. 4. While 
dysthymic neurotic patients may be more distracted by the i r symptoms 
(anxiety, g u i l t f ee l i ngs ) , extraverts may be more easi ly d is t rac t ib le 
than in t rove r ts . 
E. Memory span : 1. There is some evidence that memory span is 
reduced by anxiety in normal people. 2. Neurotics tend to have a 
lower memory span than normal. 3. These data are ambiguous, since 
they could be due to d is t rac t ion or to true differences in the capacity 
of the mechanism of immediate memory. The differences are, however, 
s t r i k i n g l y s imi lar to the differences between the groups produced by 
d i s t rac t i on . 
F. Learning : The re lat ionship between learning and 
introversion-extraversion can par t ly account for the differences in 
general cognit ive level between d i f f e ren t neurotic groups. Dysthymics 
are best at learning and have the highest I.Q. Hysterics are worse at 
both learning and in te l l igence test performance and psychopaths are 
lower s t i l l . 
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G. Retention : 1 . There are no adequate studies of long-term 
retent ion in abnormal subjects in which learning a b i l i t y has been 
cont ro l led . 2. What evidence there is suggests that retention may be 
almost completely unaffected in functional psychiatr ic disorders, 
although some patients may obtain low scores on information tests for 
other reasons (e .g . the i n a b i l i t y to at tend). 
H. Drive : 1. The data re la t ing drive to cognit ive performance are 
somewhat c o n f l i c t i n g , and only tentat ive hypothesis can be suggested. 
2. There may be a l inear re lat ionship between unconditioned anxiety 
and speed of problem-solving, high anxiety producing high drive and 
fast performance. This could par t ly explain why neurotic subjects as a 
group are of above average general in te l l igence. 3. A high degree of 
introversion (condit ioning a b i l i t y ) could produce a large number of 
d is t rac t ing conditioned anxiety responses (or obsessional checking 
tendencies) themselves correlated with level of anxiety, which could 
slow down cognit ive test performance more than high dr ive , by i t s e l f , 
speeds i t up. These obsessional rechecking tendences could, however, 
be responsible fo r the reduction in error found in introverted groups. 
4. These two relat ionships when added together, could produce in a 
heterogeneous group a tendency for cognit ive speed to appear to be 
related curv i1 inear ly with neuroticism, or level of anxiety. 5. 
Because of these re la t ionsh ips , extraverted neurot ics, when tested in a 
state of high dr ive (produced by " s t ress " ) , w i l l work fastest , stable 
extraverts less f a s t , stable in t rover ts slower, and introverted 
neurotics slowest of a l l . 
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I . R ig id i ty : 1 . There is no general factor of r i g i d i t y , so that i t 
is not possible to generalize about r i g i d i t y tes ts . 2. Gui l ford's 
analysis suggests that there are two independent kinds of in te l lec tua l 
r i g i d i t y , adaptive f l e x i b i l i t y , or the a b i l i t y to overcome a set, and 
spontaneous f l e x i b i l i t y , or the a b i l i t y to produce a d ivers i ty of 
ideas. 3. There is evidence that stress increases adaptive r i g i d i t y 
or Einstel lung r i g i d i t y . This is probably because in Einstellung tests 
the set is learned, and high drive makes learning more rapid. I t would 
be reasonable to expect in t rover ts to be more r i g i d on th is sort of 
problem than extrover ts . This type of r i g i d i t y could account for part 
of the decrement in in te l lec tua l performance produced by stress in 
int roverted neurot ics. 4. Spontaneous F l e x i b i l i t y has been very 
l i t t l e invest igated. 
Furthermore, and especial ly in recent years, depression has been 
studied from several perspectives, such as phenomenological reports, 
psychoanalytic views, physiological theories and f i n a l l y , what 
especial ly we are interested i n , cognit ive theor ies, which focus on the 
depressed person's sel f -defeat ing processes and learning theories, 
which contend with the curtai lment of a c t i v i t y associated with 
depression. In general, most processes which consist of cognitive 
functions are affected more or less in depression. In par t icu lar , 
paying at tent ion is an exhausting e f f o r t for the depressed. They have 
d i f f i c u l t y in taking in what they read and what other people say to 
them. Conversation is sometimes a chore fo r many prefer to s i t alone 
and to remain s i l e n t . They usually speak slowly, a f te r long pauses, 
using few words and low monotonous voices. Others are too agitated and 
cannot s i t s t i l l . They pace, wring the i r hands, sighing and moaning 
a l l the while or complaining. When depressed individuals are 
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confronted with a problem, ideas for i t s solution occur to them with 
great d i f f i c u l t y . Also, every movement has a great heaviness and the i r 
heads f i l l many times and reverberate with sel f - recr iminat ions. 
Besides, recent discussions and previous research, as we have already 
seen, indicate that cognit ive processes play a decisive role in 
emotional behaviour. In some theories of depression as in some 
concerning anxiety, thoughts and bel iefs are regarded as causing the 
emotional s ta te . In a way, Freud is a cognit ive theor is t too, for he 
viewed depression as resu l t ing from a person's be l ie f that loss is a 
withdrawal of a f fec t ion (Davison and Neale, 1986). 
In addit ion to Beck's theory, in recent years Martin Seligman's 
(1974) learned-helplessness theory of depression has been of 
considerable in te res t . In general, Seligman suggests that although 
anxiety is the i n i t i a l response to a stressful s i t u a t i o n , i t is replaced 
by depression i f the person comes to believe that control i s 
unattainable. 
I n i t i a l l y Seligman's view was a mediational learning theory, 
formulated to explain the behaviour of animals who received painful 
e l ec t r i c shocks in two d i f f e ren t s i tua t ions . In the f i r s t part of the 
experiment some dogs are put in a box with e lec t r i c grids in the 
f loo r ing and subjected to numerous painful e lec t r i c shocks from which 
they cannot escape. In the second part these animals, as well as dogs 
who did not have th is pr ior experience with inescapable shock, are 
placed in a s imi lar apparatus. Now painful shock can be avoided i f the 
dogs learn to leap over a pa r t i t i on to another compartment of the 
so-called shut t le box as soon as they hear a warning buzzer or see a 
lightcome on. The behaviour of the dogs is markedly affected by 
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whether they were ea r l i e r exposed to inescapable shock. Animals who 
have not had the ea r l i e r experience become quite upset when they 
receive the f i r s t few e lec t r i c shocks but f a i r l y soon thereafter learn 
to leap over the pa r t i t i on when they hear or see the conditioned 
stimulus and thereby avoid fur ther painful shock. The animals who have 
had the ea r l i e r experience with inescapable shock behave quite 
d i f f e r e n t l y . Soon a f te r receiving the f i r s t shocks, they stop running 
around in a distressed manner; instead they seem to give up and 
passively accept the painful s i t ua t ion . Not surpr is ing ly , they do not 
acquire the avoidance response as e f f i c i e n t l y and e f fec t i ve ly as the 
control animals do. Most of them in fact l i e down in a corner and 
whine. Such experiments imply that animals can acquire what might be 
cal led a "sense of helplessness" when confronted with uncontrollable 
aversive s t imula t ion. 
This helplessness la te r tends to seriously and deleteriously 
a f fec t the i r performance in stressful s i tuat ions that can be 
cont ro l led. They appear to lose the a b i l i t y and motivation to learn to 
respond in an e f fec t ive way to painful s t imulat ion. 
On the basis of th is and other work on the effects of 
uncontrol lable s t ress, Seligman f e l t that learned helplessness in 
animals can provide a model fo r at least certain forms of human 
depression. He noted s i m i l a r i t i e s between the manifestations of 
helplessness observed in animal laboratory studies and at least some of 
the symptoms of depression. Obviously, we suppose i t is not so easy to 
observe any cognit ive de f i c i t s in animals but l i ke many depressed 
people, the animals appear passive in the face of s t ress, f a i l i n g to 
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i n i t i a t e action that might allow them to cope. They also develop 
anorexia, having d i f f i c u l t y in eating or retaining what is eaten, and 
lose weight. 
On the physiological l e v e l , one of the neurotransmitter chemicals, 
norepinephrine, was found to be depleted in Seligman's animals. Drugs 
that increase levels of norepinephrine have been shown to a l lev ia te 
depression in human beings. Although effectiveness of treatment does 
not prove e t io logy, the fac t that depression is reduced by a drug that 
increases the level of norepinephrine is consistent with the f inding 
that learned helplessness in animals is associated with lower levels of 
the chemical. 
S im i la r l y , experiments with human beings have yielded results 
s imi lar to those of experiments done with animals. People who have 
been subjected to inescapable noise, or inescapable shock, or who have 
been confronted wi th unsoluble problems, f a i l la ter to escape noise and 
shock and solve simple problems ( fo r example Hiroto and Seligman, 1975; 
Roth and Cubal, 1975). Moreover, the performance of tasks by college 
students who rate as depressed on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
is s imi lar to that of non-depressed students who have ear l ie r been 
subjected to these same helplessness-including experiences (M i l l e r , 
Seligman, and Kurlander, 1975; Klein and Seligman, 1976). This is of 
course, very important for i t suggests that we can, in a laboratory 
se t t i ng , e l i c i t from non-depressed subjects behaviour s imi lar to that 
observed in depressed ind iv iduals . 
In 1978 a revised version of the learned-helplessness model was 
proposed by Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale, fo r several inadequacies 
35 
of the theory and unexplained aspects of depression had become 
apparent. Many of l i f e ' s misfortunes are beyond our con t ro l , but they 
do not sadden us to the extent that we become depressed. In addi t ion, 
many depressed people hold themselves responsible fo r the i r f a i l u res . 
I f they regard themselves as helpless, how can they blame themselves? 
And why do many depressed people have so l i t t l e self-esteem? 
The essence of the revised theory l i es in the concept of 
a t t r i bu t i on (Weiner et a l , 1971) and in th is way i t blends cognitive 
and learning elements. Given a s i tuat ion in which the individual has 
experienced f a i l u r e , he or she w i l l t r y to a t t r ibu te the fa i l u re to 
some cause. Three questions are asked in Abramson, Seligman and 
Teasdale's formulation which is applied to indicate the ways in which a 
person might a t t r i bu te his f a i l u r e . 1) Are the reasons for f a i l u re 
believed to be internal (personal) or environmentally caused 
(universal)? 2) Is the problem believed to be stable or short-term? 
and 3) How global or speci f ic is the i n a b i l i t y to succeed perceived to 
be? 
The a t t r i bu t iona l revision of helplessness theory postulates that 
the way the person a t t r ibu tes f a i l u r e w i l l determine i t s subsequent 
e f fec ts . Global a t t r ibu t ions should increase the general i ty of the 
ef fects of f a i l u r e . At t r ibut ions to stable factors w i l l make them 
long-term. F ina l l y , a t t r i bu t i ng the f a i l u re to internal 
character is t ics is more l i k e l y to diminish self-esteem, par t icu la r ly i f 
the personal f a u l t is also global and persistent. 
People then become depressed when they believe ei ther that desired 
outcomes are unattainable or that negative outcomes are unavoidable. 
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Whether self-esteem collapses too depends on whether they blame the bad 
outcome on the i r own inadequacies. The general i ty and chronic i ty of 
t he i r depression and loss of self-esteem depend on the g lobal i ty and 
persistence of the character is t ic blamed. 
In f a c t , the depression-prone individual is thought to show a 
"depressive a t t r i bu t iona l s t y l e " , a tendency to a t t r ibu te bad outcomes 
to personal, g loba l , stable fau l ts of character. When persons with 
th is s ty le have unhappy, adverse experiences they become depressed and 
self-esteem shatters (Peterson and Seligman, 1984). 
Some research gives d i rec t support to the reformulated theory. 
Seligman and his colleagues (1979) have devised the At t r ibu t iona l -Sty le 
Questionnaire (ASQ) and, as predicted by the theory, found that 
depressed college students did indeed more often a t t r ibu te fa i l u re to 
personal, g loba l , persistent inadequacies than did non-depressed 
students. 
In add i t ion , Metalsky and his colleagues (1982) have l inked 
a t t r i bu t i ona l s ty le to depressed mood. A study was conducted with 
college students taking a course in abnormal psychology. Early in the 
semester the students completed the ASQ, an adjective checkl ist 
assessment of current mood, and a questionnaire concerning the i r grade 
aspi ra t ions. Eleven days la te r they again completed the adjective 
checkl is t assessing mood. F ina l l y , f i ve days l a te r , a f te r the midterm 
exam grade was returned, the students reported on the i r mood for a 
t h i r d t ime. 
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According to the reformulated helplessness theory, a tendency to 
a t t r i bu te negative events to personal, global and persistent 
inadequacies, as determined by the ASQ, should predict a more depressed 
mood in those students who received a good grade. Students were 
divided in to two groups, one consist ing of those receiving good grades, 
another of those receiving poor grades. "Good" and "poor" depended on 
how the i r actual grades compared to the i r aspirat ions. A poor grade 
was defined as one equal to or less than the grade the student had 
ea r l i e r indicated he or she would be unhappy w i th . A good grade was 
one equal to or greater than that the student had said he or she would 
be pleased w i th . For each group correlat ions were then computed 
between measures from the ASQ and change in depressed mood from before 
to a f te r the midterm exam. Consistent with the theory, correlat ions 
wi th in the good grade group were not s ign i f i can t , for an increase in 
depressed mood required both a par t icu lar a t t r ibu t iona l sty le and a 
negative event. For the poor-grade group two or three measures -
i n t e r n a l i t y and s t a b i l i t y of fau l ts - from the ASQ did predict an 
increase in depression. Students who were prone to a t t r ibu te negative 
events to personal and persistent inadequacies became more depressed 
a f t e r a negative event, a poor grade, as predicted by the theory. 
Also, over the past several years the or ig inal 
learned-helplessness theory and i t s a t t r ibu t iona l reformulation have 
c lear ly been at the fore f ront of psychological research on depression. 
In f a c t , in 1978 an ent i re issue of a major professional publ icat ion, 
the Journal of Abnormal Psychology, was devoted to theoretical and 
experimental studies on depression and learned helplessness. Although 
the theory is promising, some problems do need to be addressed in 
future work. 
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1) Which type of depression is being modelled? In his or ig inal paper 
Seligman attempted to document the s im i l a r i t y between learned 
helplessness and "react ive depression", depression indicated in DSM-II 
to be brought on by stressful l i f e events. But Depue and Monroe (1978) 
have demonstrated that learned helplessness resembles the symptoms of a 
bipolar pat ient in a depressive episode more than i t does those of any 
form of unipolar depression. Clear ly, neither Seligman's dogs nor 
human beings in helplessness studies have exhibited both mania and 
depression. Seligman's (1978) solution to th is problem is to bypass 
the t rad i t i ona l c lass i f i ca t i on schemes and regard learned helplessness 
as a model fo r "helplessness depression". In so doing, he proposes a 
new diagnosis based on presumed et io logy. Only future research w i l l 
t e l l whether his solut ion is more than a c i rcu la r statement. 
2) Can college student populations provide good analogues? Although 
some research on learned helplessness has been done with c l i n i ca l 
populations ( fo r example, Abramson et a l , 1978), many studies have 
exmamined college students who are selected on the basis of scores on 
the Beck Depression Inventory. The inventory was not, however, 
designed to diagnose depression, only to allow an assessment of 
sever i ty in a c l i n i c a l l y diagnosed group. Indeed, accumulating 
evidence indicates that selecting subjects solely on the basis of 
elevated BDI scores does not y ie ld a group of people who can serve as a 
good analogue fo r those with c l i n i c a l depression. Hammen (1980), for 
example, found that high scorers, with a mean of 18.37 were, when 
retested two to three weeks l a t e r , down to an average of only 10.87. 
This t ransient nature of a high BDI score is par t i cu la r ly important 
because i t is common research practice to test potential subjects with 
the BDI and then have them par t ic ipate in a research study several 
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weeks or even months l a te r . Hammen's resu l ts , then, caution us that 
some subjects designated as depressed on the BDI might not in fact be 
depressed by the time the actual study takes place. 
3) Are the f indings speci f ic to depression? This issue is raised by 
the resul ts of a learned-helplessness study that Lavel le, Metalsky and 
Coyne (1979) conducted with subjects c lass i f ied as having high or low 
tes t anxiety. The subjects with high test anxiety performed a task 
poorly a f te r going through a laboratory s i tuat ion inducing 
helplessness. Thus the learned-helplessness phenomenon may not be 
speci f ic to depression. S im i la r l y , highly anxious persons blame thei r 
fa i lu res on themselves, j us t as depressives do (Doris and Sarason, 
1955). 
4) Are a t t r i bu t ions relevant? At issue here is the underlying 
assumption that people act ive ly attempt to explain the i r own behaviour 
to themselves and that the a t t r ibu t ions they make have subsequent 
ef fects on behaviour. Some research indicates that making at t r ibut ions 
is not a universal process. For example, Hanusa and Schulz (1977) 
allowed subjects in a helplessness experiment to make open-ended 
a t t r i bu t ions about the i r successes or f a i l u res . Subjects did not 
spontaneously report them, and even a f te r probing the at t r ibut ions 
given did not f a l l into speci f ic categories. Furthermore, re la t ing 
a t t r i bu t ions to behaviour has been d i f f i c u l t . Indeed, in a series of 
experiments Nisbett and Wilson (1977) showed that people are frequently 
unaware of the causes of the i r behaviour. 
S im i la r l y , the a t t r i bu t i on l i t e ra tu re makes the basic assumption 
that people care what the causes of the i r behaviour are. This central 
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idea is the bra inchi ld of psychologists whose business i t is to explain 
behaviour. I t may be that psychologists have projected the i r own need 
to explain behaviour onto other people! Laypeople may simply not 
r e f l e c t on why they act and feel as they do to the same extent that 
psychologists do. 
In add i t ion , even i f we allow that a t t r ibu t ions are relevant and 
powerful determinants of behaviour, we should note that many findings 
supporting the learned-helplessness theory have been gathered by giving 
indiv iduals the ASQ or by determining how they a t t r ibu te 
laboratory-induced successes or f a i l u res . When depressives were asked 
about the f i ve most stressful events of the i r l i v e s , however, the i r 
a t t r i bu t ions did not d i f f e r from those given by normal subjects (Hammen 
and Cochran, 1981). 
5) Some research has provided clear refutat ions of some aspects of 
the theory. In a series of studies. Al loy and Abramson (1979) examined 
one of i t s central po in ts , that depressed people perceive themselves as 
having l i t t l e control over the i r l i ves . Subjects were placed in 
various experimental s i tuat ions manipulated by the experimenter to give 
set percentages of contingency between the i r responses and an outcome. 
Af ter subjects had experienced some actual percentage or level of 
con t ro l , they were asked how much control they believed that they had 
had. Contrary to the theory, depressed students did not underestimate 
the i r degree of con t ro l . Using a classic experimental s i tuat ion to 
induce helplessness in subjects, Ford and Neale (1985) found that they 
did not underestimate the i r control on the subsequent task. 
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One key assumption of the revised learned-helplessness theory is 
that the depressive a t t r ibu t iona l sty le is a persistent part of the 
make up of depressed people. Using a battery of measures, including 
the ASQ, Hamilton and Abramson (1983) tested carefu l ly diagnosed 
depressives on two occasions, f i r s t while they were in the midst of an 
episode of depression, and second jus t before they were discharged from 
the hosp i ta l . Results from the f i r s t assessment revealed the expected 
depressive pattern on the ASQ. But the information gathered jus t 
before the patients were discharged indicated that the pattern was no 
longer present (Davison and Neale; 1986) 
On the other hand, summarizing Seligman's helplessness model, when 
human beings (and animals) are exposed to uncontrollable events, they 
exh ib i t four sets of de f i c i t s ; (1) mot ivat ional , which consists of 
retarded i n i t i a t i o n of voluntary responses ( i . e . people give up 
t r y i n g ) ; (2) cogni t ive , which involves d i f f i c u l t y in learning new 
response-outcome contingencies ( i . e . people have trouble learning that 
new outcomes are con t ro l l ab le ) ; (3) emotional, par t i cu la r ly depressed 
e f f e c t ; and (4) lowered self-esteem (Mi l le r and Seligman 1982). The 
learned-helplessness model has been proposed to account for th is 
symptomatology. As o r i g i na l l y s tated, the model's major premise for 
helplessness was that exposure to (and perception of) present 
uncon t ro l l ab i l i t y (usual ly) produced the expectation of future 
uncon t ro l l ab i l i t y . This expectation, in tu rn , produced the 
helplessness d e f i c i t s . In other words, people who perceive themselves 
to be in a helpless (uncontrol lable) s i tuat ion come to expect to be 
helpless in the fu tu re . As a resu l t of th is expectation, they show 
mot ivat iona l , cogni t ive , emotional and self-esteem de f i c i t s (Mi l ler & 
Seligman, 1982). 
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This model has also been extended to account for the large subset 
of depressions which are characterized by para l le l symptomatology. In 
the case of such "helplessness" depressions, individuals were thought 
to have a generalized expectation of uncon t ro l lab i l i t y which, in tu rn , 
was responsible fo r the occurrence of generalized depressive d e f i c i t s . 
Add i t iona l l y , a revised version of the model has recently been 
proposed, in order more adequately to accommodate the burgeoning 
f indings of recent research with helpless and depressed indiv iduals. 
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). The reformulated model is more 
consistent with the avai lable evidence than the or ig inal theory, and i t 
stresses the role of a t t r i bu t iona l states and a t t r ibu t iona l styles in 
helplessness and depression, respect ively, as modulators of the 
expectation of future uncon t ro l l ab i l i t y , that i s , the way in which a 
person construes the cause of his present helplessness determines when 
and where he w i l l expect to be helpless in the future (Mi l ler & 
Seligman, 1982). 
Furthermore, coming back to the statement of the reformulated 
helplessness model, the major new premise of th is model for explaining 
helplessness is that i t posits an a t t r ibu t iona l state which intervenes 
between the perception of uncon t ro l lab i l i t y and i t s extrapolation to 
the future as an expectation of future uncon t ro l l ab i l i t y . The major 
new premise of the model fo r explaining depression is that i t 
postulates an insidious a t t r ibu t iona l sty le that f i l t e r s fa i l u re in 
such a way as to produce the four de f i c i t s broadly, long las t i ng l y , and 
directed toward se l f (M i l le r & Seligman 1982). 
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Here is a b r ie f statement of the a t t r ibu t iona l premise of the 
reformulated view of helplessness. When individuals perceive that they 
are in a helpless ( f a i l u re ) s i t ua t i on , they ask themselves why they 
cannot do anything. The nature of the cause they assign determines in 
what new si tuat ions and across what span of time the expectation of 
fu ture helplessness w i l l be l i k e l y to occur. A person considered three 
relevant a t t r i bu t iona l dimensions : (1) S tab i l i t y : he or she may 
decide that the cause of f a i l u re is due to stable fac tors , such as low 
IQ, which w i l l pers ist in to the fu tu re , or that the cause of fa i l u re is 
due to unstable and transient fac tors , such as being sleep-deprived, 
which w i l l not recur. An a t t r i bu t i on to stable factors produces 
chronic d e f i c i t s , whereas an a t t r i bu t i on to unstable factors produces 
t ransient d e f i c i t s ; (2) g loba l i t y : he or she may a t t r ibu te fa i l u re to 
global factors (" I 'm incompetent at everything") which w i l l produce 
f a i l u r e in a wide var ie ty of circumstances, or f a i l u re may be 
a t t r ibu ted to speci f ic factors ( I 'm incompetent at flower-arranging) 
which w i l l produce f a i l u r e only in s imi lar circumstances. An 
a t t r i bu t i on to global factors produces de f i c i t s across d i f fe ren t 
s i tua t ions , whereas an a t t r i bu t i on to speci f ic factors produces 
d e f i c i t s in the or ig ina l s i tuat ions alone. And f i n a l l y , (3) 
i n t e r n a l i t y : an a t t r i bu t i on to internal factors ( " I t ' s due to 
something about me") produces self-esteem loss, whereas an a t t r ibu t ion 
to external factors ( " I t ' s due to something about the world") does 
not. Conversely, in contro l lable (success) s i tua t ions , making a 
spec i f i c , unstable and external a t t r i bu t i on for success f a c i l i t a t e s 
general ized, chronic and self-esteem de f i c i t s (Mi l le r & Seligman, 
1982). 
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Now, we should mention some very interest ing and recent work about 
cued recal l in depression by Watts and Sharrock (1987). They report an 
experiment in which a depressed and a control group were tested on free 
r e c a l l , cued recal l and recognit ion memory for a prose passage. As 
expected from previous work the depressives tended to show less 
impairment on recognit ion than on free r e c a l l . However, contrary to 
what some theories would pred ic t , cued recal l performance was no better 
than free r e c a l l . The implications of th is f inding for the nature of 
the depressive memory d e f i c i t for neutral materials are discussed. I t 
seems that neither the amount of verbal output required, nor the need 
to generate re t r ieva l cues, are c r i t i c a l fac tors . 
Coming to d e t a i l s , i t is known that depressed patients show 
impaired memory performance in tests involving neutral material 
(McAl l is ter , 1981). The extent of the impairment depends on the type 
of memory task, with more impairment in free recal l than recognition 
tests (e .g . Calev and Erwin, 1985). 
Watts and Sharrok's study was designed to advance our 
understanding of why th is d i f f e r e n t i a l d e f i c i t should arise by the 
simple device of adding a tes t of cued recal l to tests of free recal l 
and recogni t ion. Understanding the d e f i c i t , then, may eventually be 
relevant to advising patients how to make the best pract ical use of 
t he i r impaired memory funct ion. 
Weingartner and Silberman (1982) have put forward the general view 
that cognit ive impairment in depression occurs " in those situat ions or 
tasks that require e f f o r t , pa r t i cu la r l y sustained e f f o r t " and they c i te 
more severe impairment on free recal l than on recognition as an 
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i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s . On th is view the degree of impairment found with 
a cued recal l task would depend on the level of e f f o r t i t required. I f 
e f f o r t is the crucia l fac to r , then a low-ef for t cued recal l task 
should show only s l i gh t impairment comparable to that of recognition 
rather than of free r e c a l l . I t should also be noted that a paral le l 
view has been advanced that the extent of the depressive memory d e f i c i t 
depends on the level of e f f o r t required at encoding (E l l i s et a l , 
1984), but th is is not addressed by Watts and Sharrock's experiment. 
The inclusion of a cued recal l condit ion also bears on a 
hypothesis re la t ing to re t r ieva l cues. I t is widely assumed that in 
free reca l l subjects generate the i r own re t r ieva l cues. I f depressed 
patients have d i f f i c u l t y in doing t h i s , or generate re la t i ve ly 
unhelpful ones, then the i r memory impairment should be reduced in a 
cued recal l task. I f , a l t e rna t i ve l y , the main problem is in using cues 
to re t r ieve mater ia l , there would be l i t t l e advantage of cued over free 
reca l l (Watts & Sharrock, 1987). 
The subjects were: (a) 21 depressed patients (mostly hospitalized= 
c lass i f i ed as depressed by the Levine-Pilowsky questionnaire (Pilowsky 
and Boulton, 1970). Most were on anti-depressant medication (b) 21 
controls selected to have an exactly comparable mean score on the 
synonynjs section of the M i l l H i l l vocabulary t es t . 
About procedure, memory for prose was selected for study because 
of i t s s i m i l a r i t y to everyday memory tasks. Subjects were played a 
recording of a passage. Immediately afterwards they were asked to 
reca l l as much as they could. Cued recal l was then tested by 14 
questions which could be answered in a single word or short phrase. 
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This form of cued recal l was selected because i t minimises the verbal 
output demanded of subjects. F ina l l y , subjects were given a 20 item 
forced-choice recognit ion t es t , the statements in each pair d i f f e r i ng 
s l i g h t l y in wording or grammatical construct ion. Each subject 
completed a l l three memory tes ts . Provided th is is done with free 
reca l l f i r s t and recognit ion l a s t , the ef fects of one test on 
subsequent ones can be assumed to be smal l , though i t cannot be 
dismissed (Watts & Sharrock, 1987). 
The conclusion suggested by th is experiment and i t s results is 
thus that i t is r e l a t i ve l y unimportant to the depressive memory 
d e f i c i t (a) how much verbal output is required at r e t r i e v a l , and (b) 
whether subjects need to generate the i r own re t r ieva l cues or are 
provided with them. From a c l i n i c a l point of view i t is disappointing 
that the provision of cues does not appear to a l lev ia te the memory 
d e f i c i t of depressed patients (Watts & Sharrock, 1987). 
Watts and Cooper's invest igat ion of depressed pat ients ' memory for 
stor ies indicated that while normal subjects showed par t icu lar ly good 
reca l l fo r units central to the structure of the s tory , th is did not 
hold for depressed pat ients. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that depressed patients do not use structure to organize stor ies when 
encoding them. However, th is interact ion is not found for a l l uni t 
variables related to memory; imag ib i l i t y does not show a simi lar 
in teract ion with depression. In general, a f a i l u re to ident i f y central 
aspects of material and se lect ive ly recal l them is l i k e l y to be a 
handicap to everyday funct ioning (Watts & Cooper, 1987). 
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Coming to d e t a i l s , as we have discussed before, i t is well 
established that depressed patients show a d e f i c i t in memory 
performance fo r neutral material (McAl l is ter , 1981). Various l ines of 
evidence converge to support th is conclusion : comparisons of the 
performance of depressed patients in "depressed" and "recovered" 
s ta tes; comparisons of depressed patients with matched controls; and 
corre lat ions of memory performance with severi ty of depression within a 
pat ient group. 
In add i t ion , the induction of depressed mood in normal subjects 
leads to impaired memory performance (e .g . E l l i s et a l , 1980). I t is 
also clear that the memory d e f i c i t is not based on a mere lack of 
confidence or wi l l ingness to respond (Watts and Sharrock, 1987; Watts 
et a l , in press). I t is therefore of in terest to investigate the exact 
nature of the memory d e f i c i t in depression. 
There is re l i ab le evidence based on experiments using word l i s t s 
that depressed patients show less c luster ing at recal l than controls 
(Koh et a l , 1973, Russell and Beekhuis, 1976, Weingartner et a l , 1981, 
Calev and Erwin, 1985). This suggests that depressed patients encode 
words in clusters less than do contro ls . 
The related hypothesis of Watts and Cooper's research is that 
depressed patients impose less structure than do controls on a passage 
of prose. S im i la r l y , research on recal l of stor ies has shown that 
dif ferences in the extent to which individual units are recal led can be 
predicted from the i r place in the overal l structure of the story 
(Mandler, 1984). So, normal subjects show a bias towards recal l of 
uni ts that are central to the structure of a story. Obviously, th is 
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bias depends on subjects being able to encode the story in a way that 
i den t i f i es which units are central to i t s s t ructure. I f depressed 
patients are def ic ien t in th is a b i l i t y , they would be expected to show 
less bias than normals towards select ive recal l of control un i ts . 
Then, a general f a i l u re in depressed patients to iden t i f y and 
se lec t ive ly reca l l the important parts of material they are exposed to 
could have potent ia l l y serious consequences for everyday functioning 
(Watts & Cooper, 1987). 
"These predict ions contrast with the f ixed order hypothesis 
proposed by Rubin (1985), that the probabi l i ty of recal l of the units 
of a passage of prose is invar iant , regardless of both subject 
population and procedural variables such as retention period. Rubin 
would therefore expect which units are recal led by depressed patients 
to be predictable from how well individual units are recalled by 
normals. I f the hypothesis of Watts & Cooper's research is confirmed 
( that depressed patients do not show the normal bias towards recal l of 
uni ts central to the structure and g i s t of a story) i t would const i tute 
a challenge to the f ixed order hypothesis." (Watts & Cooper, 1987) 
The subjects in Watts and Cooper's experiment were (a) 21 patients 
(mostly hosp i ta l i zed) , c lass i f i ed as depressed on the basis of the i r 
responses to the Levine-Pilowsky questionnaire, (b) 40 contro ls , 21 of 
whom were selected to have an equal mean score (18.4) on the synonyms 
section of the. M i l l H i l l vocabulary tes t (Watts & Cooper, 1987). 
About procedure, subjects were played a recording of a passage and 
immediately afterwards they were asked to recal l as much as they could 
(Watts & Cooper, 1987). 
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The resul ts reported in Watts and Cooper's experiment indicate 
that "depressed patients are less l i k e l y than normals to show a bias 
towards reca l l ing units that were central to the structure of the 
s tory . Furthermore, th is is not dependent on any par t icu lar method of 
iden t i f y ing c e n t r a l i t y , as i t emerged equally c lear ly whether the 
analyses were based on story grammar levels or on subjective ratings of 
the g is t of the story" (Watts & Cooper, 1987) 
Also, the hypothesis that the memory performance of depressed 
patients shows a deficiency in the st ructur ing of material is not novel 
and has already been moderately well established on word- l is t data, at 
least i f c luster ing at recal l is taken as an index of structur ing at 
the encoding stage. Watts & Cooper's data indicate that "the 
s t ruc tur ing deficiency is not confined to word l i s t s , but is also 
demonstrable with prose. This suggests that the problem may be 
s u f f i c i e n t l y general to be of pract ical signif icance for the everyday 
funct ioning of depressed pat ients" (Watts & Cooper, 1987) 
F ina l l y , according to Watts & Cooper's view "understanding the 
nature of the encoding problem that is implicated in the memory d e f i c i t 
of depressed patients is relevant to developing remedial strategies. 
Simply looking at the overal l recal l levels of depressives may 
underestimate the problems caused in everyday functioning by the i r not 
being biased towards the recal l of important un i t s . " The results of 
Watts and Cooper's study suggest that " i t may be of par t icu lar value to 
depressed patients to develop strategies that help them to ident i f y and 
se lect ive ly reca l l the important units of a passage." (Watts & Cooper, 
1987). 
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Hence, i t has been suggested that the poor performance of 
depressed patients on tests of memory re f lec ts cautious response 
c r i t e r i a other than reduced access ib i l i t y of memories. Studies of 
recognit ion memory enable th is issue to be addressed. An experiment of 
Watts et al provides the f i r s t clear demonstration of a d e f i c i t in 
recognit ion memory in depression that is not explicable in terms of 
response bias. A subsidiary concern of th is experiment was to examine 
the e f fec t of requir ing subjects to vocalize words on presentation. 
This had no s ign i f i can t ef fects on " h i t s " , but interacted with 
depression on " fa lse alarms", suggesting that discrepant claims in the 
l i t e ra tu re regarding the ef fects of depression on false alarms may be 
a t t r ibu tab le to procedural var ia t ions. As we have discussed before, 
there is previous research indicat ing that depressed patients have poor 
memory for neutral material (see McAl l is ter , 1981). However, i t is 
possible that th is apparent memory d e f i c i t can be accounted for by 
conservative response biases, i . e . depressed people underperform, not 
because memories are less accessible, but because they lack confidence 
in them (Watts et a l , 1987). 
One experimental method that is relevant to exploring th is 
question is a forced recal l t es t . Using t h i s , Leight and E l l i s (1981) 
were able to demonstrate a decrement in recal l in normal subjects who 
had been given a depressive mood induction procedure, and exclude an 
explanation in terms of wi l l ingness to respond. Another approach is to 
study recognit ion memory and examine whether a reduced level of h i ts in 
depression is para l le l led by a reduced level of false alarms. The 
f i r s t problem that arises wi th such studies is that recognition memory 
is less sensi t ive to the ef fects of depression than free r e c a l l , even 
where the reca l l and recognit ion tasks are matched on for general 
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d i f f i c u l t y (Calev and Erwin, 1985). On the other hand, fa i lures to 
f i nd a s ign i f i can t e f fec t of depression on ' h i t s ' in recognition memory 
(e .g . Davis and Unruh, 1980; Cole and Z a r i t , 1984) may therefore be due 
to the l imi ted sens i t i v i t y of recognit ion measures. 
However, several studies have found a s ign i f i cant e f fec t of 
depression on h i t s (Mi l le r and Lewis, 1977; Silberman et a l . , 1983; 
Dunbar and Lishman, 1984). The c r i t i c a l question is then whether or 
not the lower level of h i t s in depression is para l le l led by a lower 
level of fa lse alarms, and is th is interpretable in terms of a 
conservative response strategy. Silberman et al (1983) reported that 
fa lse alarms were not affected by depression, whereas Mi l le r and Lewis 
(1977) and Dunbar and Lishman (1984) found that both h i ts and false 
alarms-were s im i l a r l y reduced. Also, when a signal detection analysis 
was appl ied. M i l l e r and Lewis (1977) and Dunbar and Lishman (1984) both 
found an e f fec t of depression on B but not on d ' . Silberman did not 
carry out a signal detection analysis. 
Unfortunately, these studies have methodological features that 
render them inconclusive. In none of them were the groups matched on 
in te l l i gence , which is important in such c l i n i ca l studies. 
There are also issues about the sens i t i v i t y of the experiments. 
These various issues leave the question of whether depression affects 
d' in recognit ion memory in depression is therefore required (Watts et 
a l , 1987). 
So, "two addit ional variables were incorporated" in Watts et a l ' s 
experiment : 1) The presentation of three successive l i s t s were 
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presented to each subject. This is par t ly because i t is known from the 
work of Leight and E l l i s (1981) that the memory d e f i c i t of depressed 
subjects may increase over successive recal l t r i a l s . 2) Vocalization. 
This is known to improve free recal l (e .g . Murray, 1965) though l i t t l e 
seems to be known about i t s ef fects on recognit ion. I t seems possible 
that some depressives might f a i l to encode even basic structural 
features of words presented v i sua l l y , as has been suggested in 
connection with Alzheimer patients (Wilson et a l . , 1983). 
The general hypothesis of Watts et a l ' s experiment was that " i f 
depressives show a d e f i c i t in d' in both vocalization and non 
vocal izat ion condi t ions, an explanation in terms of a gross lack of 
encoding would be rendered less p laus ib le . " 
The subjects in Watts et a l ' s experiment were (a) 36 patients 
c lass i f i ed on the basis of the i r responses to the Levine-Pilowsky 
depression questionnaire (Pilowsky and Boulton, 1970). 75% were 
c lass i f i ed by the questionnaire as having endogenous depression, (b) 
24 controls matched on age, sex, and (as far as possible) educational 
l e v e l . 
The materials were "three l i s t s of 20 words constructed for 
learn ing, together with three addit ional l i s t s of 20 f i l l e r words for 
the recognit ion t es t s . " A l l six l i s t s were matched for concreteness, 
frequency and word length. 
About the procedure, "ha l f of the patient group and hal f of the 
control group were randomly al located to the 'voca l izat ion ' condit ion, 
the remainder to the ' s i l e n t ' condi t ion. " "Subjects in the 
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vocal izat ion group were asked to say each word aloud as i t was 
presented; the other subjects read them s i l e n t l y . A l l subjects were 
to ld that i t was a memory tes t and asked to t r y to remember the words." 
Then, a f te r a 4 minute interval subjects were shown "a series of 40 
words on cards, ( including 20 ' f i l l e r ' words) and asked to say 'Yes' or 
'No' to each word to indicate whether or not they had jus t been shown 
i t . They were to ld to guess i f they were not sure." 
"The resul ts provide evidence of a strong and s ign i f i cant e f fect 
of depression on recognit ion memory, in that the depressed subjects 
produced fewer h i t s . This cannot be a t t r ibu ted to more cautious 
response c r i t e r i a , as depression also has a strong and s ign i f icant 
e f fec t on d ' , with the depressed subjects having lower d ^ . I t is 
pa r t i cu la r l y clear in the vocal izat ion groups that the ef fect of 
depression in reducing h i ts is not due to cautious response c r i t e r i a 
because the depressed subjects give more false alarms in th is 
condi t ion. There was also, no s ign i f i can t support for the 
supplementary hypothesis that vocal izat ion would help to bring 
depressives up to the performance standards of normals. However, the 
fac t that depressives were impaired in the vocal izat ion condition 
establishes that the apparent memory impairment cannot be at t r ibuted to 
a simple f a i l u r e to read the words." 
Besides, "the present experiment, by demonstrating opposite 
e f fects of depression on false alarms wi th in the same experiment 
depending on condi t ion, indicates that procedural variables determine 
the d i rec t ion of the e f f e c t . " On the other hand, generalizing from 
other works' resul ts ( i . e . Dunbar and Lishman (1984), M i l le r and Lewis 
(1977) and Zuroff et al (1983), "one might suggest that depressives 
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show more false alarms than controls where procedures are used that 
require addit ional processing, but that in other conditions they show 
fewer fa lse alarms". In general, "the conclusion is that the lower h i t 
rate obtained by depressives in recognition memory is not always 
expl icable in terms of response c r i t e r i a . In th is experiment, the 
e f fec t of depression was on d ' " . (Watts et a l , 1987). 
Furthermore, Watts et a l , - in another of Watts' a r t i c les -
propose "a remedial strategy for memory and concentration problems in 
depressed pat ien ts . " In par t icu lar Watts et al have seen that 
"depressed patients complain of problems of memory and concentration, 
and i t would be helpful to have a procedure capable to a l lev ia t ing 
these problems that could be used in the course of cognit ive therapy". 
According to th is point of view "the short term effects of an imagery 
formation technique were compared with br ie f relaxation on a range of 
subjective and object ive measures. I t was found from the results that 
"imagery formation substant ia l ly improved objective memory for a 
passage of prose, especial ly in non-endogenous depressives, though i t 
had no comparable ef fects on subjective measures." 
In d e t a i l s , the whole thing star ts from Watts et a l ' s statement 
that "among the cognit ive symptoms of depression described by Beck et 
al (1979) are d i f f i c u l t i e s in concentration and memory." For example, 
in a recent study of a series of patients with re la t i ve l y severe 
c l i n i c a l depression. Watts and Sharrock (1985) found that 65% or more 
reported that the i r concentration was ei ther 'af fected a l o t ' or 
' impossible' fo r each of (a) watching te lev is ion , (b) reading, and (c) 
working/doing household jobs. 
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Add i t iona l l y , "many c l in ic ians assume, and probably correct ly that 
the memory problems of which depressed patients often complain of are 
secondary to t he i r concentration problems." Also, " i t is d i f f i c u l t to 
disentangle what ef fects d i f f i c u l t i e s in concentration and memory have 
on other aspects of depression, though c l i n i ca l observations suggest 
that they contr ibute to the maintainance of a negative mood s ta te . " 
And th is is par t ly because "many patients f ind the i r concentration 
problems intensely f rus t ra t i ng and th is contributes to a general state 
of being annoyed with themselves." So, Watts et al think that " i t is 
reasonable to suggest that there is a feedback loop involving mood and 
concentration, comparable to that which obtains for mood and negative 
thoughts (Teasdale, 1983), in which mood has an adverse ef fect on 
concentration and concentration has an adverse e f fec t on mood. I f so, 
there would be a good rat ionale for including measures designed to 
improve concentration as part of cognit ive therapy for depression." 
In add i t ion , "the distress caused is heightened by the fact that a 
substantial minor i ty of patients do not recognize that the i r 
concentration problems are a symptom of depression" (Watts, MacLeod and 
Trezise, 1987). In support of th is - in the Watts and Sharrock series 
- 35% said they did not expect that the i r concentration would return to 
normal when they get over the i r depression. As Beck et al (1979) point 
out , i t is important fo r cognit ive therapists to seek to correct these 
misa t t r ibu t ions . In addit ion to ef fects on mood s ta te , concentration 
problems probably play an important ro le in prolonging pat ients' 
funct ional incapacity. For example, severe d i f f i c u l t i e s in 
concentrating on job instruct ions can prolong absence from employment 
due to depression. I t is also suggested by Watts et al that "sometimes 
patients become unable to engage in a var iety of a c t i v i t i e s that are 
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po ten t ia l l y pleasurable, which would in turn be expected to contribute 
to the maintainance of a negative mood s ta te . " For these various 
reasons, in accordance with Watts et a l ' s opinion, i t is appropriate to 
include techniques aimed at concentration problems such as the 
structured concentration assignments suggested by Beck et al (1979) 
among the family of cognit ive therapy techniques (Watts et al 1987). 
This is par t ly because "the character is t ic description that depressed 
patients give of the i r d i f f i c u l t i e s in reading is that they can' t 'take 
i n ' what they are reading, with the resul t that when they get to the 
bottom of a page they have no idea what they have jus t been reading 
about. This seems to be a phenomenological account of poor semantic 
processing. The re la t i ve lack of semantic c luster ing in the free 
reca l l of depressed patients (e .g . Weingartner et a l , 1981) and the i r 
f a i l u r e to se lect ive ly recal l the units of a prose passage that are 
central to i t s semantic structure (Watts and Cooper, 1987) are also 
consistent with the hypothesis that the i r semantic processing is poor. 
However, according to Watts et a l , "the appl icat ion of processing 
strategies to help depressed patients concentrate d i f f e rs at several 
points from the i r standard laboratory app l ica t ion. " This is mainly 
because most laboratory research has been done on word l i s t s , though 
there is evidence of the i r app l i cab i l i t y to prose (e.g. Shal ler t , 
1976). I t is also possible that the concentration problems of 
depressed patients w i l l make them unable to derive as much benefi t from 
processing strategies as non-depressed subjects, though the relevant 
data on th i s point is inconclusive (Weingartner et a l , 1981, E l l i s et 
a l , 1984). In add i t ion , most laboratory research has examined the 
ef fects of processing strategies on incidental recal l rather than 
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intent ional learning. F ina l l y , there have been no studies of 
processing strategies that have included se l f - repor t measures of 
concentration as well as objective memory measures. I t is therefore 
not known what subjective benefits they have (Watts, MacLeod & Trezise, 
1987). 
The processing strategy, in Watts et a l ' s experiment focused "on 
the formation of visual imagery while l i s ten ing to prose being read 
aloud." Furthermore, "there is a substantial experimental l i t e ra tu re 
on the ef fects of imagery instruct ions on memory, including work on i t s 
ef fects on memory for prose in adults (see Alesandrini , 1982) though 
there is not yet agreement on whether these ef fects can be adequately 
accounted for in terms of depth of processing." I t is also important 
to note about imagery formation, that i t can be applied by patients in 
a "wide range of s i tua t ions . For example, a depressed patient who was 
unable to return to work because of his i n a b i l i t y to concentrate on job 
instruct ions reported that he was able to learn to imagine job 
operations while he was being given ins t ruc t ions, and that th is 
produced a marked improvement in his concentration on them". (Watts et 
a l , 1987). 
Besides, attempts to use imagery strategies to improve the memory 
performance of neurological patients (see Powell, 1981) and the elderly 
(Kausler, 1982) have met with some success. Par t icu lar ly relevant is 
the study of Edmunson and Nelson (1976) showing that imagery improved 
the reca l l performance of high anxious subjects more than low anxious 
subjects, and indeed eliminated the performance decrement associated 
with anxiety. In spi te of that "there have so far been no attempts to 
use imagery strategies in depressed pat ients. The main challenge in 
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using imagery strategies with depressives seems l i ke l y to l i e in 
get t ing them to use the s t ra teg ies . " In the i r experiment. Watts et al 
"ant ic ipated that instruct ions alone would not be su f f i c ien t and that 
guided practice would be necessary." (Watts et a l , 1987) 
Turning to another aspect work on the control of negative thoughts 
by d is t rac t ion suggests that endogenous patients show less benefit 
(Teasdale and Rezin, 1978; Fennell and Teasdale, 1984; Fennel, 1985). 
By analogy, the same might be expected to be true of the imagery 
intervent ion under invest igat ion in Watts et a l ' s experiment. In 
support of t h i s "a fur ther indicat ion that the imagery technique might 
be less helpful in endogenous depressives is that there is a trend for 
the normal re lat ionship between imag ib i l i t y and recal l to hold less 
strongly in endogenous than in non-endogenous depressives " (Watts, 
1986). In add i t ion , a questionnaire measure of visual imagery was 
included in Watts et a l ' s experiment to test the hypothesis that 
v isual isers would benef i t most from the imagery procedure. 
Coming to the method of Watts et a l ' s experiment, subjects were 36 
pat ients who had depression as the i r primary c l i n i c a l diagnosis. The 
patients were administered the Levine-Pilowsky depression questionnaire 
(Pilowsky and Boulton, 1970). 
The materials were prose passages constructed in th is way "to be 
maximally sensi t ive to the imagery procedure." They thus dealt with 
concrete material capable of being imagined and needed a processing 
e f f o r t to be encoded. 
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In accordance with Watts et a l ' s opinion, the results of the i r 
experiment provide clear support for the ef fects of imagery formation 
on the memory performance of depressed pat ients. I t might be doubted 
whether patients could be trained b r i e f l y and e f fec t i ve ly in an 
e f f o r t f u l strategy such as imagery formation, but the posi t ive results 
obtained imply that th is was achieved. The ef fects were also 
s u f f i c i e n t l y substantial to be of c l i n i ca l in te res t . In the to ta l 
group, imagery resulted in an improvement of memory performance by 
about 30% in one of the experimental condit ions, and in the sub-group 
of non-endogenous depressives memory scores increased by 70%. Further 
c l i n i c a l work w i l l be needed to explore the range of materials and 
contexts in which patients can benefi t from imagery strategies. Watts 
et a l ' s experiment resul ts provide the experimental evidence to j u s t i f y 
exploring the i r c l i n i c a l appl icat ion. 
Watts et al commenting on the resul ts wrote that " i t was 
disappointing that imagery had no clear e f fec t on ei ther se l f - repor t 
measure (though there was a trend for i t to reduce lapses of 
concentration in subjects with less state anx ie ty ) . " Also, "previous 
work on the ef fects of d is t rac t ion had suggested that reactive 
depressives might respond to the interventions better than endogenous 
depressives, and th is was confirmed for the imagery in tervent ion." In 
addi t ion "at the present time i t is unclear whether endogenous 
depressives are less able to form imagery, or whether the i r imagery is 
equally v i v i d but fo r some other reason f a i l s to f a c i l i t a t e recal l in 
the usual way" but Watts et al conclude that "the evidence available so 
far is su f f i c i en t to j u s t i f y recommending that endogeneity be included 
as a moderator variable in studies of cognit ive interventions in 
depression" (Watts et a l , 1987). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Introduction to the Experiments 
The aim of th is thesis is obviously to investigate the cognitive 
organisation of anxious, depressed and agoraphobic patients (the 
patients used in the f i r s t experiment were anxious, depressed and 
agoraphobic whereas the patients used in the second experiment were 
overal l more anxious than depressed - see also Appendices D and T ) . 
The cognit ive organisation of par t icu lar in terest in th is thesis is the 
organisation of information concerning the se l f , or the self-schema. 
The self-schema is described as an organised body of knowledge 
containing information about the se l f which is also capable of 
organising new incoming information about the se l f into the exist ing 
schema. So the self-schema can be seen as a cognit ive mechanism for 
both stor ing and processing information which is relevant to the se l f . 
The schema i t s e l f can be seen as consisting of a number of t r a i t s 
organised in a hierarchial fashion (Rogers 1977) where the hierarchy 
consists of the most extreme t r a i t s , i . e . those that are individual 
"scores highest" on, followed by the next most extreme, then the next 
most extreme and so on un t i l a l l meaningful t r a i t s are exhausted. 
(This is comparable to Kel ly 's (1955) theory of personal constructs, 
where the constructs are roughly equivalent to t r a i t s ) . 
From th is i t is assumed that certain types of personal information 
are more easi ly integrated in to the schema than others, and some types 
may not be integrated at a l l . For example, i f a person rates 
themselves high on ' f r i end l iness ' ie they see themselves as very 
f r iend ly and th is is an extreme t r a i t in the i r hierarchy of t r a i t s , 
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information they gain from social in teract ion which t e l l s them they are 
f r i end ly w i l l be easi ly integrated in to the i r exist ing schema. 
However, should they ever behave in an unfr iendly manner then th is 
information w i l l not be integrated into the schema and i f the i r schema 
is to remain stable they must a t t r ibu te the i r unfr iendly behaviour to 
external or s i tuat iona l fac tors . But i t is also possible that a person 
might not have ' f r i end l iness ' wi th in the i r schema so such information 
would be l i k e l y to be ignored and not integrated. A further 
poss i b i l i t y is the biasing e f fec t of the schema. Social interact ion is 
often ambiguous, so i t is l i k e l y that an ind iv idua l 's se l f schema could 
have a biasing e f fec t on an ind iv idua l 's social perception in such a 
way that po ten t ia l l y schema-contradictory personal information could be 
simply ignored or perceived in a way which was not contradictory to the 
ex is t ing schema. 
This biasing e f fec t was proposed by Beck (1976). He said that a 
depressive's self-schema contained a number of depressed-content or 
negative t r a i t s which were dominant in the person's idea of themselves. 
In order to maintain th is dominance consistent ly , a biasing ef fect was 
necessary. As a r esu l t , a depressed ind iv idua l 's social perception was 
al tered so that they ignored any posi t ive feedback they might get from 
social in teract ion concerning themselves. But social interact ion is 
not the only source of personal knowledge or information; ac t i v i t i es 
carr ied out alone e.g. at work or in the home can also indicate such 
qua l i t i es as competence and the a b i l i t y to enjoy an a c t i v i t y . 
According to Beck, such s i tuat ions are also subject to the biasing 
ef fects of the depressive's schema. S imi la r l y , biased memories are 
shown by depressives - they tend to remember only negative or unhappy 
experiences. 
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In general, according to the cognit ive view, the ind iv idual 's low 
self-esteem and negative, d is tor ted thinking is the basic psychological 
problem in the depression syndrome. In par t i cu la r . Beck and Rush 
(1978) invoked the concept of "schema" to explain th is low self-esteem 
in depressives. Schemata were defined as stable cognit ive patterns, of 
response to s imi lar types of events. Thus, where a depressive might 
consistent ly make a negative self-reference fol lowing the negative 
evaluation of behaviour. Beck and his associates have reasoned that a 
stable schema is used to negatively bias such evaluations and 
sel f - references. Such negative b ias, or cognit ive d is tor t ion has 
consistency of v i r tue of i t s guiding schema; the resul t is a 
consistent set of negative sel f - references. 
This theory led on to Kuipers and Rogers (1979) f inding a 
consistent pattern fo r applicable se l f - re ferent words to be better 
recal led than non-applicable words. Although the c l i n i ca l depressive's 
se l f descript ions included equal proportions of non-depressed and 
depressed content, the i r incidental recal l patterns revealed a clear 
depressed content bias fo r a se l f reference task. Derry and Kuiper 
(1981) repl icated th is f ind ing and made two fur ther observations which 
provided fur ther support fo r Beck's proposal that an e f f i c i e n t negative 
self-schema ex i s t s , speci f ic to the disorder of depression: i ) 
depressives recal led more se l f - ra ted adjectives than did controls, i i ) 
depressives recal led depressive se l f - ra ted adjectives while controls 
recal led neutral se l f - ra ted adject ives. 
Evidence fo r enhanced memory for depressive items can also work 
alongside suppression of recal l for posi t ive items. Breslow, Kocsis 
and Bel kin (1981) conducted an experiment where subjects had to recal l 
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as much of a story that was to ld to them as possible. The results 
showed that the depressed pat ient 's memory was worse than that of 
controls but most of th is was ascribed to a decrement in the recal l of 
posi t ive themes in the story. Depressive patients may omit to mention 
posi t ive elements despite good memory for them, because of the i r frame 
of mind and i t s preoccupation with negat iv i ty has diminished the 
importance of these issues to the point that they are not considered 
s ign i f i can t enough to mention. 
Furthermore, Clark and Teasdale (1982) found that depressed 
patients were more l i k e l y to remember unhappy past experiences than 
happy ones. This can be explained in terms of the self-schema bias 
because unhappy past experiences are l i k e l y to be those where the 
indiv idual was behaving in a depressed manner ie one that is consistent 
with the self-schema. So the function of the self-schema bias is to 
maintain the ex is t ing self-schema by f i l t e r i n g out anything which is 
inconsistent with the ind iv idua l ' s ex is t ing self-schema. The idea of a 
f i l t e r is supported by Clark and Teasdale's fur ther f inding that when 
the same patients were less depressed, they were more l i k e l y to recal l 
happy experiences than unhappy ones. So, i t is clear that the happy 
experiences were stored in memory whi ls t the patients were depressed, 
but to recal l them would have threatened the consistency of the 
depressed self-schema, so they were f i l t e r e d out somehow in the memory 
re t r ieva l process. So, taking the idea that the self-schema causes 
depression presumably in the less depressed pat ients, the self-schema 
had been al tered and the nature of the f i l t e r with i t . This could have 
happened due to a very happy experience, a newly-found competence or 
anything which the negative bias could not d i s to r t su f f i c i en t l y to give 
i t a negative in terpre ta t ion and integrate i t in to the ind iv idual 's 
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depressed self-schema. Or, more d i r e c t l y , as Beck (1976) suggests, 
cognit ive rest ructur ing therapy where patients are made f u l l y aware of 
t he i r negative bias and are taught to replace i t with a more posit ive 
appraisal of s i tua t ions . 
So, the self-schema can be seen as a stable en t i t y which maintains 
i t s e l f by two related ways. F i r s t , in the ongoing s i tuat ion the 
negative bias f i l t e r s out, ignores, or d is tor ts information which is 
inconsistent with the schema. Secondly, in a s imi lar way, inconsistent 
memories are f i l t e r e d out, not retr ieved or " forgot ten" . The two 
processes are l inked because the f i r s t is of an attent ional nature and 
the second is of a re t r ieva l nature. 
Ult imately a l l experience which has at tent ion paid to i t becomes a 
memory and the nature and strength of that at tent ion determines the 
nature and strength of the resul t ing memory t race. The point under 
invest igat ion in th is thesis is whether anxious, depressed and 
agoraphobic pat ients , in the f i r s t experiment, and anxious pat ients, in 
the second one, possess a s imi lar self-schema. For example, since they 
behave in an anxious manner we would expect the i r self-schema to be 
correspondingly characterized and dominated by anxiety and 
anxiety-reported t r a i t s . A l o t of the research into the cognitive 
organisation of neurotic patients has been carr ied out on phobics. For 
example, Beck and Rush (1975) conducted structured interviews with 
phobics and on the basis of these proposed a phobic schema. Within 
th is schema are s i tuat ions which have been label led as dangerous by the 
ind iv idua l . So when an individual appraises a s i tuat ion as f e a r f u l , 
they integrate th is into the schema and the overal l "dangerous" label 
is adopted fo r that s i t ua t i on , and so t r iggers the anxiety they 
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subsequently experience. This is v i r t u a l l y the same as the 
depressive's self-schema which Beck (1976) postulated, except that the 
cognit ive organisation revolves around si tuat ions rather than personal 
t r a i t s derived from s i tua t ions . Nunn et al (1984) found that phobics 
remembered more phobic-related material than neutral material while the 
reverse was true fo r cont ro ls . 
This f ind ing was interpreted as support for Beck and Rush's phobic 
schema proposal. Phobics remembered more phobic-related material at 
the expense of neutral mater ia l , so th is can be construed as evidence 
for the f i l t e r or bias generated by the schema-neutral material was 
e i ther ignored during presentation or f i l t e r e d out during memory 
r e t r i e v a l , or both. This is comparable to Derry and Kuipe r 's (1981) 
f ind ing that depressives recal led more depressed-content adjectives 
than neutral-content adject ives. S imi la r ly , McDowall (1984) found that 
depressives recal led more unpleasant words than pleasant ones and that 
also they did th is at the expense of recal l for pleasant words. These 
two studies both invoked Beck's (1976) depressive self-schema proposal 
to explain t he i r f indings (though McDowall did only to lesser extent) . 
So, i t is clear that cognit ive organisation can be inferred from 
memory reca l l fo r d i f f e ren t types of mater ia l . I t is th is type of 
inference which is used in both current experiments, so some 
elaboration on the re lat ionship between cognit ive organisation and 
experimental memory reca l l measures is needed. 
Bas ica l ly , when looking at memory in a free recal l paradigm (as is 
used in both current experiments), there are two important measures 
which can be looked a t . F i r s t , the recal l to ta l of one type of 
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material compared to another e.g. unpleasant material compared to 
pleasant material or phobic-related material compared to non-phobic 
related mater ia l . Then secondly, how much material of each type is 
grouped together on reca l l e.g. i f from a mixed l i s t of pleasant and 
unpleasant words, a subject recal ls a number of a l l pleasant words then 
a number of a l l unpleasant words than the maximum grouping for each 
type of word at reca l l w i l l have been done. Grouping or "c luster ing" 
measures can be taken which express the number of words of each type 
clustered as a proportion of the to ta l number of words, of each type 
recal led or some number related to th is t o t a l , e.g. the Ratio of 
Repetit ion (RR) measure of c luster ing (Cohen et a l , 1954) (see RESULTS 
of the two experiments for more d e t a i l s ) , thus the cluster ing measure 
is independent of reca l l to ta l in such a way that c luster ing scores for 
subjects wi th d i f f e ren t to ta ls can be compared. The cluster ing measure 
is taken as being a d i rec t representation of the subjective 
organisation imposed on the material to be remembered by the individual 
(Sternberg and Tulv ing, 1977). The re la t i ve amount of material 
recal led can be interpreted in a number of ways. Either enhanced 
encoding of one type of material compared to another e.g. cluster ing by 
category, select ive re t r ieva l of one type compared to another or both 
processes together (see McDowall 1984). 
These interpretat ions a l l imply the existence of some body of 
knowledge organised around a category concept e.g. depression or 
anxiety. That i s , they imply a schema. The degree of subjective 
organisation is l inked to recal l to ta l since i t has been shown that 
th is increases the memory capacity fo r items to be remembered (see 
Murphy 1979). 
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Thus, subjective organisation can be used as a more d i rect method 
fo r estimating whether persons use schemata to organise personal 
information (e .g . se l f -descr ip t ive adject ives) . In other words, 
subjective organisation refers to the imposition of a persistent word 
order on a randomly ordered l i s t . On a mult i t r i a l free r e c a l l , 
subjects are presented with a group of words one at a time, over 
several t r i a l s ; each t r i a l has a random word order. Subjective 
organisation is observed when a subject consistent ly recal ls the words 
in c lus ters . From a unique pattern of contiguous word r e c a l l , i t is 
in ferred that the subject has encoded the to-be-remembered words on the 
basis of word in ter - re la t ionsh ips that be, and not the experimenter, 
has perceived. Bonsfield (1953) said that th is cluster ing in free 
reca l l takes advantage of pre-exist ing associations and therefore 
organisation in memory thus re f lec ts the degree to which the learner 
assimilates or schematises his (word) environment. 
S im i la r l y , Tulving (1962) noted the well established f inding that 
the order of recal l or randomly ordered word l i s t s increases over 
t r i a l s as a function of subjective organisation. Further development 
studies suggest that subjective organisation i t s e l f increases as a 
funct ion of "experience" with the semantic processing of words on a 
given l i s t i . e . as a function of a schema of word meaning. Bjorklund, 
Ornstein and Haig (1977) showed that the a b i l i t y to organise words for 
reca l l increases as a function of experience with the words. 
Presumably then, the greater the var iety of contexts in which a word 
has been encountered, the more elaborated i t s meaning schema becomes, 
and thus the more l i k e l y i t is that the word w i l l be organised among 
others in r e c a l l . 
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In the special case of se l f -descr ip t ive adject ives, i f persons 
have organised and stable se l f -descr ip t ions, that is i f they have 
described themselves with s imi lar terms over d i f fe ren t contexts and 
over a period of t ime, i t is l i k e l y that they have also developed 
schemata to represent the re lat ions among self-reference adjectives 
pr io r to a recal l task. Therefore i f a depressive possesses a stable 
self-schema, i t is expected that he would show s ign i f i cant differences 
in the subjective organisation of se l f descript ive adjectives and 
neutral adject ives. 
Thus, i f measures of c luster ing and re la t ive levels of recal l are 
examined in conjunction with each other i t should be possible to in fer 
more d i rec t l y the nature of the underlying cognit ive organisation. In 
th is case, i t is proposed that the individual w i l l impose his or her 
own subjective organisation on the material on the basis of the 
agoraphobic, anxious or depressive nature of the material ( i . e . the 
experimental category as determined in the f i r s t experiment - see 
Appendix G for material used). 
Such subjective organisation is assumed to re f lec t underlying 
cognit ive organisation systems in which the concepts of agoraphobia, 
anxiety, depression or both anxiety and depression are dominant. 
These cognit ive organisation systems could correspond to the 
agoraphobic self-schema, the depressive self-schema and an anxious 
self-schema since the concepts of agoraphobia, anxiety and depression 
respect ively would play a dominant organisational role in these three 
self-schemas. However, i t is not possible to jump to conclusions about 
the existence of a self-schema on the basis of subjective organisation 
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ef fects alone, only a general schema can be inferred from such e f fec ts . 
Bearing th is in mind, a se l f - ra t i ng task was included in the design of 
the second experiment where subjects were asked to indicate whether or 
not the adjectives they had been asked to recal l described them, i .e . 
whether or not they were se l f - re fe ren t . 
Furthermore, Diethelm and Jones (1947) found the presence of 
c l i n i c a l anxiety s i gn i f i can t l y decreased scores on many tests and maze 
learning was re l i ab l y slower under anxiety condit ions, though i t has 
also been suggested that as the learning process proceeded, the anxiety 
dr ive of a high anxiety group tended to improve performance. 
However Beck and Rush (1978) propose that anxiety subjects do show 
some form of self-schema s imi lar to depression subjects which 
in terprets (or d i s to r t s ) information re la t i ve to the i r behaviours and 
a t t r i bu tes . They also claim that phobias and anxiety are not two 
d i f f e ren t forms of neurosis but are d i f fe ren t positions on the anxiety 
scale. 
Addison (1981) has shown that phobias act as an organising aid fo r 
the reca l l and c luster ing oi" phobic items and the phobic patients show 
more c luster ing of phobic words than neutral words. Therefore i f 
anxiety is s imi lar to phobias and contains a self-schema, then one can 
suppose that anxiety subjects w i l l recal l and cluster anxiety words 
more than neutral words. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Experiment One 
3.1 Introduct ion 
The f i r s t experiment used hospital outpatients or day patients who 
rated as depressed or anxious on the Leeds Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(Snaith et a l , 1976) and also those who rated as agoraphobic on the 
Agoraphobia Test (See Appendix for the t es t s ) . The present experiment 
also used controls who were employees at the same hospital as the 
pat ients . 
In a way, a modif icat ion of Tulving's (1962) experiment was used. 
Tulving presented subjects with a 16 word word- l is t over 16 separate 
t r i a l s , each t r i a l involving l i s t presentation then wr i t ten r eca l l . 
The aim was to invest igate subjective organisation in subject 's r e c a l l , 
but in the present experiment, subject 's to ta l recal l of words was 
examined also. In the present experiment 12 t r i a l s (4 fo r anxiety and 
neutral words, 4 fo r depression and neutral words and 4 for agoraphobia 
and neutral words) were used. 20 words comprised each l i s t - 10 
emotional words (anxiety on the anxiety l i s t or depression on the 
depression l i s t or agoraphobia on the agoraphobia l i s t ) and 10 neutral 
words. This was to invest igate whether anxiety, depression and 
agoraphobia subjects remembered more of the i r re la t i ve words overall 
than neutral items and showed c luster ing of these words in comparison 
to the control groups. The other main aim of th is experiment was to 
explore the indiv idual dif ferences between subject groups on the 
experiment. 
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As mentioned before. Perry and Kuiper's (1981) depressed subjects 
recal led more se l f - ra ted words than did contro ls. Such recal l should 
go hand in hand wi th c lus te r ing , and would provide support for Beck and 
Rush's (1978) proposal of a stable schema as an explanation of low 
self-esteem. I f anxiety or agoraphobia subjects also recalled and 
clustered more se l f - ra ted words than controls th is would also suggest a 
schema might be present, though Addison's (1981) experiment on phobias 
showed no di f ference in recal l of phobic words and neutral words, only 
in c lus te r ing . 
Aims of the Experiment 
The aims of the f i r s t experiment were th ree- fo ld : 
i ) do anxious subjects show f a c i l i t a t i o n for the recal l and 
c luster ing of anxiety words? 
i i ) do agoraphobic subjects show greater c luster ing and recal l of 
agoraphobic words? 
Beck and Rush (1978) suggest that anxiety imposes a negative 
self-schema on the anxious in the same way as phobias do. Hence 
anxiety subjects should show greater c luster ing and recal l of emotional 
words. 
i i i ) do depressives show superior reca l l and c luster ing of depressive 
words? 
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The aims can be considered in terms of the fol lowing hypotheses: 
1. That depression, anxiety and agoraphobia can be construed as 
schemas, which w i l l act to d i rec t at tent ion and memory of external 
events in these terms. 
2. Anxiety subjects should remember more anxiety l i s t words overall 
than agoraphobia, depression and control subjects and should also 
show greater c luster ing of anxiety l i s t words. 
3. Agoraphobia subjects should recal l more agoraphobia l i s t words 
overal l than anxiety, depression and control subjects and should 
show greater c luster ing of agoraphobia l i s t words. 
4. Depression subjects should recal l more depression l i s t words 
overal l than agoraphobia, anxiety and control subjects and should 
show greater c luster ing of depression l i s t words. Also controls 
w i l l not have any s ign i f i can t di f ference in recal l for depression 
l i s t words versus anxiety or agoraphobia l i s t words, for anxiety 
l i s t words versus depression or agoraphobia l i s t words for 
agoraphobia l i s t words versus anxiety or depression l i s t words. 
5. Anxiety subjects should recal l more anxiety words than neutral 
words overal l than depression, agoraphobia and control subjects 
and should show greater c luster ing for anxiety words. 
6. Depression subjects should reca l l more depression words than 
neutral words overal l than anxiety, agoraphobia and control 
subjects and should show greater c luster ing for depression words. 
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7. Agoraphobia subjects should recal l more agoraphobia words than 
neutral words overal l than anxiety, depression and control 
subjects and should show greater c luster ing for agoraphobia words. 
8. In general, patients w i l l recal l more experimental ( ie depressed, 
anxious or agoraphobic content) words compared to neutral words; 
no s ign i f i can t di f ference in recal l for experimental versus 
neutral words w i l l be found for the controls. 
9. Since there are four t r i a l s for each l i s t , the number of words 
recal led increase as we go from the f i r s t to the fourth t r i a l and 
there w i l l be a corresponding increase in the amount of cluster ing 
(Sternberg & Tulv ing, 1977). 
10. There w i l l be correlat ions between subjects' neuroticism, 
agoraphobia, anxiety, depression and disposi t ion scores on the 
personal i ty tests and these two measures ( ie to ta l recal l and 
c luster ing) taken from the experimental words of each l i s t 
separately. More spec i f i ca l l y , i t is hypothesised that 
agoraphobia scores w i l l correlate with the measure from the 
agoraphobia l i s t , anxiety scores w i l l correlate with the measure 
from the anxiety l i s t , depression scores w i l l correlate with the 
measure from the depression l i s t and the neuroticism and 
d isposi t ion scores w i l l correlate with the measures from a l l three 
l i s t s . 
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3.2 Method 
Subjects 
Twelve patients suf fer ing predominantly from anxiety, twelve 
patients from depression, twelve patients from agoraphobia and ten 
controls served as subjects. The patients were a l l attending a local 
hospital e i ther as outpatients or day pat ients. 
The c r i t e r i a for including the patients in the study were: 
i ) anxiety, depression or agoraphobia feel ings were the main problem 
for each group 
i i ) they had not been outpatients or day patients for longer than six 
weeks 
i i i ) they were not taking anti-depressant drugs or tranqui l l isers. 
In the anxiety group, there were 7 females and 5 males. Their 
average age was 47 years (range 24-84 years). In the depression group, 
there were 9 females and 3 males. Their average age was 41 years 
(range 30-61 years) . In the agoraphobia group, there were 10 females 
and 2 males. Their average age was 42 years (range 25-65 years). 
Also, ten persons served as contro ls . There were 8 females and 2 
males. Their average age was 34 years (range 20-54 years). The 
controls were a l l employees at the same hospital as the pat ients. They 
were volunteers from the nursing, c le r i ca l and cleaning s t a f f . As far 
as possible, the four groups were matched for age and education. 
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Materials 
F i r s t l y , three questionnaires were given to the subjects: a) The 
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire, b) The Anxiety and Depression scale 
which is consisted of 68 general questions about the sub jec t s ' l i f e and 
fee l ings, c) The Agoraphobia Test which consisted of 13 words or short 
phrases which are threatening for agoraphobic pat ients, such as: 
theatres, supermarkets, high places, etc . At the end of the test a f ter 
a short de f i n i t i on of what is a panic at tack, subjects were asked to 
" indicate the to ta l number of panic attacks" they had had in the 
previous seven days. 
Examples of E.P.Q. questions are: "Do you have many d i f fe ren t 
hobbies?", "Do you tend to keep in the background on social occasions?" 
etc. Examples of "The Anxiety and Depression Scale" questions are: 
"Are you often a moody person?", "Do you feel you often can' t get your 
breath?", "Do you often feel nervous and shaky?" etc. Copies of the 
questionnaires are in Appendices A, B and C. 
Secondly, three l i s t s of words were constructed: the anxiety 
l i s t , the depression l i s t and the agoraphobia l i s t . Each l i s t 
consisted of 10 experimental words and 10 neutral words. For the 
anxiety l i s t , the experimental words were rated high on anxiety and low 
on depression. S im i la r l y , fo r the "depression" l i s t the experimental 
words were rated high on depression and low on anxiety. For the 
"agoraphobia" l i s t the words were rated high on agoraphobia threatening 
meanings and low on both depression and anxiety. Neutral words were 
not rated high on depression, anxiety or agoraphobia. (See Appendix G 
fo r word l i s t s and ra t ings ) . The experimental and neutral words were 
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matched on number of sy l lab les , frequency of occu»j,ence and imagery 
values. They were selected by discussion between a c l i n i ca l 
psychologist and an experimental psychologist. 
Examples of anxiety words are "panic", "shaking", "d izzy"; 
examples of depression words are " f a i l u r e " , " g u i l t " , "disgust" ; 
examples of agoraphobia words are "shopping", " t r a i n " , "aeroplane" and 
examples of neutral words are "London", "autumn", "mir ror" . A l l l i s t s 
were presented on the screen of a BBC mircocomputer. For each subject, 
the computer program randomised both the order of the l i s t s and the 
order of the words wi th in each l i s t . 
Design and Procedure 
F i r s t l y , the overal l procedure was described to each subject. 
They were also assured that the information we obtained would be 
con f iden t ia l . Subjects then signed a consent form agreeing to take 
part in the experiment (see Appendix R for Ins t ruc t ions) . 
Subjects were asked i f they would take part in an experiment " to 
invest igate the way people remember information". The experimenter 
thanked the subject fo r agreeing to take part and gave a fur ther br ie f 
explanation of what the subject was required to do. The subject was 
to ld he/she would see three d i f f e ren t l i s t s each containing 20 words. 
He/she should read each word as i t appeared on the computer screen. 
(Subjects were asked to read aloud, so that the experimenter could 
check for reading e r ro rs ) . Immediately a f te r each l i s t f inished the 
subject was requested to say as many of the words he/she could 
remember. No time l i m i t was set , subjects simply indicated that they 
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had said as many of the words as they f e l t they could remember. Then 
a f te r each l i s t had been reca l led , the subject would read the same l i s t 
again but with the words in a d i f f e ren t order, and again would be asked 
to say as many of the words as he/she could remember when the l i s t 
f i n i shed . This was repeated two more times (so, there was a to ta l of 
four t r i a l s fo r each l i s t , or each l i s t had to be recalled four t imes). 
The procedure for the control subjects was exactly the same as for 
the pat ients. Af ter the experiment, the experimenter obtained personal 
information such as name, age and occupation. The subject was also 
given the EPQ, the Anxiety and Depression Scale and the Agoraphobic 
tes t and asked to f i l l them in at home and to return the completed 
questionnaires in an accompanying stamped addressed envelope. 
3.3 Results 
(A) Scoring Procedure 
Two main measures were calculated. 
i ) Total recal led (see Appendix E) i . e . the to ta l number of 
experimental and control words correct ly recal led by each subject for 
each l i s t on each t r i a l . Sometimes subjects recal led the same word 
twice on the same t r i a l ; these repet i t ions were included in the to ta l 
reca l l score fo r that t r i a l . 
i i ) Looking at the order of recal l of the words a cluster ing score 
(see Appendix F) fo r each subject on each l i s t on each t r i a l was 
calculated. A Ratio of Repetit ion (RR) (Cohen et a l , 1954) was 
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calculated fo r each subject for each l i s t and experimental and neutral 
words separately. I t is calculated in the fol lowing way : RR = ^ 
n - 1 
where n = the number of words correct ly recalled from a part icular 
category i . e . experimental or neut ra l , 
and r = the number of pairs of words consecutively recalled from the 
same category or "category repe t i t i ons" . 
What th is measured was how much the subject clustered category 
words together and in such a way that the score calculated was 
independent of to ta l r e c a l l . An example of the procedure i s : - i f a 
subject 's to ta l reca l l from a par t icu lar l i s t ( in th is case, 
depression) was:-
Bargain, SUICIDE, SADNESS, FAILURE, Gallon, DISGUST, bashful, stress, 
WAKEFUL, FAILURE, London, Bathing, EFFORT 
where words in upper case were the experimental words, words in lower 
case and underlined are the control words and words in lower case which 
are not underlined are words not on the l i s t being recalled i . e . 
foreign words. I t w i l l also be noted that 'FAILURE' is repeated. This 
repe t i t i on is treated j us t the same as any other experimental word i .e . 
i t is not excluded in any way from the resu l ts . Where more than one 
word of the same category are recal led together, th is counts towards 
the to ta l r. One pair is r = 1 , two pairs are r = 2, three pairs are r 
= 3 and so on. 
e.g. WAKEFUL, FAILURE, r = and for SUICIDE, SADNESS, FAILURE there 
are two pa i rs , so r = 2. 
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The to ta l r fo r the depression l i s t and for the par t icu lar subject 
is therefore r = 3 and n = 7 so RR = 0.50 for the experimental words. 
For the neutral words, r = 1 and n = 4, so RR = 0.33. 
Treatment of Results 
Various analyses were made to detect differences between 
combinations of the experimental groups, and the three word l i s t s and 
the word type i . e . experimental words versus control words, using the 
two measures described above. 
Results are in two parts : f i r s t l y patients and controls and 
secondly patients only. Besides looking at a l l subjects together, 
patients are also being looked at separately because not only were the 
controls not well matched with the pat ients , but also taking into 
account that cont ro ls , who are nurses, are very fami l ia r with the 
patients and they are used to the vocabulary that is used for the 
memory tes ts . Also, fo r a l l the resu l t s , the data have been combined 
over a l l four t r i a l s . 
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( i ) Total Recalled ( including controls) 
Since no di f ference was found between experimental and control 
words the data to be reported here do not include th is factor . The 
mean number of words recal led by each group are shown in Table 1 below: 
TABLE 1 : MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED BY EACH SUBJECT GROUP 
Subject Groups 
Agoraphobics Anxious Depressives Controls 
5.403 5.347 5.410 5.667 
There was no re l iab le di f ference between the groups. A l l subjects 
remembered the words equally well (F = 0.18; df = 3.92; see also 
Appendix H). 
However, as can be seen, control subjects scored more overall than 
pa t ien ts , depressives more overal l than agoraphobics and anxious, and 
agoraphobics more overal l than anxious. 
Although there are no s ign i f i can t differences ove ra l l , the 
analysis of variance revealed some interact ion ef fects between l i s t s 
and a l l subjects, and between each l i s t and each subject group. 
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Taking a l l subjects, the mean number of words recalled on each 
l i s t are shown in Table 2 below: 
TABLE 2: MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED ON EACH LIST 
Lists 
Agoraphobia Depression Anxiety 
6.038 4.777 5.527 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le dif ference between these 
scores (F = 30.45, df = 2.84; p<0.01, see also Appendix H). 
Overa l l , subjects have a lower score for the depression l i s t than 
for the anxiety l i s t or the agoraphobia l i s t . Also, overal l subjects 
have a higher score for the agoraphobia l i s t than for the depression 
l i s t of the anxiety l i s t . So, a l l subjects were less l i k e l y to recal l 
depression words than anxiety and agoraphobia words. 
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Taking each subject group, the mean number of words recalled on 
each l i s t are shown in Table 3 below (see also Fig. 1 ) : 
TABLE 3 : MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED ON EACH LIST BY 
EACH SUBJECT GROUP 
Lists 
Groups Agoraphobia Depression Anxiety 
Agoraphobics 6.250 4.479 5.479 
Anxious 6.083 4.396 5.563 
Depressives 5.521 5.125 5.583 
Controls 6.350 5.175 5.475 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le dif ference between these 
scores (F = 2.38; df = 6.84; p<0.04; see also Appendix H). 
The main point that arises out of these f indings is the pattern of 
scores on the depression l i s t . Each subject group except depressives 
and controls was less l i k e l y to recal l depression words than 
agoraphobia and anxiety words. 
On the other hand, the depressive subject group was more l i ke l y to 
reca l l depression words than any other group except contro ls. 
Also, the depressive group has a lower score for the agoraphobia 
l i s t than the other groups have. Furthermore, agoraphobia, anxiety and 
control groups are more l i k e l y to recal l agoraphobia words, less l i k e l y 
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to reca l l anxiety words and even less l i k e l y to recal l depression 
words. F ina l ly controls have a higher score for the agoraphobia l i s t 
than for the depression l i s t or the anxiety l i s t . These results w i l l 
be discussed in the "Discussion" part of th is study. 
( i i ) Clustering RR ( including controls) 
Table 4 below shows the mean c luster ing scores for each subject group, 
including cont ro ls . 
TABLE 4 : MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE BY EACH SUBJECT GROUP 
Groups 
Agoraphobics Anxious Depressives Controls 
0.654 0.591 0.591 0.598 
An analysis of variance indicated a dif ference between these cluster ing 
scores (F = 2.58; df = 3.42; p<0.05; see also Appendix I ) . 
As can be seen, agoraphobics clustered more overal l than a l l the 
other groups. Control subjects had about the same mean cluster ing 
score wi th anxious and depressive subjects. I t should be remembered 
that a higher c luster ing score does not imply a greater word r e c a l l . 
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Furthermore Table 5 below shows the mean cluster ing score for each 
l i s t . 
TABLE 5: MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH LIST 
L is t 
Depression Anxiety Agoraphobia 
0.618 0.635 0.575 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le dif ference between these 
c luster ing scores (F = 3.74, df = 2.84; p<0.03; see also Appendix I ) . 
From table 5, i t can be seen that subjects have the i r lowest 
scores on the agorophobia l i s t . On the other hand patients and 
cont ro ls , taken together, have the i r highest c luster ing scores on the 
anxiety l i s t . 
Table 6 shows the mean c luster ing score for each type of words: 
TABLE 6: MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH TYPE OF WORDS 
Type of words 
Experimental Control 
0.667 0.552 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le dif ference between these 
c luster ing scores (F = 76.49; df = 1.42; p<0.01; see also Appendix I ) . 
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Considering the c luster ing of neutral and emotional words (or 
control and experimental words respectively) taking a l l subjects and 
a l l l i s t s over a l l t r i a l s there was more cluster ing of experimental 
than control words. Furthermore, taking a l l subjects and over a l l 4 
t r i a l s , the mean c luster ing score for each type of word and each l i s t 
is shown in Table 7 below (see also Fig. 2 ) : 
TABLE 7 : MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH WORD TYPE AND EACH LIST 
Depression 
Anxiety 
Agoraphobia 
Experimental 
0.655 
0.731 
0.614 
Type of words 
Control 
0.581 
0.539 
0.535 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le dif ference between these 
c lus ter ing scores (F = 7.18; df = 2.84; p<0.01; see also Appendix I ) . 
The main point that arises out of these findings is the 
experimental words' pattern of c luster ing scores on the anxiety l i s t . 
A l l subjects were more l i k e l y to c luster the experimental words on the 
anxiety l i s t than the experimental words on depression l i s t of 
agoraphobia l i s t . Also, a l l subjects were more l i ke l y to c luster the 
experimental words on the depression l i s t than the experimental words 
on the agoraphobia l i s t . 
S im i la r l y , a l l subjects over were more l i k e l y to cluster the 
control words on the depression l i s t than the control words on the 
anxiety or the agoraphobia l i s t s . 
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( i i i ) Total Recalled (without controls - patients only) 
The mean number of words recalled by each group of patients are 
shown in Table 8 below: 
TABLE 8 : MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED BY EACH PATIENT GROUP 
Patient groups 
Agoraphobics Anxious Depressives Al l patients 
4.847 4.951 4.823 4.879 
There was no re l iab le di f ference between the groups. A l l subjects 
remembered the words equally well (F = 0.04; df = 35.33; p<0.0.5; see 
also Appendix J ) . 
Taking a l l pat ients and overal l 4 t r i a l s , the mean number of words 
recal led on each l i s t are shown in Table 9, below: 
TABLE 9 : MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED ON EACH LIST 
Agoraphobia Depression Anxiety 
5.438 4.472 4.712 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le dif ference between these 
scores (F = 27.02; df = 2.66; p<0.01; see also Appendix J ) . 
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The main point that arises out of these f indings is the pat ients' 
pattern of scores on the agoraphobia l i s t . F i r s t , overa l l , patients 
have a higher score fo r the agoraphobia l i s t than for the anxiety l i s t 
or the depression l i s t . Secondly, ove ra l l , patients have a l i t t l e 
higher score for the anxiety l i s t than for the depression l i s t . 
Taking a l l patients on a l l 3 l i s t s the mean number of words 
recal led fo r each type of words, are shown in Table 10 below: 
TABLE 10 : MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED FOR EACH TYPE OF WORDS 
Type of words 
Experimental Control 
5.387 4.361 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le dif ference between these 
scores (F = 58.20; df = 1.33; p<0.01; see also Appendix J ) . 
Looking at the di f ference between two types of words, the analysis 
showed that patients were more l i k e l y to recal l experimental words than 
control words. 
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Taking a l l patients overal l 4 t r i a l s , the interact ion between 
word-type and word- l is ts can be seen in Table 11 below (see also Fig. 
3 ) : 
TABLE 11: INTERACTION BETWEEN WORD-TYPE AND WORD-LISTS FOR TOTAL RECALL 
Type of words 
Experimental Control 
Agoraphobia 5.951 4.924 
Depression 4.667 4.278 
Anxiety 5.542 3.882 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le difference between these 
scores (F = 11.35; df = 2.66; p<0.01; see also Appendix J ) . 
The main point that arises out of these f indings is the 
experimental words' pattern of scores on the depression l i s t . Al l 
pat ients were less l i k e l y to recal l the experimental words on the 
depression l i s t than the experimental words on the anxiety l i s t or 
depression l i s t . 
Also, a l l patients have a higher score for experimental words on 
the agoraphobia l i s t than for experimental words on the anxiety l i s t . 
S im i la r l y , a l l patients overal l 4 t r i a l s , were more l i k e l y to recal l 
control words on the agoraphobia l i s t , less l i k e l y to recal l control 
words on the depression l i s t and even less l i ke l y to recal l control 
words on the anxiety l i s t . 
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F ina l l y , on a l l 3 l i s t s , patients have a higher score for 
experimental words than fo r control words. The dif ference of recal l 
between experimental and control words is highest on the anxiety l i s t 
and lowest on the depression l i s t . 
( i v ) Clustering RR (without controls) 
Table 12 below shows the mean cluster ing scores for each patient 
group: 
TABLE 12: MEAN CLUSTERING SCORES BY EACH PATIENT GROUP 
Groups 
Agoraphobics Anxious Depressives 
0.654 0.591 0.591 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le dif ference between these 
c luster ing scores (F = 3.58, df = 35.33; p<0.04; see also Appendix K). 
As can be seen agoraphobics clustered more overall than anxious 
and depressives. Anxious and depressive subjects had the same mean 
c luster ing score. I t must be noted that a higher c luster ing score does 
not imply a greater word r e c a l l . 
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Furthermore table 13 below shows the mean cluster ing score for 
each l i s t : 
TABLE 13: MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH LIST 
Depression 
Lists 
Anxiety Agoraphobia 
0.629 0.640 .568 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le dif ference between these 
c lus ter ing scores (F = 4.74; df = 2,66; p<0.02; see also Appendix K). 
From Table 13 i t can be seen that patients have the i r lowest 
scores on the agoraphobia l i s t . On the other hand, patients have the i r 
highest c luster ing scores on the anxiety l i s t . 
Table 14 shows the mean c luster ing score for each l i s t and each group 
(see also Fig. 4 ) : 
TABLE 14 : MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH LIST BY EACH PATIENT GROUP 
Depression 
Lists 
Anxiety Agoraphobia 
Agoraphobics 
Anxious 
Depressives 
0.657 
0.575 
0.656 
0.697 0.610 
0.643 0.556 
0.581 0.537 
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The main point that arises out of these f indings is the 
depressives' pattern of c luster ing scores on the depression l i s t . 
Depressive group has a higher c luster ing score for the depression l i s t 
than for the other two l i s t s , whereas agoraphobic and anxious patients 
have a higher score for the anxiety l i s t than for the other two l i s t s . 
Also, a l l three groups clustered more for anxiety l i s t than for 
agoraphobia l i s t . For the depression l i s t , the anxiety group clustered 
less than the other two groups d id , whereas for the anxiety and 
depression l i s t s , agoraphobics have the highest scores and depressives 
the lowest. 
However, the in teract ion between groups and l i s t s was not 
s ign i f i can t (F = 1.54; df = 2.4; p>0.20; see also Appendix K). 
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(v) Correlations 
Two corre la t ion matrixes were constructed, the one with controls 
and the other without controls which correlated the f i ve questionnaire 
scores of neuroticism, agoraphobia, anxiety, depression and disposit ion 
with the two measures i . e . to ta l recal l and cluster ing score of words 
correct ly recal led taken from each word l i s t - a to ta l of six measures 
since only the experimental word category was used (see Appendix G). 
a) Including controls 
TABLE 15 : CORRELATION MATRIX (EXPERIMENTAL WORDS ONLY) 
Correlations between Questionnaire Scores and Total 
Recall and Clustering Measures 
Measures Questionnaire Scores 
Taken Word L i s t * Neur Agor Anxiety Depr Disp 
Depression .1451 -.1286 .2062 .1847 .2581 
TOTAL Anxiety .0682 -.1750 .2449 .0664 .0494 
RECALL Agoraphobia .2180 -.1580 .0013 -.1139 -.2201 
Depression .3997 -.0083 .0801 .2682 .3820 
CLUSTERING Anxiety .0090 .2469 .2864 .1430 -.0461 
Agoraphobia .2547 -.1397 .1440 .1326 .1101 
R %e .500 = .2907 R %o .100 = .3761 
* Neur = Neuroticism; Agor = Agoraphobia; 
Depr = Depression; Disp = Disposit ion. 
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The main point that arises out of the correlat ion f indings is the 
subjects' pattern of corre lat ion on the depression l i s t . 
F i r s t l y , there is no s ign i f i can t corre lat ion between the scores of 
to ta l recal l of experimental words in any l i s t and the general scores 
of neuroticism, agoraphobia, anxiety etc. 
Secondly, there are two s ign i f i can t correlat ions in c luster ing : 
f i r s t , one between the c luster ing score of experimental words on the 
depression l i s t and the general score of neuroticism (.40) and second, 
one between the c luster ing score of experimental words on the 
depression l i s t and the general score of disposi t ion (.382). The f i r s t 
cor re la t ion means that the higher score the subjects had in neuroticism 
the more l i k e l y they were to c luster experimental words from the 
depression l i s t . The second corre lat ion means that the higher score 
the subjects had in d ispos i t ion , the more l i k e l y they were to cluster 
experimental words from the depression l i s t . 
I t should be noted that i ) i f corre lat ion is .291 then i t is 
s ign i f i can t at p = .05, i i ) i f corre lat ion is .376 or higher then i t is 
s ign i f i can t at p = .01 and i i i ) i f the corre lat ion is lower than .291, 
then i t is not s ign i f i can t because the p robab i l i t y , in th is case, is 
high. 
96 
( v i ) Correlations 
b) Without controls 
TABLE 16 : CORRELATION MATRIX (EXPERIMENTAL WORDS ONLY) 
Correlations between Questionnaire Scores and Total 
Recall and Clustering Measures 
Measures Questionnaire Scores 
Taken Word L i s t * Neur Agor Anxiety Depr Disp 
Depression .2611 -.1249 .3380 .3248 .3378 
TOTAL Anxiety .0200 -.2199 .3327 .0403 .0747 
RECALL Agoraphobia -.1704 -.1362 .1681 -.0319 -.1477 
Depression .4726 -.0454 .0114 .2933 .4105 
CLUSTERING Anxiety .2262 .2241 .2266 -.0125 -.1401 
Agoraphobia .2273 -.2204 .2226 .1798 .2471 
R . 0500 = .3291 RXo .0100 = .4238 
* Neur = Neuroticism; Agor = Agoraphobia; 
Depr = Depression; Disp = Disposit ion. 
The main point that arises out of the corre lat ion f indings is the 
pat ients ' pattern of corre lat ion on the depression l i s t . 
F i r s t l y , there is a s ign i f i can t correlat ion (.338) between the 
score of to ta l recal l of experimental words on the depression l i s t and 
the general questionnaire score on anxiety. This correlat ion means 
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that the higher score the patients had in anxiety, the more l i ke l y they 
were to recal l words from the depression l i s t . 
Secondly, there is a s ign i f i can t corre lat ion (.338) between the 
score of to ta l recal l of experimental words on the depression l i s t and 
the general score of d ispos i t ion . That means that the higher score the 
patients had in d ispos i t ion , the more l i k e l y they were to recal l words 
from the depression l i s t . 
S im i la r l y , there are two s ign i f i can t correlat ions with c luster ing: 
f i r s t l y , between the c luster ing score of experimental words on the 
depression l i s t and the general score of neuroticism (.473) and 
secondly, between the c luster ing score of experimental words on the 
depression l i s t and the general score of disposi t ion (.411). 
I t should be noted that i ) i f correlat ion is .329 then i t is 
s ign i f i can t at p = .05, i i ) i f corre lat ion is .424 or higher then i t is 
s ign i f i can t at p = .01 and i i i ) i f the correlat ion is lower than .329, 
then i t is not s ign i f i can t because the p robab i l i t y , in th is case, is 
high. 
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3.4 Discussion 
In terms of the hypotheses, dealing with the recal l to ta ls f i r s t , 
the or ig ina l hypothesis that anxiety subjects should remember more 
anxious words overal l than agoraphobia, depression and control subjects 
is not borne out by the resu l ts . From Table 3, i t can be seen that 
anxious patients were more l i k e l y to recal l words on the agoraphobia 
l i s t than words on the other l i s t s . Also, depressives and not anxious 
patients were the ones who had the highest score on the anxiety l i s t 
although the di f ference with each other score on the same l i s t is very 
smal1. 
S im i la r l y , the or ig ina l hypothesis that depression subjects should 
reca l l more depression words overal l than the other subject groups 
should do is refuted by the resu l ts . From Table 3 again, i t can be 
seen that depressives were more l i k e l y to remember words from the 
anxiety l i s t than words from any other l i s t . Also, controls and not 
depressives were the ones who had the highest score on the depression 
l i s t although the di f ference of contro ls ' and depressives' scores on 
the depression l i s t was very small . 
In add i t ion , the hypothesis that agoraphobics should remember more 
agoraphobia words overal l than the other subject groups should do is 
only par t ly borne out by the resu l ts . In par t i cu la r , from Table 3 
again, i t can be seen that agoraphobics do have the i r highest score on 
the agoraphobia l i s t but on the other hand controls have a higher score 
on the same l i s t . 
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F ina l l y , the hypothesis that there w i l l be no s ign i f icant 
di f ference in reca l l between the l i s t s for controls is also refuted by 
the resu l t s , as control subjects have got the i r highest score on the 
agoraphobia l i s t and there is also a dif ference between controls ' 
scores on the depression l i s t and the anxiety l i s t . 
Furthermore, the or ig ina l hypothesis that anxiety subjects, 
agoraphobics and depressives should remember more anxiety, agoraphobia 
and depression words respectively than neutral words, is not borne out 
by the resu l t s , since analysis of variance indicated no difference 
between these fac tors . Also, as i t was expected, i t showed no 
di f ference in reca l l fo r experimental versus neutral words for the 
cont ro ls . 
Furthermore, fo r patients i t was hypothesised that they would 
remember more experimental words compared to neutral words; th is 
hypothesis is borne out by the resu l ts . From Table 10 i t can be seen 
that patients did remember more experimental words than control words. 
This fac t can also be seen from the Table 17 below. 
TABLE 17 : MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED FOR EACH WORD-TYPE 
Patient Type of Words 
Groups Experimental Control 
Agoraphobics 5.403 4.292 
Anxious 5.347 4.556 
Depressed 5.410 4.236 
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Also, the or ig ina l hypothesis about the t r i a l s is borne out by the 
resu l t s . A l l subjects did recal l more words overall on the second 
t r i a l than on the f i r s t t r i a l , more words overall on the th i rd than on 
the second t r i a l and more words on the fourth than on the th i rd t r i a l . 
This fac t can be seen from the Table below (see also Appendix J ) : 
TABLE 18 : MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS CORRECTLY RECALLED OVER FOUR TRIALS 
Tr ia ls 
1 2 3 4 
Including controls 4.449 5.225 5.920 6.196 
Without controls 3.366 4.801 5.537 5.792 
The above resul ts are s i gn i f i can t . (F = 46.56; df = 3,126; p<0.01; see 
also Appendix H). 
For c luster ing scores, the or ig ina l hypothesis that anxiety 
subjects would have higher c luster ing scores for anxiety l i s t words is 
borne out by the resul ts since, as seen in Table 14 anxious subjects 
showed greater c luster ing on the anxiety l i s t words than words on the 
other l i s t s . However, agoraphobics and not anxious subjects were the 
ones who had the highest c luster ing score on the anxiety l i s t although 
the di f ference of anxious' and agoraphobics' scores on the anxiety l i s t 
was smal l . 
S im i la r l y , the or ig ina l hypothesis that depression subjects should 
c luster more depression words overal l than the other groups should do 
is borne out by the resul ts since from Table 14 again, i t can be seen 
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that depressives not only clustered more words from the anxiety l i s t 
than words from any other l i s t but also were the ones who had the 
highest c luster ing score on the depression l i s t than any other group; 
however agoraphobics' c luster ing score on the depression l i s t is 
roughly equal to the c luster ing score of depressives on the same l i s t . 
On the other hand, the hypothesis that agoraphobics should cluster 
more agoraphobia words overal l than the other subject groups should do 
is only par t ly borne out by the resu l ts . In par t icu lar from Table 14 
again, i t can be seen that agoraphobics are the ones who have the 
highest score on the depression l i s t (although depressives' c luster ing 
score is roughly equal to agoraphobics' c luster ing score) but were less 
l i k e l y to c luster the agoraphobia l i s t words than words from any other 
l i s t . 
F ina l l y , the hypothesis that there w i l l be no s ign i f icant 
di f ference in c luster ing between the l i s t s fo r controls is borne out by 
the resul ts as there was no re l iab le dif ference between cluster ing 
scores fo r contro ls . 
Furthermore, the or ig ina l hypothesis that anxiety subjects, 
agoraphobics and depressives should c luster more anxiety, agoraphobia 
and depression words respectively than neutral words, is not borne out 
by the resu l t s , since analysis of variance indicated no difference 
between these groups. 
Also, as there was no re l iab le dif ference in c luster ing scores for 
experimental versus neutral words for the contro ls. 
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Furthermore, fo r patients i t was hypothesised that they would 
c luster more experimental words compared to neutral words; th is 
hypothesis is borne out by the resu l ts . From Table 19 below, i t can be 
seen that patients did c luster more experimental words than control 
words. 
TABLE 19 : MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH WORD-TYPE 
Type of Words 
Experimental Control 
0.674 0.551 
For a l l patients i t should be noted that analysis of variance 
indicated a re l i ab le di f ference between these c luster ing scores (F = 
3.08; df = 2.33; p = 0.05; see also Appendix K). 
A l l subjects clustered more words overal l on the f i r s t t r i a l than 
on any other t r i a l ; also a l l subjects clustered more words overall on 
the t h i r d t r i a l than on the second one and more words on the fourth 
t r i a l than on the t h i r d one. 
In add i t ion , considering j us t the pat ients, they clustered more 
words overal l on the f i r s t t r i a l than on any other t r i a l ; besides a l l 
pat ients clustered more words on the second t r i a l than on the th i rd one 
and more words on the fourth t r i a l than on the second one. This fact 
can be seen from the Table over the page. 
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TABLE 20 : MEAN CLUSTERING SCORES OVER FOUR TRIALS 
Tr ia ls 
1 2 3 4 
Subjects 0.634 0. 596 0.600 0.607 
Patients only 0.632 0. 604 0.598 0.615 
However, the above resul ts are not s ign i f i can t (F = 0.98; df = 3,126; 
p>0.05; see also Appendix I ) . 
For the correlat ions between questionnaire scores and the two 
measures carr ied out on the experimental words only one of the or ig inal 
hypotheses was par t ly borne out by the results in the "including 
contro ls" case. This was that there would be s ign i f i can t correlat ions 
between neuroticism and disposi t ion scores and the words clustered from 
the depression l i s t . 
S imi lar ly in the "without controls" case, only one, of the 
or ig ina l hypotheses was par t ly borne out by the resu l ts . This was 
tha t , as before, there would be s ign i f i can t correlat ions between 
neuroticism and disposi t ion scores and the words ei ther recalled or 
clustered from the depression l i s t . 
However, a corre lat ion between anxiety score and the score of 
to ta l reca l l of experimental words on the depression l i s t was borne out 
by the resul ts without having been hypothesised o r i g i na l l y . 
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Furthermore, looking at Table 9 i t can be seen that a l l subjects 
were more l i k e l y to recal l agoraphobia words, less l i k e l y to recal l 
anxiety words and even less l i k e l y to recal l depression words. This 
may be because depression words are too unpleasant to be recalled a l o t 
when agoraphobia words are easy enough to be e f fo r t l ess l y remembered. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Experiment Two 
4.1 Introduct ion 
(m) 
Derry and Kuiper required subjects to carry out the se l f - re ferent 
ra t ing task before they were required to free recal l as many of the 
adjectives as possible. In th is experiment subjects were simply 
presented wi th the words and to ld they would have to recal l them at the 
end of the presentation. The se l f - ra t i ng task was carried out a f te r 
th is memory task. 
The main reason for carrying out the experiment in th is order was 
to ensure that the subject 's recal l was t r u l y subject ively organised in 
terms of se l f and not imposed by the experimenter. 
A possible explanation of the Derry & Kuiper f inding that 
depressives remember a greater proportion of yes-rated depressed-
content personal adjectives than yes-rated nondepressed-content 
adjectives is that the ex is t ing self-schema had been strengthened to 
provide these memory ef fects which would not have otherwise occured. 
Another di f ference between th is experiment and Derry & Kuiper's is 
the nature of the material used. Derry and Kuiper used personal 
adjectives d i f fe ren t ia ted on the basis of depressed versus 
non-depressed content. 
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This experiment uses personal adjectives d i f fe rent ia ted on three 
d i f f e ren t types of content:- depressed, anxious and a combination of 
anxious and depressed ( i . e . both, see Appendix P). Also the i n i t i a l 
pool of personal adjectives was made up of these adjectives judged to 
be unpleasant or negative by the experimenter. This d i f f e r s from Derry 
and Kuiper's i n i t i a l pool which contained personal adjectives "viewed 
as representative of a broad range of normal character is t ics" , and 
personal adjectives derived from the depression l i t e r a t u r e . A l l words 
were rated for content (anxiety and depression) and imagery in th is 
experiment. (See procedure). So the crucial dif ference is that the 
adjectives used here are not d i f fe ren t ia ted on the basis of negative 
versus posi t ive content. Examples of neutral adjectives used by Derry 
& Kuiper are "amiable", "cur ious" , " l oya l " and "organised" which would 
not be judged as negative. 
Thus, i t is possible that Derry and Kuiper's adjectives were 
dist inguishable on two measures - depressed content versus nondepressed 
content and negative content versus a range of "un-negative" to 
posi t ive content (possibly mostly pos i t i ve ) . Since these two measures 
went together, i t is not possible to say whether the depressed content 
adjectives were remembered because of the i r depressed and negative 
content or simply because of t he i r depressed content or simply because 
of t he i r negative content. 
McDowall (1984) has already found that depressives remember more 
negative or unpleasant content words than posit ive or pleasant words, 
so by removing the posi t ive versus negative d is t inc t ion by having a l l 
the words unpleasant (as in th is experiment) i t should be possible to 
determine whether subjects remembers words pr imari ly for the i r 
depressed content and s i m i l a r l y , pr imari ly fo r the i r anxious content. 
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There are three word l i s t s (see Appendix P). In one, the words 
were d i f fe ren t ia ted on the basis of depressed content adjectives versus 
non-depressed content and non-anxious content adject ives. In the 
second, the words d i f fe red in terms of anxious content adjectives 
versus non-anxious content and nondepressed content adject ives. The 
t h i r d word l i s t d i f fe ren t ia ted on the basis of anxious and depressed 
content adjectives versus non-anxious and non depressed content 
adject ives. 
Since the patients used in th is study scored higher overall than 
controls on measures of both anxiety and depression, i t is hypothesised 
that the i r underlying cognit ive organisation w i l l re f lec t both these 
elements, thus increasing the l ike l ihood of adjectives containing both 
anxiety and depression being integrated or encoded wi th in that 
organisat ion. I t is fur ther hypothesised that th is e f fec t w i l l be 
greater on the t h i r d ("both") l i s t than on the anxiety or depression 
l i s t s where only one element is present. 
So, in terms of experimental resu l t s , a number of f indings are 
hypothesised. F i r s t , that patients w i l l recal l more experimental ( i . e . 
depressed, anxious or both content) adjectives compared to neutral 
ad ject ives, and the highest di f ference in recal l w i l l be found for the 
"both" l i s t ; no s ign i f i can t di f ference in recal l for experimental 
versus neutral words w i l l be found for the controls although the 
overal l reca l l level w i l l be higher due to the overal l higher IQ 
inferred from educational background. 
Secondly, that a corresponding pattern of c luster ing scores w i l l 
be found. 
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T h i r d l y , s ince there are two t r i a l s f o r each l i s t , t h a t the number 
o f ad j ec t i ves r e c a l l e d on the second t r i a l w i l l increase and there w i l l 
be a corresponding increase i n the amount of c l u s t e r i n g (Sternberg & 
T u l v i n g , 1977). 
F o u r t h l y , out o f the experimental words c o r r e c t l y r e c a l l e d , the 
p ropo r t i on o f " y e s - s e l f - r a t e d ad jec t i ves w i l l be greater than the 
corresponding p ropo r t i on out o f the neu t ra l a d j e c t i v e s , and again t h i s 
d i f f e r e n c e w i l l be g rea tes t f o r the "bo th " l i s t . No s i g n i f i c a n t 
d i f f e r e n c e i s hypothesised f o r the c o n t r o l s . 
F i n a l l y , there w i l l be c o r r e l a t i o n s between i n d i v i d u a l sub jec t ' s 
a n x i e t y , depression and neuro t i c scores on the pe rsona l i t y tes ts and 
these th ree measures ( i e r e c a l l , c l u s t e r i n g and propor t ion of 
s e l f - r a t e d words c o r r e c t l y r e c a l l e d ) taken from the experimental 
ad j ec t i ves o f each l i s t sepa ra te l y . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t ha t anx ie ty 
scores w i l l c o r r e l a t e w i t h the measures from the anx ie ty l i s t and 
"bo th " l i s t , depression scores w i l l c o r r e l a t e w i t h the measure from the 
depression l i s t and the neu ro t i c (neuro t i c i sm) scores w i l l c o r r e l a t e 
w i t h the measures from a l l th ree l i s t s . 
109 
4.2 Method 
A) P re l im ina ry study f o r cons t ruc t i on o f word l i s t s used 1n main 
experiment 
Subjects 
Four students a t Durham U n i v e r s i t y served as sub jec ts . There were 
two females and two males and a l l were aged 20 yea rs . 
Ma te r i a l s 
A l i s t o f personal ad jec t i ves was cons t ruc ted . The c r i t e r i a f o r 
i n c l u s i o n on t h i s l i s t were: 
a) The ad jec t i ves had a frequency o f occuj^nce in Engl ish of between 
10 and 50 as measured by Thorndike & Lorge (1944). 
b) Ad jec t i ves were a l l judged to be negat ive by the experimenter. 
Examples of negat ive ad jec t i ves are " c a r e l e s s " , " c r u e l " , " f eeb le " and 
"ashamed". 
Procedure 
The l i s t o f words was read out to each sub jec t . A f t e r hearing 
each word the sub jec t was asked to r a te i t on a 9 -po in t scale e i t h e r o f 
anx ie t y desc r ip t i veness or depression descr ip t i veness (see Appendices M 
and N ) . On the anx ie ty scale an a d j e c t i v e was ra ted T i f i t 
"descr ibes a person who i s very re laxed" and ' 9 ' i f i t "descr ibes a 
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person who i s very anx ious" . The corresponding end po in ts on the 
depression scale were ' ve ry happy' (1) and 'very depressed' ( 9 ) . The 
words were in a d i f f e r e n t random order f o r every p resen ta t ion . The 
sub jec t was then asked to r a te the words on the depression or anx ie ty 
sca le in the same way, again the words were in a d i f f e r e n t random 
o rde r . 
About a week l a t e r , the same subjects ra ted the words f o r imagery. 
They were given i n s t r u c t i o n s to read which were adapted from Paiv io et 
a l ' s (1968) study o f 925 nouns. (The i n s t r u c t i o n s used are shown in 
Appendix 0 ) . The ad jec t i ves were ra ted on a 7 -po in t scale where 1 was 
" low imagery" and 7 was "h igh imagery". This was done using the same 
procedure as f o r the anx ie ty and depression descr ip t iveness r a t i n g s . 
Thus, f o r each word, three sets o f r a t i ngs were obtained : 
a n x i e t y , depression and imagery. From these s e t s , average anx ie t y , 
depression and imagery r a t i n g s were c a l c u l a t e d . 
B) Main Study 
Subjects 
Twelve p a t i e n t s s u f f e r i n g predominant ly from anx ie ty (but in some 
cases a lso depression to a lesser ex ten t (see Appendix T) ) and e igh t 
unmatched c o n t r o l s served as s u b j e c t s . The pa t i en ts were a l l a t tend ing 
a l oca l hosp i t a l e i t h e r as ou tpa t i en t s or daypa t ien ts . (Only two out 
o f twelve were day p a t i e n t s ) . The c r i t e r i a f o r i nc lud ing the pa t ien ts 
i n the study were : ( i ) anx ie ty or depression f e e l i n g s , or bo th , were 
I l l 
t h e i r main problem, ( i i ) they had not been ou tpa t i en ts or day pa t ien ts 
f o r longer than s i x months, ( i i i ) they were not t ak ing ant i -depressant 
drugs or t r a n q u i l l i s e r s . 
There were s i x female pa t i en t s and s i x male p a t i e n t s . Thei r 
average age was 40.8 years (range 26-66 y e a r s ) . Eight students at 
Durham U n i v e r s i t y served as c o n t r o l s . There were two females and s i x 
males. The i r average age was 19 (range 18-20) . Educational d e t a i l s 
f o r the two groups o f sub jec ts are given in the r e s u l t s s e c t i o n , Table 
22. 
No at tempt was made to match the two groups of subjects f o r age, 
occupat ion and educa t ion . I t was thought t h a t these fac to rs would have 
some e f f e c t on the o v e r a l l numbers of words remembered i . e . students 
would remember more words than p a t i e n t s . However, i t was not thought 
they would a f f e c t the pa t t e rn o f r e s u l t s . 
Ma te r i a l s 
Three l i s t s of 20 words were const ructed : the anx ie ty l i s t , the 
depression l i s t and the "bo th " l i s t . East l i s t consis ted of 10 
exper imental words and 10 neu t ra l words a l l taken from a l i s t of words 
used i n the p r e l i m i n a r y s tudy . For the anx ie ty l i s t , the experimental 
words were ra ted high on anx ie ty and low on depression. S i m i l a r l y , f o r 
the depression l i s t , the experimental words were ra ted high on 
depression and low on a n x i e t y . For the "bo th " l i s t the words were 
ra ted high on both depression and a n x i e t y . Neutral words were not 
ra ted high on e i t h e r depression or a n x i e t y . (See Appendix P f o r word 
l i s t s and r a t i n g s ) . The words were ra ted by 5 independent judges 
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(undergraduate s tudents ) on a 5 po in t scale f o r anx ie ty and f o r 
depress ion. 
The exper imental and neu t ra l words were matched on number o f 
s y l l a b l e s , frequency o f occurrence and imagery va lue . 
Examples o f anx ie t y words are " f r a n t i c " , "uncomfortable" and 
" w a t c h f u l " ; examples o f depression words are " deso la te " , "wretched" and 
"desperate" and examples of neu t ra l words are " v u l g a r " , " h o r r i b l e " and 
" c o n t r a r y " . A l l l i s t s were pre-recorded and preceded by a p rac t i ce 
l i s t (see Appendix Q). Three tapes were made of the f o l l o w i n g three 
d i f f e r e n t l i s t o rde rs : 
( i ) p r a c t i c e , " b o t h " , a n x i e t y , depression 
( i i ) p r a c t i c e , depress ion , " b o t h " , anx ie ty 
( i i i ) p r a c t i c e , a n x i e t y , depress ion , "bo th " 
So every l i s t appeared f i r s t , second and t h i r d in order of 
p resen ta t i on to the s u b j e c t . The words in each l i s t except the 
p r a c t i c e l i s t were in a d i f f e r e n t random order every t ime they were 
recorded. The words were recorded a t a r a te o f approximately one every 
fou r seconds. For the s e l f - r a t i n g t a s k , a f o u r t h tape was made of a l l 
the words (except those on the p rac t i ce l i s t ) recorded a t a ra te of one 
every f i v e seconds (see Appendix S ) . The Leeds self-assessment scale 
ques t ionna i re was used, along w i t h the Eysenck Persona l i t y 
Quest ionnai re (see Appendices L and C) . 
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Design and Procedure 
Subjects were asked i f they would take pa r t in an experiment " t o 
i n v e s t i g a t e the way people remember i n f o rma t i on " fo l lowed by some 
ques t i onna i res . They were immediately escorted next door and 
in t roduced to the w a i t i n g exper imenter . The experimenter thanked the 
sub jec t f o r agreeing to take pa r t and gave a f u r t h e r b r i e f exp lanat ion 
o f what the sub jec t were requ i red to do. The sub jec t was t o l d he/she 
would hear three d i f f e r e n t l i s t s each con ta in ing 20 words. He/she was 
requ i red to l i s t e n to each l i s t c a r e f u l l y and then immediately a f t e r 
each l i s t had f i n i s h e d say as many of the words t ha t he/she could 
remember. No t ime l i m i t would be s e t , sub jec ts simply ind ica ted tha t 
they had sa id as many o f the words as they f e l t they could remember. 
Then a f t e r each l i s t had been r e c a l l e d , the sub jec t would l i s t e n to the 
same l i s t again but w i t h the words i n a d i f f e r e n t o rde r , and again 
would be asked to say as many of the words as he/she could remember 
when the l i s t s f i n i s h e d . When a l l the l i s t s had been reca l l ed twice 
there would be some b r i e f ques t i onna i res . Once f u l l y acquainted w i th 
what they were asked to do, the sub jects were given a consent form to 
read and s ign i f they s t i l l wished to take par t in the experiment (see 
Appendix R ) . Before the main experiment began, subjects heard and 
r e c a l l e d the p r a c t i c e l i s t so the experimenter and the subject could 
f ee l abso lu te l y sure t h a t the i n s t r u c t i o n s had been understood. 
A f t e r the memory t e s t had f i n i s h e d the sub jects heard the f ou r t h 
tape which had been recorded f o r the s e l f - r a t i n g task . In the pauses 
between words, sub jec ts were requ i red to say "yes" i f they f e l t the 
word descr ibed them r e c e n t l y i . e . in the past few days or week and 
"no" i f they f e l t i t d i d no t . 
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Because o f a poss ib le response bias in favour o f "yes" and because 
o f the unpleasant nature o f the words, sub jec ts were t o l d t h a t i t was 
not impor tant i f they sa id many more " n o ' s " than " y e s ' s " . The 
experiments noted the "yes" and "no" responses and then obtained 
d e t a i l s o f age, occupa t ion , age l e f t school and type o f school 
a t tended . Then sub jec ts were given the Eysenck Persona l i t y 
Quest ionnai re (E.P.Q. ) and the Leeds sel f -assessment scale and asked t o 
f i l l them i n . 
The procedure f o r the con t ro l subjects was exac t l y the same as f o r 
the p a t i e n t s except t h a t : ( i ) they were approached by the experimenter 
r a t h e r than the c l i n i c a l psycho log i s t , ( i i ) the t e s t took place i n a 
room which was usua l l y the s u b j e c t ' s own, ra the r than a " f o r e i g n " 
hosp i t a l room. ( i i i ) the con t ro l sub jec t was alone w i t h the 
exper imenter r a t he r than a co l league of the experimenter being present 
throughout the whole exper iment, ( i v ) the experimenter presented the 
ques t ionna i res t o the c o n t r o l sub jec ts r a t he r than the exper imenter 's 
co l league who presented them to the p a t i e n t s . 
115 
4.3 Results 
1 . Subject D e t a i l s 
(A) Quest ionnai re Scores 
Anx ie ty and Depression scores f o r each sub jec t were ca lcu la ted 
from the Leeds Se l f Assessment Scale and a neuro t ic ism score was 
c a l c u l a t e d from the E.P.Q. The mean quest ionna i re scores f o r each group 
are shown i n Table 21 below. 
TABLE 21 : MEAN QUESTIONNAIRE SCORES FOR EACH SUBJECT GROUP 
Subject Group 
Type o f Quest ionnai re Score Pa t ien ts Contro ls 
Anx ie ty 9.75 4.14 
Depression 5.92 2.71 
Neurot ic ism 16.32 10.86 
(8) Sub jec t s ' Education 
TABLE 22 : EDUCATION OF SUBJECTS 
Subject Group Average Age Numbers who attended each type o f school 
on leav ing Comprehensive Secondary Modern Grammar 
Pa t ien ts 15.5 3 5 4 
Contro ls 18 5 0 3 
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Three main measures were c a l c u l a t e d . 
i ) To ta l r e c a l l e d (see Appendix U) i . e . the t o t a l number o f 
exper imental and con t ro l words c o r r e c t l y r eca l l ed by each subject f o r 
each l i s t on each t r i a l . Sometimes subjects reca l l ed the same word 
tw ice i n the same t r i a l ; these r e p e t i t i o n s were inc luded in the t o t a l 
r e c a l l score f o r t h a t t r i a l . 
i i ) To ob ta in some measure o f c l u s t e r i n g , a r e c a l l count was based on 
words r e c a l l e d as ad jacent pa i rs : the number of depression or anx ie ty 
or " bo th " words r e c a l l e d in a c lus te red fash ion f o r each sub jec t , f o r 
one t r i a l and exper imental and neu t ra l words separa te l y , was counted as 
the number o f s e q u e n t i a l l y occur r ing adjacent word pa i rs and t h i s 
measure was taken as a p ropor t i on o f a l l the words reca l l ed f o r t ha t 
t r i a l , considered as the number of poss ib le sequent ia l adjacent p a i r s , 
i r r e s p e c t i v e o f word t ype . 
Words were on ly inc luded in t h i s count as a measure of c l u s t e r i n g 
i f they occurred a t l e a s t as a p a i r . 
I f a p a i r o f words o f a p a r t i c u l a r category was i d e n t i f i e d e i t h e r 
s ide o f a repeated word, the p a i r o f words was only counted as such i f 
the middle word was of the same ca tegory , so there i s an assumption 
here t h a t the o rgan is ing p r i n c i p l e f o r these th ree words would be the 
same. This d i d not mat ter in cons t r uc t i ng the denominator o f the score 
of course. 
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A Rat io o f Repe t i t i on (RR) (Cohen e t a l , 1954) i s ca lcu la ted in 
the f o l l o w i n g way : RR = ^ 
(n -1) 
where n = the number o f words c o r r e c t l y r eca l l ed from a p a r t i c u l a r 
category i . e . exper imental or n e u t r a l , 
and r = the number o f pa i r s o f words consecut ive ly r eca l l ed from the 
same category or "category r e p e t i t i o n s " . 
What t h i s measured was how much the sub jec t c lus te red category 
words together and i n such a way t h a t the score ca lcu la ted was 
independent o f t o t a l r e c a l l . An example o f the procedure i s : i f a 
s u b j e c t ' s t o t a l r e c a l l from a p a r t i c u l a r l i s t ( i n t h i s case, 
depress ion) was : 
c r i t i c a l , TRAGIC, HELPLESS, LONELY, h u r r i e d , GLOOMY, b a t h f u l , BEATEN, 
HELPLESS, c h i l d i s h , clumsy, DREARY 
where words in upper case are the experimental words, words in lower 
case and under l ined are the con t ro l words and words in lower case which 
are not under l ined are words not on the l i s t being reca l l ed i . e . 
f o r e i g n words. I t w i l l a lso be noted t ha t 'HELPLESS' i s repeated. 
This r e p e t i t i o n i s t r e a t e d j u s t the same as any other experimental word 
i . e . i t i s not excluded i n any way from the r e s u l t s . Where more than 
one word o f the same category are r e c a l l e d toge the r , t h i s counts 
towards the t o t a l r . One p a i r i s r = 1 , two pa i rs are r = 2 , three 
pa i r s are r = 3 and so on. 
e . g . BEATEN, HELPLESS, r = 1 and f o r TRAGIC, HELPLESS, LONELY there are 
two pa i r s so r = 2 ; a l s o , c h i l d i s h , c lumsy, r = 1 . The t o t a l r f o r 
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the depression l i s t i s t h e r e f o r e r = 3 and n = 7 so RR = 0.50 f o r the 
exper imental words. For the neu t ra l words, r = 1 and n = 4 , so RR = 
0.33 (see a lso Appendix V ) . 
i i i ) The p ropor t ions o f s e l f - r a t e d words c o r r e c t l y r eca l l ed (see 
Appendix W) was c a l c u l a t e d . That i s , f o r each s u b j e c t , out of the 
words they c o r r e c t l y reca l . l ed , some o f them were s e l f - r a t e d . The 
p ropo r t i on o f c o r r e c t l y r e c a l l e d words which were s e l f - r a t e d was 
c a l c u l a t e d f o r each word category on each word l i s t w i t h both t r i a l s 
combined and f o r each s u b j e c t . 
Treatment o f r e s u l t s 
Various analyses were made to de tec t d i f f e rences between 
combinat ions of the exper imental groups, and the three word l i s t s and 
the word type i . e . exper imental words versus con t ro l words, using the 
three measures descr ibed above. Except where e x p l i c i t l y mentioned the 
r e s u l t s were combined f o r the 2 t r i a l s . As in the f i r s t experiment 
r e s u l t s are i n two p a r t s : f i r s t l y pa t i en ts and con t ro l s and secondly 
p a t i e n t s o n l y . Besides look ing a t a l l sub jec ts t oge the r , pa t ien ts are 
a lso being looked a t separa te ly because not on ly were the con t ro ls not 
matched w i t h the p a t i e n t s , but a l so t ak ing i n t o account t h a t c o n t r o l s , 
who are s tudents are very f a m i l i a r and used to the vocabulary t ha t i s 
used f o r the memory t e s t s . 
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i ) Tota l Recal led ( i n c l u d i n g c o n t r o l s ) 
The mean number o f words r e c a l l e d by each sub jec t group are shown in 
Table 23 below: 
TABLE 23: MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED BY EACH SUBJECT GROUP 
Subject Groups 
Contro ls Pat ients 
4.740 3.021 
Ana lys is o f var iance i nd i ca ted a r e l i a b l e d i f f e r e n c e between these 
scores (F = 7 .05; d f = 1,19; p<0.02; see a lso Appendix X ) . 
The on ly e f f e c t here i s the expected e f f e c t of sub ject group on 
o v e r a l l t o t a l r e c a l l . Control subjects remembered more words overa l l 
than p a t i e n t s . 
Taking a l l sub jec ts on a l l th ree l i s t s , the mean number of words 
r e c a l l e d f o r each t r i a l are shown in Table 24 below: 
TABLE 24 : MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED FOR EACH TRIAL 
T r i a l 1 T r i a l 2 
3.458 3.958 
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Ana lys is o f var iance i nd i ca ted a r e l i a b l e d i f f e r e n c e between these 
scores (F = 4 . 9 1 ; d f = 1,18; p<0.05; see a lso Appendix X ) . 
From Table 24 i t i s c l e a r t h a t f o r a l l sub jects on a l l three 
l i s t s , there i s increased r e c a l l on the second t r i a l - as i t was 
expected - and t h i s e f f e c t i s a lso s i g n i f i c a n t . 
Taking a l l sub jec ts on a l l th ree l i s t s and ove ra l l 2 t r i a l s , the 
mean number o f words r e c a l l e d f o r each type o f words, i s shown in Table 
25 below: 
TABLE 25 : MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED FOR EACH WORD TYPE 
Control Experimental 
3.200 4.217 
Ana lys is o f var iance i nd i ca ted a r e l i a b l e d i f f e r e n c e between these 
scores (F = 23.43; d f = 1,18; p<0 .01 ; see a lso Appendix X ) . 
Looking a t the d i f f e r e n c e between two types of words, the ana lys is 
showed t h a t sub jec ts were more l i k e l y to r e c a l l experimental words than 
c o n t r o l words. 
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Taking each sub jec t group, the mean number o f words reca l l ed f o r 
each word-type can be seen in Table 26 below (see a lso F i g . 5 ) : 
TABLE 26 : MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED FOR EACH WORD-TYPE 
BY EACH SUBJECT GROUP 
Type of words 
Control Experimental 
Cont ro ls 
Pa t ien ts 
3.854 
2.764 
5.625 
3.278 
Ana lys is of var iance i nd i ca ted a r e l i a b l e i n t e r a c t i o n between subject 
group and type o f word (F = 7 .09; d f = 1.18; p<0.02; see a lso Appendix 
X ) . 
The main po in t t h a t a r i ses out o f these f i nd i ngs i s the c o n t r o l ' s 
pa t t e rn o f scores on the experimental type of words. 
Each sub jec t group was more l i k e l y to r e c a l l experimental words 
than c o n t r o l words. Also con t ro l s have a higher score f o r both 
exper imental and con t ro l words. In a d d i t i o n the d i f f e rence at r e c a l l 
between c o n t r o l s and pa t i en t s on the experimental type of words was at 
l e a s t tw ice the d i f f e r e n c e on the con t ro l type o f words. 
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Taking a l l sub jec ts o v e r a l l 2 t r i a l s , the i n t e r a c t i o n between 
word- type and w o r d - l i s t s can be seen in Table 27 below (see also F ig . 
6 ) : 
TABLE 27: INTERACTION BETWEEN WORD-TYPE AND WORD-LIST 
FOR TOTAL RECALL 
L i s t s Type of words 
Control Experimental 
Both 3.325 4.125 
Anx ie ty 2.875 4.525 
Depression 3.400 4.000 
Ana lys is o f var iance i nd i ca ted a r e l i a b l e d i f f e r e n c e between these 
scores (F = 5 .03 ; d f = 2 .38 ; p<0.02; see a lso Appendix X ) . 
The main po in t t h a t a r i ses out o f these f i n d i n g s is the words' 
pa t t e rn o f scores on the a x i e t y l i s t . A l l sub jects were less l i k e l y to 
r e c a l l the c o n t r o l words on the anx ie ty l i s t than the con t ro l words on 
the "bo th " l i s t or depression l i s t . On the o ther hand, a l l subjects 
have a h igher score f o r exper imental words on the anx ie ty l i s t than f o r 
exper imental words on the "bo th " l i s t or depression l i s t . 
F i n a l l y , i t can be seen once more tha t on a l l 3 l i s t s , subjects 
have a h igher score f o r exper imental words than f o r con t ro l words. The 
d i f f e r e n c e o f r e c a l l between experimental and con t ro l words is h ighest 
on the anx ie t y l i s t and lowest on the depression l i s t . 
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i i ) Clustering ( including controls) 
Table 28 below shows the mean c luster ing score for each l i s t and 
each group (see also Fig. 7 ) : 
TABLE 28: MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH LIST BY EACH GROUP 
Groups L is ts 
Both Anxiety Depression 
Controls 0.416 0.372 0.617 
Patients 0.361 0.434 0.316 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le difference between these 
c luster ing scores (F = 4.65; df = 2.36, p<0.02; see also Appendix Y). 
From Table 28 i t can be seen that patients have the i r lowest 
scores on the depression l i s t whereas controls have the i r highest. 
S im i la r l y , patients have the i r highest c luster ing scores on the anxiety 
l i s t whereas controls have the i r lowest c luster ing scores on th is l i s t . 
So the pattern of resul ts for each group mirrors that of the other. 
From Table 28, i t can also be seen that controls clustered more overall 
than the pat ients . The dif ference of c luster ing between controls and 
patients is highest on the depression l i s t . The to ta l mean cluster ing 
score fo r the controls was calculated to be 0.46 whereas for the 
patients i t was 0.37. However, th is dif ference was not s ign i f i can t . 
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Taking a l l subjects and overal l 2 t r i a l s , the mean cluster ing 
score for each type of words and each l i s t , is shown in Table 29 below 
(see also F ig. 8 ) : 
TABLE 29: MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH WORD-TYPE AND 
EACH WORD-LIST 
L is ts Type of words 
Control Experimental 
Both 0.331 0.437 
Anxiety 0.457 0.361 
Depression 0.378 0.495 
Although the probab i l i t y is only marginal, analysis of variance 
indicated a di f ference between these c luster ing scores (F = 2,95, df = 
2.36; p0.05 <p<0.07; see also Appendix Y). 
From Table 29 i t can be seen that experimental type of words has 
i t s lowest scores on the anxiety l i s t whereas control type of words has 
i t s highest. On the other hand experimental type has i t s highest 
c luster ing scores on the depression l i s t whereas control type has i t s 
lowest c luster ing scores on the "both" l i s t . I t can also be seen that 
overal l subjects clustered more experimental words than control words. 
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Furthermore, taking patients and controls separately and overall 2 
t r i a l s , the mean c luster ing score for each type of words and each l i s t 
is shown in Table 30 (see also Fig. 9 ) : 
TABLE 30: MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH WORD-TYPE AND 
EACH LIST BY EACH SUBJECT GROUP 
a) Controls 
L is ts Type of words 
Control Experimental 
Both 0.392 0.442 
Anxiety 0.309 0.434 
Depression 0.582 0.653 
b) Patients 
L is ts Type of words 
Control Experimental 
Both 0.290 0.433 
Anxiety 0.555 0.313 
Depression 0.242 0.390 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le dif ference between these 
c luster ing scores (F = 5.79; df = 2.36; p<0.01; see also Appendix Y). 
a) Controls 
The main point that arises out of these f indings is the words 
pattern of c luster ing scores on the depression l i s t . Controls were 
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more l i k e l y to c luster both the experimental and control words on the 
depression l i s t , less l i k e l y to c luster the words on the "both" l i s t 
and even less l i k e l y to c luster the words on the anxiety l i s t . Also, 
on a l l 3 l i s t s , controls were more l i k e l y to c luster experimental words 
than control words. 
b) Patients 
The second part of Table 30 is s imi lar to Table 29. In th is part , 
i t can be seen that control type of words has i t s highest scores on the 
anxiety l i s t whereas experimental type of words has i t s lowest. On the 
other hand experimental type has i t s highest c luster ing scores on the 
"both l i s t " whereas control type has i t s lowest c luster ing scores on 
the depression l i s t . 
From the second part of Table 30, i t can also be seen that 
patients clustered more overal l experimental words than control words. 
Also, from both parts of Table 30, i t can be seen that the overall 
d i f ference of c luster ing between experimental and control words is 
higher in the case of controls than in the case of pat ients. 
i i i ) Proportion of se l f - ra ted words correct ly recalled ( including 
controls) 
The mean number of se l f - ra ted words recal led over 2 t r i a l s by each 
subject group are shown in Table 31 over: 
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TABLE 31: MEAN NUMBER OF SELF-RATED WORDS RECALLED OVER 2 TRIALS 
Subject Groups 
Controls Patients 
0.170 0.216 
Although Table 31 indicates that patients recal l a higher proportion of 
se l f - ra ted overal l than do cont ro ls , th is dif ference was not re l iab le 
(F<1). 
Taking a l l subjects and overal l 2 t r i a l s , the mean number of 
se l f - ra ted words recal led on each l i s t are shown in Table 32 below: 
TABLE 32: MEAN NUMBER OF SELF-RATED WORDS RECALLED ON EACH LIST 
Lists 
Both Anxiety Depression 
0.174 0.245 0.173 
Looking at the di f ference between three l i s t s , the main point that 
arises is the subjects' pattern of scores on the anxiety l i s t . 
Subjects, o v e r a l l , have a higher score for the anxiety l i s t than for 
the "both" l i s t or the depression l i s t , although the dif ference was not 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y re l i ab le (F = 1.25, df = 2.36; see also Appendix Z) . 
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Taking each subject group, the mean number of se l f - rated words 
recal led on each l i s t are shown in Table 33 below (see also Fig. 10): 
TABLE 33: MEAN NUMBER OF SELF-RATED WORDS RECALLED ON 
EACH LIST BY EACH SUBJECT GROUP 
Subject Lists 
Groups Both Anxiety Depression 
Controls 0.114 0.243 0.153 
Patients 0.214 0.246 0.187 
The main point that arises out of these f indings is the difference 
between controls and patients on the "both" l i s t . however as before. 
th is di f ference is not re l iab le (F<1). 
In general, patients have higher scores on a l l three l i s t s than 
controls do. The di f ference between controls and patients is highest 
on the "both" l i s t and lowest on the anxiety l i s t . 
From Table 33, i t can also be seen that both groups (controls and 
pat ients) have the i r highest scores on the anxiety l i s t , whereas 
controls have the i r lowest scores on "both" l i s t s and patients have 
the i r lowest scores on depression l i s t . 
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Taking each subject group, the mean number of sel f - rated words 
recal led for each word-type can be seen in Table 34 below (see also 
Fig. 11): 
TABLE 34: MEAN NUMBER OF SELF-RATED WORDS RECALLED FOR EACH 
WORD-TYPE BY EACH SUBJECT GROUP 
Subject Type of words 
Groups Control Experimental 
Controls 0.200 0.140 
Patients 0.185 0.246 
Again there was no re l iab le di f ference between these scores (F = 1.65; 
df = 1.10; see also Appendix Z) . 
However, from Table 34, i t can be seen, as expected, that controls 
have a higher score for the control words than for the experimental 
words. Also, controls have a higher score for control words than 
patients do for these words, whereas patients have a higher score for 
the experimental words than controls do for these words. The 
di f ference of scores between controls and patients is higher for the 
experimental type of words than i t is fo r the control type of words. 
( i v ) Correlations ( including controls) 
Two corre la t ion matrices were constructed (the one without 
controls and the other including controls) which correlated the three 
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questionnaire scores of anxiety, depression and neuroticism with the 
three measures i . e . to ta l r e c a l l , c luster ing score and proportion of 
se l f - ra ted words correct ly recal led taken from each word l i s t - a 
to ta l of nine measures since only the experimental word category was 
used (see Table 35). 
TABLE 35 : CORRELATION MATRIX (EXPERIMENTAL WORDS ONLY) 
Correlations between Questionnaire Scores and Total 
Recal l , Clustering and "Proportion Measures" 
Measure 
Taken 
Word 
L is ts 
Questionnaire Scores 
Anxiety Depression Neuroticism 
Both -.5356 -.5126 -.2941 
Total Anxiety -.5143 -.3803 -.1520 
Recall Depression -.3508 -.3963 -.0133 
Both -.0047 -.1987 -.1566 
Clustering Anxiety -.0628 -.4534 -.0148 
Depression -.5739 -.4561 -.3035 
Proportion Both .6964 .4756 .3630 
Self-Rated Anxiety -.0269 .0702 .1270 
Recalled Depression .5744 .2919 .3270 
R @ .0500 = .4683 R @ .0100 = .5897 
I t should be noted that i ) i f the correlat ion is 0.468 then i t is 
s ign i f i can t at p = 05, i i ) i f the corre lat ion is 0.589 or higher then 
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i t is s ign i f i can t at p = .01 and i i i ) i f the correlat ion is lower than 
0.468, then i t is not s ign i f i can t because the probab i l i t y , in th is 
case, is high. 
The main point that arises out of the correlat ion findings is the 
posi t ive corre lat ion of 0.69 (p<.01) between anxiety questionnaire 
score and the proportion of se l f - ra ted words recal led for the "both" 
l i s t . 
Secondly, there are f i ve s ign i f i can t negative correlat ions at 
p<0.5. These are between anxiety score and to ta l recal l on the "both" 
l i s t (0 .53) , anxiety score and to ta l recal l on the anxiety l i s t , 
(0 .51) , anxiety score and c luster ing score on the depression l i s t 
(0 .57) , depression score and to ta l recal l on the "both" l i s t (0.51) and 
depression score and the proportion of se l f - ra ted words recalled for 
the "both" l i s t . 
There is also one s ign i f i can t posi t ive corre lat ion as p<.05 of .57 
between anxiety questionnaire score and the proportion of sel f - rated 
words recal led for the depression l i s t . 
(v) Total Recalled (without controls) 
Taking a l l patients on a l l three l i s t s , the mean number of words 
recal led fo r each t r i a l are shown in Table 36 below: 
TABLE 36: MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED FOR EACH TRIAL 
Tr ia l 1 Tr ia l 2 
3,458 3.958 
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Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le dif ference between these 
scores (F = 4 .51 ; df = 1.19; p<0.05; see also Appendix Z l ) . 
From Table 36 i t is clear that fo r a l l subjects on a l l three 
l i s t s , there is increased recal l on the second-trial - as was expected -
and th is e f fec t is also s ign i f i can t . 
Taking a l l patients in a l l three l i s t s and overal l 2 t r i a l s , the 
mean number of words recal led for each type of words, is shown in Table 
37 below: 
TABLE 37: MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED FOR EACH WORD TYPE 
Control Experimental 
3.200 4.217 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le difference between these 
scores (F = 14.64; df = 1,19; p<0.01; see also Appendix Z l ) . 
Looking at the di f ference between two types of words, the analysis 
showed that patients were more l i k e l y to recal l experimental words than 
control words. 
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Taking a l l patients overal l 2 t r i a l s , the interact ion between 
word-type and word- l i s t can be seen in Table 38 below (see also Fig. 
12): 
TABLE 38: INTERACTION BETWEEN WORD-TYPE AND WORD-LIST FOR TOTAL RECALL 
Lis ts Type of words 
Control Experimental 
Both 3.325 4.125 
Anxiety 2.875 4.525 
Depression 3.400 4.000 
Analysis of variance indicated a re l iab le dif ference between these 
scores (F = 4 .91 ; df = 2,38; p<0.02; see also Appendix Z l ) . 
The main point that arises out of these f indings i t the words' 
pattern of scores on the anxiety l i s t . A l l patients were less l i k e l y 
to reca l l the control words on the anxiety l i s t than the control words 
on the "both" l i s t or depression l i s t . On the other hand, a l l patients 
have a higher score fo r experimental words on the anxiety l i s t than for 
experimental words on the "both" l i s t or depression l i s t . F ina l ly , i t 
can be seen once more that on a l l 3 l i s t s , patients have a higher score 
for experimental words than for control words. The difference of 
recal l between experimental and control words is higher on the anxiety 
l i s t and lowest on the depression l i s t . 
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( v i ) Clustering r r (without controls) 
A) Taking a l l patients on a l l three l i s t s , the mean cluster ing score 
fo r each t r i a l are shown in Table 39 below: 
TABLE 39: MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH TRIAL 
Tr ia l 1 Tr ia l 2 
0.391 0.428 
Table 39 indicates that fo r a l l patients on a l l three l i s t s there is an 
increased c luster ing score on the second t r i a l , as was expected. 
However, th is di f ference was not re l iab le (p>0.4; F<1). 
Taking a l l patients on a l l three l i s t and overall 2 t r i a l s , the 
mean c luster ing score for each type of words, is shown in Table 40 
below: 
TABLE 40: MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH WORD TYPE 
Control Experimental 
0.388 0.431 
Looking at the di f ference between two types of words, the analysis 
showed that patients were more l i k e l y to c luster experimental words 
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than c o n t r o l words. However, as be fo re , t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s not 
r e l i a b l e (F<1 ; p>0 .2 ) . 
Taking a l l pa t i en t s o v e r a l l 2 t r i a l s , the i n t e r a c t i o n i n 
c l u s t e r i n g between word-type and w o r d - l i s t s can be seen i n Table 41 
below (see a lso F i g . 13) : 
TABLE 4 1 : MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR WORD-TYPE AND EACH WORD-LIST 
L i s t s Type o f words 
Control Experimental 
Both 0.331 0.437 
Anx ie ty 0.457 0.361 
Depression 0.378 0.495 
Analys i s o f var iance i nd i ca t ed a r e l i a b l e d i f f e r e n c e between these 
c l u s t e r i n g scores (F = 4 . 0 1 ; d f = 2 .34; p<0.03; see also Appendix 12). 
From Table 41 i t can be seen t h a t experimental type o f words has 
i t s lowest score on the anx ie ty l i s t whereas c o n t r o l type o f words has 
i t s h i g h e s t . On the other hand experimental type has i t s highest 
c l u s t e r i n g score on the depression l i s t whereas c o n t r o l type has i t s 
lowest c l u s t e r i n g score on the "both" l i s t . 
From Table 4 1 , i t can a lso be seen t ha t pa t i en t s c lus te red more 
o v e r a l l experimental words than con t ro l words. 
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( v i i ) P ropor t ion o f s e l f - r a t e d words c o r r e c t l y r e ca l l ed (wi thou t 
c o n t r o l s ) 
Taking a l l pa t i en t s and o v e r a l l 2 t r i a l s , the mean number o f 
s e l f - r a t e d words r e c a l l e d on each l i s t are shown i n Table 42 below: 
TABLE 42: MEAN NUMBER OF SELF-RATED WORDS RECALLED ON EACH LIST 
L i s t s 
Both Anxie ty Depression 
0.174 0.245 0.173 
Looking a t the d i f f e r e n c e between three l i s t s , the main po in t t h a t 
a r i ses i s the p a t i e n t s ' pa t t e rn o f scores on the anxie ty l i s t . 
Pa t ien ts o v e r a l l , have a higher score f o r the anx ie ty l i s t than f o r the 
"both" l i s t or the depression l i s t , al though the d i f f e r e n c e was not 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y r e l i a b l e (F = 1.13; d f = 2 .34; p>0.3; see a lso Appendix 
Z 3 ) . 
Taking a l l p a t i e n t s , the mean number o f s e l f - r a t e d words r eca l l ed 
f o r each word-type can be seen i n Table 43 below: 
TABLE 43: MEAN NUMBER OF SELF-RATED WORDS RECALLED FOR EACH WORD-TYPE 
Type o f words 
Control Experimental 
0.191 0.204 
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Again there was no r e l i a b l e d i f f e r e n c e between these scores (F = 0.07; 
d f = 1.19; p>0.7; see a l so Appendix 13). 
However, f rom Table 43, i t can be seen, as expected, t ha t pa t ien ts 
have a higher score f o r the experimental words than f o r the con t ro l 
words. 
Taking a l l pa t i en t s and o v e r a l l 2 t r i a l s , the mean number o f 
s e l f - r a t e d words r e c a l l e d on each l i s t f o r each word-type are shown in 
Table 44 below (see a lso F i g . 14) : 
TABLE 44: MEAN NUMBER OF SELF-RATED WORDS RECALLED ON EACH LIST FOR 
EACH WORD-TYPE 
L i s t s Control Experimental 
Both 0.135 0.212 
Anxie ty 0.237 0.252 
Depression 0.200 0.147 
From Table 44, i t can be seen t h a t c o n t r o l type o f words has i t s 
lowest score on the "both" l i s t whereas experimental type o f words has 
i t s lowest score on the depression l i s t . On the other hand each type 
o f words has i t s h ighes t scores on the anxie ty l i s t . I t can also be 
seen t h a t pa t i en t s have a higher score o v e r a l l on the experimental 
s e l f - r a t e d words than on the c o n t r o l s e l f - r a t e d words. However, 
depression l i s t i s the only excep t ion , whereas pa t ien t s r e c a l l e d more 
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c o n t r o l s e l f - r a t e d words than experimental s e l f - r a t e d words. However, 
as b e f o r e , these d i f f e r e n c e s are not r e l i a b l e (F = 0.60; df = 2.38; 
p>0.5; see a l so Appendix 13). 
( v i i i ) Cor re l a t i ons ( w i t h o u t c o n t r o l s ) 
Table 45 shows the c o r r e l a t i o n m a t r i x . F i r s t l y , i t should be 
noted t h a t i ) i f c o r r e l a t i o n i s 0.602 then i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t a t p = 
0 .05, i i ) i f c o r r e l a t i o n i s 0.734 or higher then i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t on p 
= 0.01 and i i i ) i f the c o r r e l a t i o n i s lower than 0.602, then i t i s not 
s i g n i f i c a n t because the p r o b a b i l i t y i n t h i s case i s h igh . 
TABLE 45 : CORRELATION MATRIX (EXPERIMENTAL WORDS ONLY) 
Cor r e l a t i ons between Quest ionnaire Scores and Total 
R e c a l l , C l u s t e r i n g and "Propor t ion Measures" 
Measure 
Taken 
Word 
L i s t s 
Questionnaire Scores 
Anxie ty Depression Neuroticism 
Both -.5737 -.4144 -.0783 
Tota l Anx ie ty -.4715 -.1365 .2203 
Recall Depression -.4010 -.3756 .0487 
Both .3125 .1014 .3735 
C l u s t e r i n g Anxie ty - .2242 -.5177 -.0241 
Depression -.2887 -.2748 -.0086 
Propor t ion Both .5714 .3790 .1203 
Se l f -Ra ted Anx ie ty - .3386 .0911 -.0209 
Recalled Depression .5704 .1877 .1887 
R @ .0500 = .6021 R @ .0100 = .7348 
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Secondly, there are no s i g n i f i c a n t c o r r e l a t i o n s e i t h e r p o s i t i v e or 
nega t ive , i n t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n m a t r i x . However, there are f ou r 
i n t e r e s t i n g c o r r e l a t i o n s ; two o f them are p o s i t i v e and two of them are 
nega t ive ; a l l o f them are r e l i a b l e a t p>0.05. 
These are the anx ie ty score and t o t a l r e c a l l on the "both" l i s t 
( - 0 . 5 7 ) , the anx ie ty score and the p ropor t ion o f s e l f - r a t e d words 
r e c a l l e d f o r the "both" l i s t ( 0 . 5 7 ) , the anx ie ty score and the 
p r o p o r t i o n o f s e l f - r a t e d words r e c a l l e d f o r the depression l i s t (0.57 
and f i n a l l y , the depression score and c l u s t e r i n g score on the anxie ty 
l i s t ( - 0 . 5 1 ) . 
4 .4 Discussion 
Dealing w i t h the r e c a l l t o t a l s f i r s t , the o r i g i n a l hypothesis t ha t 
pa t i en t s would remember more experimental ad j ec t i ve s than neutra l 
a d j e c t i v e s i s borne out by the r e s u l t s . The o v e r a l l mean number o f 
experimental words r e c a l l e d by the pa t i en t s i s more than the o v e r a l l 
mean number o f neu t ra l words r e c a l l e d , so the d i f f e r e n c e i s s i g n i f i c a n t 
(see Appendix Z l ) . From Table 38 i t can be seen t h a t t h i s d i f f e r e n c e 
i s due t o a l l l i s t s , since i n every l i s t more experimental ad j ec t i ve s 
than neu t ra l a d j e c t i v e s are r e c a l l e d o v e r a l l two t r i a l s . 
For c o n t r o l s , i t was hypothesised t h a t there would be no 
d i f f e r e n c e i n r e c a l l between experimental and neut ra l a d j e c t i v e s . 
However, the o v e r a l l mean r e c a l l f o r experimental ad j ec t i ve s i s found 
to be h igher than f o r neu t ra l a d j e c t i v e s . From Table 27 i t can be seen 
t h a t t a k i n g a l l subjec ts o v e r a l l 2 t r i a l s , the d i f f e r e n c e o f a r e c a l l 
between experimental and c o n t r o l words i s highest on the anxie ty l i s t . 
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The o r i g i n a l hypothesis t h a t a l l subjects would r e c a l l more words 
o v e r a l l on the second t r i a l than on the f i r s t t r i a l i s borne out by the 
r e s u l t s . 
For c l u s t e r i n g scores, the o r i g i n a l hypothesis t h a t pa t i en t s would 
have higher c l u s t e r i n g scores f o r experimental words and tha t there 
would be no d i f f e r e n c e i n c l u s t e r i n g scores f o r con t ro l subjects was 
not borne ou t . 
Table 46 shows t h a t both groups had higher c l u s t e r i n g scores f o r 
the experimental words, but the d i f f e r e n c e was not s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t f o r e i t h e r group and the pa t i en t s have the smal les t 
d i f f e r e n c e . 
TABLE 46: MEAN OVERALL CLUSTERING SCORES FOR EXPERIMENTAL VERSUS 
NEUTRAL ADJECTIVES 
Subject Group Word Category 
Neutral Experimental 
Controls 0.428 0.510 
Pat ien ts 0.362 0.379 
As can be seen, c o n t r o l subjec ts c lu s t e red more o v e r a l l than p a t i e n t s , 
m i r r o r i n g t h e i r g rea te r o v e r a l l r e c a l l t o t a l s . However, t h i s r e s u l t i s 
not s i g n i f i c a n t (F = 0 .68; p>0 .4) . 
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A l s o , Table 47 below shows the mean c l u s t e r i n g scores f o r each 
sub jec t group 
TABLE 47: MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH SUBJECT GROUP 
Subject Groups 
Contro ls Pat ients 
0.469 0.371 
Although there are no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s o v e r a l l (F = 2.76; d f = 
1.18; see a lso Appendix Y) the analys is of variance revealed 
s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r a c t i o n e f f e c t s between l i s t and group (F = 4 .65; 
p<0.02; see a lso Appendix Y ) . 
Table 48 below shows the i n t e r a c t i o n e f f e c t s between l i s t and 
group: 
TABLE 48: INTERACTION BETWEEN LIST AND GROUP 
Groups 
Both 
L i s t s 
Anxie ty Depression 
Cont ro ls 
Pa t ien t s 
0.417 
0.361 
0.372 
0.434 
0.617 
0.316 
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F i r s t , o v e r a l l , pa t i en t s have a higher c l u s t e r i n g score f o r the anxie ty 
l i s t than f o r the "both" l i s t or the depression l i s t . Secondly, 
c o n t r o l s have a higher score f o r the depression l i s t than f o r the 
"both" l i s t , or f o r the anx ie ty l i s t . On the other hand, o v e r a l l , 
p a t i e n t s have t h e i r lowest c l u s t e r i n g score f o r the depression l i s t and 
c o n t r o l s have t h e i r lowest c l u s t e r i n g score f o r the anxie ty l i s t . 
For the p r o p o r t i o n o f 'yes ' s e l f - r a t e d ad j ec t i ve s out o f the t o t a l 
r e c a l l e d , the o r i g i n a l hypothesis t ha t pa t i en t s would have a higher 
score on t h i s measure f o r the experimental ad j ec t ives than on the 
neu t ra l a d j e c t i v e s was not borne out by the s t a t i s t i c a l ana lys i s . 
However, a grea ter p ropo r t i on o f the experimental ad j ec t ives c o r r e c t l y 
r e c a l l e d by the subjec ts were 'yes ' s e l f - r a t e d than the corresponding 
p r o p o r t i o n o f neu t ra l a d j e c t i v e s whereas the opposi te was t rue f o r the 
c o n t r o l subjects (see Table 34 ) . 
The o ther po in t o f i n t e r e s t i s found when the data i s broken down 
i n terms o f l i s t s . From Table 33 i t can be seen t h a t f o r pa t i en t s the 
g rea tes t p r o p o r t i o n o f 'yes ' s e l f - r a t e d a d j e c t i v e s which were c o r r e c t l y 
r e c a l l e d i s found i n the experimental h a l f o f the anxie ty l i s t . 
For the c o r r e l a t i o n between the ques t ionnai re scores and the three 
measures c a r r i e d out on the experimental ad j ec t i ve s only one o f the 
o r i g i n a l hypotheses was borne out by the r e s u l t s . This was t ha t there 
would be a p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between anxie ty score and the 
p r o p o r t i o n o f yes s e l f - r a t e d words r e c a l l e d f rom the "both" l i s t and 
t h i s was borne out by the " i n c l u d i n g c o n t r o l s " par t o f the r e s u l t s . 
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One more o f the hypotheses was disproved by the " i n c l u d i n g 
c o n t r o l s " p a r t o f the r e s u l t s as w e l l , i . e . t ha t there would be a 
s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between depression scores and the 
t o t a l r e c a l l e d on the "both" l i s t . Instead o f a p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n 
there was a negat ive one. Thus the more depressed pa t ien t s were, the 
less experimental a d j e c t i v e s they were l i k e l y to r e c a l l f rom the "both" 
l i s t , or v i c e versa - the more experimental a d j e c t i v e s a sub jec t 
r e c a l l e d f rom the "both" l i s t , the lower t h e i r depression score was 
l i k e l y to be. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
General Discussion 
Looking f i r s t l y a t the f i r s t experiment f o r a l l l i s t s , i n the 
p a t i e n t vs . c o n t r o l groups comparison there was an e f f e c t o f t r i a l s as 
expected. Recall o f a l l words increased w i t h t r i a l s as d i d c l u s t e r i n g . 
However, there was no d i f f e r e n c e between subjec t groups f o r r e c a l l and 
there was a small and n o n s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e in agoraphobics' group 
f o r c l u s t e r i n g . 
This r e f u t e s one o f the hypotheses t h a t pa t ien ts should remember 
more experimental words o v e r a l l than con t ro l subjects and show greater 
c l u s t e r i n g o f experimental words. 
The f i n d i n g s o f t h i s experiment does not provide support f o r 
Beck's (1978) proposal t h a t a t l e a s t depressives possess negative 
self-schemata which were de f ined as s table c o g n i t i v e pat terns o f 
response t o s i m i l a r types o f events , leading to a cons i s ten t set o f 
negat ive s e l f r e fe rences . However Davis (1979) has i n f e r r e d t ha t shor t 
term depressives may lack schemata to represent the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between personal a d j e c t i v e s and t h e i r perceived a t t r i b u t e s and 
behaviours . He also suggests t h a t undergraduate depressives (and these 
ones can be compared w i t h the o u t - p a t i e n t s o f the f i r s t experiment) 
tend to have shor t term depressions, i n f e r r i n g t h a t they had not ye t 
developed s t ab le se l f -schemata . That i s , the words ra ted as 
s e l f - d e s c r i p t i v e may only have received such a r a t i n g f o r as long as 
those sub jec t s had been " i d i o s y n c r a t i c a l l y d i s t o r t i n g personal 
i n f o r m a t i o n to f i t a negat ive bias" i . e . f o r as long as they had been 
depressed. 
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Consequently the o u t - p a t i e n t shor t term depressives may have 
lacked a f a m i l i a r i t y advantage w i t h such words and may have shown 
d e f i c i t s i n o rgan i sa t i on as a r e s u l t . The c o g n i t i v e theory o f 
depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw and Emery, 1978) has not taken i n t o 
account the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t shor t - t e rm o u t - p a t i e n t depressives do not 
descr ibe themselves c o n s i s t e n t l y . In f a c t Davis suggests t ha t Beck's 
theory i t s e l f (Beck and Rush, 1978) might r equ i re minor m o d i f i c a t i o n 
s ince i t s ta tes t h a t depressives employ r e l a t i v e l y s table negative 
schemata f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g (or d i s t o r t i n g ) i n fo rma t ion r e l a t i v e to one's 
behaviours or a t t r i b u t e s , and makes no d i s t i n c t i o n between shor t - te rm 
o u t - p a t i e n t and longTterm i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d depressives. 
However there was a d i f f e r e n c e between groups in the depression 
vs . anx ie ty and agoraphobia groups comparison on the depression l i s t . 
The depressives were more l i k e l y t o r e c a l l depressive words than the 
anx ie ty and agoraphobia group. However, r e c a l l was s i m i l a r between the 
depression group and the c o n t r o l group. 
On the o ther hand t h i s f i n d i n g was not mi r ro red i n the analysis on 
the c l u s t e r i n g scores since the corresponding c l u s t e r i n g scores 
d i f f e r e n c e s were not s i g n i f i c a n t ( p > 0 . 1 ) . This d i f f e r e n c e between 
c l u s t e r i n g scores and t o t a l r e c a l l scores was not to be expected as 
c l u s t e r i n g f a c i l i t a t e s r e c a l l as a sub jec t i s imposing his own 
o rgan i s a t i on on the words, al though i t can be said i n general t ha t a 
h igher c l u s t e r i n g score does not imply o b l i g a t o r i l y a greater word 
r e c a l l . 
As the depression group d i d not d i f f e r f rom the c o n t r o l s ' group in 
the r e c a l l or c l u s t e r i n g o f depression words i t i s l i k e l y tha t the 
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d i f f e r e n c e between the depression group and the anxie ty group can be 
a t t r i b u t a b l e to the anx ie ty group. I t may be t h a t the anxie ty s ta te i s 
not s i m i l a r t o depression i n t h a t the negative self-schema, i f i t i s 
present , does not ac t as an instrument which enhances memory f o r 
negat ive emotional words (depress ive , anxious and agoraphobic) but the 
a n x i e t y i t s e l f avoids these words and, though remembered, prefers to 
concentrate more on the s a f e r , neu t ra l words. 
I t may a lso be t h a t the neu t ra l words are more memorable and t ha t 
the depressive group do have enhanced memory f o r depressive words but 
t h i s i s u n l i k e l y as the depression vs . con t ro l s comparison showed no 
evidence f o r t h i s . 
There was a lso an e f f e c t o f t r i a l s ; r e c a l l increased w i t h t r i a l s . 
However i t i s not happening the same i n c l u s t e r i n g although in both 
cases the d i f f e r e n c e s among t r i a l s are not s i g n i f i c a n t (p>0.1 and 
p>0.07) . Looking a t the anx ie ty vs . con t ro l groups comparison on the 
a n x i e t y l i s t , aga in , there was no b ig d i f f e r e n c e between groups. 
However there was an i n t e r e s t i n g e f f e c t o f word type; anxie ty words 
were c l u s t e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y more than neu t ra l words. S i m i l a r l y , 
agoraphobia and depression words were c lus t e red more than neutra l 
words. Although there i s not enough in fo rma t ion about t h a t i n t o t a l 
r e c a l l , the f a c t t h a t the e f f e c t o f word type was in favour o f 
experimental words seem to be c o n t r a d i c t o r y to the f a c t t h a t there was 
no d i f f e r e n c e between subjec t groups. 
But the f a c t t h a t anx ie ty words were c lus t e red more than neutra l 
words by a l l groups i n a d d i t i o n w i t h the f a c t t ha t a l l the groups 
( i n c l u d i n g c o n t r o l s ) c l u s t e r e d more the experimental words than the 
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neu t ra l words, r e f u t e s support f o r Beck and Rush's (1978) proposal t ha t 
anx ie ty imposes a negat ive s e l f schema on the anxious i n d i v i d u a l s i n 
the same way as agoraphobia do (Addison, 1981). 
The f a c t t h a t a l l kinds of experimental words ( i . e . anx ie ty , 
depression and agoraphobia words) are i n general c lus te red more than 
the neu t ra l words by a l l groups, even by the con t ro l group, may be due 
to the f a c t t h a t experimental words are more e a s i l y c lus te red than 
c o n t r o l words since experimental words are s i m i l a r to each other and 
they are r e f e r r e d to the same s i t u a t i o n ( i . e . a n x i e t y , depression and 
agoraphobia) whereas neu t ra l words cannot be organised so e a s i l y since 
each o f them i s r e f e r r e d to d i f f e r e n t contexts and s i t u a t i o n s . 
On the o ther hand there i s a lso a p o s s i b i l i t y f o r the experimental 
words t h a t they would have been c lus t e red more than they were but a l l 
p a t i e n t s are suppressing the emotional words; however t h i s i s u n l i k e l y 
as the p a t i e n t s ' vs c o n t r o l s ' group comparison showed no evidence f o r 
t h i s . Therefore f rom a l l these one cannot r u l e out completely the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t anxious people do possess a negative self-schema. The 
f a c t t h a t there were no group d i f f e r e n c e s a t a l l may r e f l e c t a 
d i f f e r e n c e between the severely anxious and non-severely anxious 
p a t i e n t s . 
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Table 49 (see a lso F i g . 15) shows t ha t i n the c l u s t e r i n g analysis 
there was also a three way i n t e r a c t i o n - n o n - s i g n i f i c a n t though -
between groups, word-type and t r i a l s 
TABLE 49 : MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH WORD-TYPE AND 
EACH TRIAL BY EACH SUBJECT GROUP 
Group 1 Agoraphobics 
Type o f Words 
T r i a l s Experimental Control 
1 0.766 0.692 
2 0.674 0.509 
3 0.634 0.576 
4 0.741 0.643 
Group 2 : Depressives 
Type of Words 
T r i a l s Experimental Control 
1 0.645 0.456 
2 0,680 0.627 
3 0.633 0.560 
4 0,613 0.517 
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Group 3 : Anxious 
Type o f Words 
T r i a l s Experimental Control 
1 0.752 0.479 
2 0.665 0.470 
3 0.642 0.546 
4 0.638 0.538 
Group 4 : Controls 
Type of Words 
T r i a l s Experimental Control 
1 0.688 0.598 
2 0.619 0.516 
3 0.649 0.561 
4 0.613 0.541 
(F = 1.23; d f = 9,126; p>0.2) 
On t r i a l 1 the depressed and anxious subjects show greater scores i n 
c l u s t e r i n g o f experimental words compared to neu t ra l words, but t h i s 
d i f f e r e n c e i s less marked f o r agoraphobics and c o n t r o l s . So in t h i s 
three way i n t e r a c t i o n , t r i a l 1 i s the c r i t i c a l t r i a l . This i s the 
f i r s t exposure to i t ems , and the anxie ty and depressive subjects may 
o v e r r i d e t h e i r suppression of experimental words i n order to do wel l on 
r e c a l l , whereas i n the remaining t r i a l s , performance i s good enough on 
the experimental words to dampen r e c a l l o f neut ra l words. 
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Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t i f , as hypothesised b e f o r e , t he 
a n x i e t y and d e p r e s s i v e s u b j e c t s possess a n e g a t i v e self-schema, they 
p i c k o u t t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l words on t r i a l one a t t h e f i r s t exposure but 
the r e m a i n i n g t r i a l s may g i v e s u f f i c i e n t exposure t o o v e r r i d e some o f 
the e m o t i o n a l i t y e f f e c t s . There was a l s o , as s a i d b e f o r e , an e f f e c t o f 
t r i a l s i n each comparison : r e c a l l and c l u s t e r i n g i n general increased 
w i t h t r i a l s . 
The f i r s t e xperiment was l a c k i n g i n many r e s p e c t s . I n t h e 
o r i g i n a l s t u d y , T u l v i n g (1962) used 16 t r i a l s , and scored t he r e c a l l 
f o r t h e r e p e a t e d o r d e r i n g o f c e r t a i n items s e q u e n t i a l l y . I n t h e 
p r e s e n t e x p e r i m e n t , as e x p l a i n e d p r e v i o u s l y , o n l y f o u r t r i a l s were 
p o s s i b l e . T h i s meant t h a t a more crude a n a l y s i s o f the data had t o be 
adopted. 
A l s o t h e words r e c a l l e d i n c l u s t e r s by emotional s u b j e c t s and 
t h e i r c o n t r o l s , were emotional o r n o t as desig n a t e d by the 
e x p e r i m e n t e r . More c o n t r o l l e d work has t o be done on t h i s aspect both 
t o e l u c i d a t e aspects o f the mechanism proposed here as o r g a n i s i n g t he 
m a t e r i a l , and a l s o t o e l a b o r a t e upon t h e n a t u r e o f t h e type o f items 
i n v o l v e d i n d e p r e s s i o n , a n x i e t y and agoraphobia r e c a l l . 
A p a r t from s t r i n g e n t c o n t r o l on f a c t o r s t h a t were beyond t h e 
c o n t r o l o f t h e p r e s e n t s t u d y ( i . e . sample number, matching groups f o r 
c e r t a i n f a c t o r s e t c . ) more a t t e n t i o n c o u l d be devoted t o d e v e l o p i n g t h e 
approach used i n t h i s s t u d y . For i n s t a n c e l o n g e r word l i s t s , more 
t r i a l s , s e t s o f s t i m u l u s words arranged i n an "emotional h i e r a r c h y " 
( u s i n g a d d i t i o n a l l y s e v e r e l y a n x i o u s , depressed and agoraphobic 
s u b j e c t s ' r e p o r t s as w e l l as t h e p r e s e n t experiment's s u b j e c t s ' 
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r e p o r t s , imagery values and so o n ) . T h i s would y i e l d more i n f o r m a t i o n 
c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s and p r o c e s s i n g o c c u r i n g f o r and between 
e m o t i o n a l i t e m s . 
D e s p i t e these l i m i t a t i o n s c l e a r answers were p r o v i d e d f o r the aims 
o f t h e f i r s t e x p e r i m e n t . S h o r t - t e r m o u t - p a t i e n t depressives i n t h i s 
s t u d y do n o t show t h e same s u p e r i o r r e c a l l and c l u s t e r i n g o f depressive 
words as t h e i r s e v e r e l y depressed c o u n t e r p a r t s . This suggests t h a t 
t h e y a r e q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t and p r o v i d e s s u p p o r t f o r Davis' (1979) 
t h e o r y t h a t s h o r t term d e p r e s s i v e s do n o t possess s t a b l e n e g a t i v e 
self-schema. 
A l s o c l e a r f r o m t h i s s t u d y was t h a t non-severely anxious and 
agoraphobia s u b j e c t s do n o t show t h e same f a c i l i t a t i o n f o r the 
c l u s t e r i n g and r e c a l l o f a n x i e t y and agoraphobia words as t h e i r 
s e v e r e l y anxious and agoraphobic c o u n t e r p a r t s . This suggests t h a t Beck 
and Rush (1978) were e i t h e r i n c o r r e c t i n t h e i r proposal t h a t a n x i e t y 
imposes a n e g a t i v e s e l f schema on t h e anxious i n d i v i d u a l i n the same 
way as phobias do, o r t h a t n o n - s e v e r e l y anxious s u b j e c t s are 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t t o t h e i r s e v e r e l y anxious c o u n t e r p a r t s . 
One p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a r i s e s from t h i s experiment i s t h a t where 
phobics are i n a way more drawn t o phobic items and r e c a l l and c l u s t e r 
these b e t t e r than n e u t r a l i t e m s , a n x i o u s , o r a t l e a s t non-severely 
anxious i n d i v i d u a l s , a r e , i n a way, drawn, as w e l l , t o anxious items 
b u t a t t h e same t i m e t h e y a v o i d some p a r t o f n e g a t i v e emotional words. 
A l t h o u g h t h e y seem t o remember more a n x i e t y words than n e u t r a l words, 
t h e y a l s o seem t o supress r e c a l l o f these i t e m s . 
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However t h i s proposal goes hand i n hand w i t h the f a c t t h a t anxious 
people are a l s o anxious t o p e r f o r i n w e l l on t h e experiment and t h e r e i s 
a p o i n t when t h i s f a c t o r may o v e r r i d e t h e d e s i r e t o suppress emotional 
items f o r t h e sake o f performance, i f i t i s o t h e r w i s e l i k e l y t o be low. 
In p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s p a t t e r n i s apparent f o r d e p r e s s i v e , a n x i e t y and 
agoraphobia words, s u g g e s t i n g t h a t anxious s u b j e c t s w i l l behave i n t h i s 
way f o r d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f emotional words. 
Looking a t t h e second e x p e r i m e n t , none o f t h e o r i g i n a l t h r e e 
hypotheses were borne o u t by t h e r e s u l t s . However, these a l l p r e d i c t e d 
t h a t t h e t h r e e measures taken ( i e r e c a l l t o t a l , c l u s t e r i n g p r o p o r t i o n 
score and p r o p o r t i o n o f "yes" s e l f - r a t e d a d j e c t i v e s c o r r e c t l y r e c a l l e d ) 
would d i s t i n g u i s h t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l a d j e c t i v e s o v e r a l l ( i . e . l i s t s and 
t r i a l s combined) f r o m t h e n e u t r a l a d j e c t i v e s . 
However, what was n o t e x p l i c i t l y h y p o t h e s i s e d but was i n f e r r e d i n 
the i n t r o d u c t i o n was t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t word l i s t s would have an 
e f f e c t , t h e main e f f e c t being e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d t h a t the g r e a t e s t 
d i s t i n c t i o n between e x p e r i m e n t a l and n e u t r a l words would be found i n 
t h e " b o t h " l i s t . T h i s , however, does n o t seem t o have been the case. 
D e s p i t e t h i s a number o f s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r a c t i o n s i n v o l v i n g word l i s t s , 
t r i a l s , a d j e c t i v e t y p e and s u b j e c t group i n v a r i o u s combinations were 
found. Some o f these p r o v i d e t e n t a t i v e s u p p o r t f o r c o g n i t i v e 
o r g a n i s a t i o n per se and p o s s i b l y self-schema t y p e c o g n i t i v e 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . But t h i s can o n l y be demonstrated by d i s c u s s i o n o f these 
r e s u l t s . 
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So, l o o k i n g f i r s t a t t h e a n x i e t y l i s t s e v e r a l s i g n i f i c a n t p a t t e r n s 
were found . The p i c t u r e t h a t emerges fr o m these p a t t e r n s i s one where 
s u b j e c t s r e c a l l more a d j e c t i v e s o v e r a l l on t h e second t r i a l than on the 
f i r s t t r i a l a l t h o u g h t h e co r r e s p o n d i n g p a r t o f the r e s u l t s was not 
s i g n i f i c a n t . 
TABLE 50 : MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED FOR EACH WORD-TYPE 
AND EACH TRIAL ON THE ANXIETY LIST 
A n x i e t y L i s t 
Type o f Words 
T r i a l s C o n t r o l Experimental 
1 2.600 4.350 
2 3.150 4.700 
(F = 0.64; d f = 2,36; p>0.5) 
TABLE 51 : MEAN CLUSTERING SCORE FOR EACH WORD-TYPE 
AND EACH TRIAL ON THE ANXIETY LIST 
A n x i e t y L i s t 
Type o f Words 
T r i a l s C o n t r o l Experimental 
1 0.482 0.322 
2 0.431 0.400 
(F = 0.61; d f = 2,36; p>0.5) 
Cluster in^ 
Scores 
0.5 i 
0.4 
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Tables 50 and 51 (see a l s o F i g . 16 and 17) show on the f i r s t t r i a l 
t h e y r e c a l l more anxious a d j e c t i v e s than n e u t r a l a d j e c t i v e s a l t h o u g h 
these anxious a d j e c t i v e s are l e s s c l u s t e r e d than t he n e u t r a l 
a d j e c t i v e s . On t h e second t r i a l , t h e o v e r a l l i n c r e a s e i n the number o f 
a d j e c t i v e s r e c a l l e d i s due t o the s u b j e c t s r e c a l l i n g more n e u t r a l 
a d j e c t i v e s than on t h e f i r s t t r i a l , b ut n o t so s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n c r e a s i n g 
t h e number o f anxious a d j e c t i v e s they r e c a l l e d . Thus, the r e c a l l on 
t h e second t r i a l i s composed o f more n e u t r a l a d j e c t i v e s than anxious 
a d j e c t i v e s , i . e . t h e r e l a t i v e c o m p o s i t i o n i s the reverse o f the f i r s t 
t r i a l c o m p o s i t i o n . F u r t h e r , t h e c l u s t e r i n g f o r the n e u t r a l a d j e c t i v e s 
decreases on t h e second t r i a l , so t h i s cannot be c i t e d as being r e l a t e d 
t o t h e i n c r e a s e d r e c a l l t o t a l . So, i t would seem t h a t some memory 
enhancing s t r a t e g y o t h e r than s u b j e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n on the basis o f 
a d j e c t i v e c a t e g o r y i s bei n g used on t h e second t r i a l . I t seems t h a t 
s u b j e c t s h a v i n g used s u b j e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n on the f i r s t t r i a l r e j e c t 
t h i s s t r a t e g y and s i m p l y t r y t o r e c a l l t h e a d j e c t i v e s they d i d n o t 
r e c a l l on t h e f i r s t t r i a l . I t may be p o s s i b l e t h a t they adopted 
a n o t h e r form o f s u b j e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n , e.g. c l u s t e r i n g a d j e c t i v e s 
t o g e t h e r on t h e b a s i s o f same i n i t i a l l e t t e r ( s ) , which would n o t 
be d e t e c t e d by t h e c l u s t e r i n g measure used. (E.g. s u b j e c t s c o u l d 
c l u s t e r "stormy", " s o l i t a r y " and "savage", t o g e t h e r ) . I f a c l u s t e r i n g 
measure was being made on t h e b a s i s o f i n i t i a l l e t t e r then t he number 
o f r e p e t i t i o n s ( r ) would be 2, however w i t h t h e c l u s t e r i n g measure 
used, i . e . on t h e b a s i s o f a n x i o u s / n e u t r a l c a t e g o r y , t he number o f 
r e p e t i t i o n s i s zero s i n c e " s o l i t a r y " belongs t o a n e u t r a l c a t e g o r y , 
whereas t h e o t h e r two a d j e c t i v e s belong t o the anxious c a t e g o r y (see 
A n x i e t y l i s t . Appendix P). 
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One p a t i e n t a c t u a l l y made i t c l e a r t h a t he was u s i n g a s t r a t e g y o f 
encoding t h e words by t h e a l p h a b e t , t o see i f t he i n i t i a l l e t t e r sounds 
would a c t as a r e t r i e v a l cue f o r t h e p h o n e t i c a l l y - e n c o d e d words. 
But t h i s does n o t w h o l l y e x p l a i n why t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n o f 
decreased c a t e g o r y c l u s t e r i n g f o r n e u t r a l type o f a d j e c t i v e s on t h e 
second t r i a l was observed o n l y f o r t h e a n x i e t y l i s t s i n c e examination 
o f a l l t h r e e l i s t s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e maximum number o f r e p e t i t i o n s on 
th e b a s i s o f i n i t i a l l e t t e r f o r each l i s t are r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t : f o r 
the " b o t h " l i s t i t i s e i g h t , and f o r t h e o t h e r two l i s t s i t i s seven. 
I t a l s o does n o t e x p l a i n why t h i s p a t t e r n f o r t o t a l r e c a l l was 
observed both f o r t h e p a t i e n t s and f o r the c o n t r o l s on t h e a n x i e t y 
l i s t as can be seen i n Table 52 (see a l s o F i g . 18) below: 
TABLE 52 : MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS RECALLED FOR EACH WORD-TYPE 
AND EACH LIST BY EACH SUBJECT GROUP 
a) C o n t r o l s 
Type o f Words 
L i s t s C o n t r o l Experimental 
Both 3.813 5.438 
A n x i e t y 3.625 6.188 
Depression 4.125 5.250 
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b) P a t i e n t s 
Type o f Words 
L i s t s C o n t r o l Experimental 
Both 3.000 3.250 
A n x i e t y 2.375 3.417 
Depression 2.917 3.167 
(F = 0.42; d f = 2,36; p>0.6 - This r e s u l t i s n o t s i g n i f i c a n t ) 
The o r i g i n a l e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e t he best one i . e . s u b j e c t s are 
anxious t o do w e l l on the second t r i a l and having used s u b j e c t i v e 
o r g a n i s a t i o n t h e y a r e aware t h a t they have remembered more anxious 
a d j e c t i v e s than n e u t r a l a d j e c t i v e s on t h e f i r s t t r i a l so t r y and 
remember a l l t h e n e u t r a l a d j e c t i v e s they l e f t o ut on the f i r s t t r i a l a t 
th e expense o f t h e anxious a d j e c t i v e s . 
From t h e " b o t h " l i s t r e s u l t s t h e r e are a number o f p o i n t s o f 
i n t e r e s t . The f i n d i n g o f a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between 
a n x i e t y scores and t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f c o r r e c t l y r e c a l l e d s e l f - r a t e d 
" b o t h " c o n t e n t a d j e c t i v e s g i v e s s u p p o r t t o a self-schema organised i n 
terms o f a n x i e t y and d e p r e s s i o n . The h i g h e s t a n x i e t y scores were shown 
by t h e p a t i e n t s (See Appendix T) and o v e r a l l a l l s u b j e c t s were about 
h a l f as depressed as t h e y were a n x i o u s , thus t h e r e i s a s i m i l a r but 
weaker c o r r e l a t i o n between d e p r e s s i o n scores and t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f 
" b o t h " a d j e c t i v e s which were c o r r e c t l y r e c a l l e d (see Table 3 5 ) . 
So, t a k i n g these f a c t s t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e f i n d i n g t h a t the 
p a t i e n t s ' h i g h e s t p r o p o r t i o n o f c o r r e c t l y r e c a l l e d s e l f - r e f e r e n t 
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a d j e c t i v e s were t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l a d j e c t i v e s from the "both" l i s t , i t 
appears t h a t p a t i e n t s remember these words because they are 
s e l f - r e f e r e n t r a t h e r than t h e y s e l f - r a t e t h e a d j e c t i v e s because they 
have c o r r e c t l y r e c a l l e d them. I t i s c l e a r t h a t these words from the 
" b o t h " l i s t are m o s t l y s e l f - r e f e r e n t f o r the p a t i e n t s because they 
c o n t a i n components o f both a n x i e t y and d e p r e s s i o n , r e f l e c t i n g the 
components o f t h e p a t i e n t s ' emotional d i s o r d e r s i n every way except the 
r e l a t i v e p r o p o r t i o n s o f t h e two components. 
That i s , p a t i e n t s have lower d e p r e s s i o n scores than a n x i e t y scores 
whereas t h e a n x i e t y and d e p r e s s i o n d e s c r i p t i v e n e s s r a t i n g s f o r the 
e x p e r i m e n t a l " b o t h " a d j e c t i v e s are r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t . This e x p l a i n s 
why t h e r e i s o n l y a weak c o r r e l a t i o n between depression scores and the 
s e l f - r e f e r e n t p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e c o r r e c t l y r e c a l l e d e x p e r i m e n t a l 
a d j e c t i v e s f r o m t h e " b o t h " l i s t . 
T h i s f i n d i n g i s n o t c o m p l e t e l y comparable t o Derry and Kuiper's 
(1981) f i n d i n g t h a t d e p r e s s i v e s r e c a l l a g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n o f 
depressed c o n t e n t s e l f - r a t e d a d j e c t i v e s than nondepressed c o n t e n t 
a d j e c t i v e s s i n c e t h e i r p r o p o r t i o n was taken o u t o f the number o f 
a f f i r m a t i v e l y s e l f - r a t e d a d j e c t i v e s , whereas t h e one used here was 
taken o u t o f t h e numbers o f a d j e c t i v e s c o r r e c t l y r e c a l l e d . So, whereas 
t h e i r measure a d j u s t e d f o r t h e number o f y e s - r a t i n g s , the measure used 
here a d j u s t e d f o r t o t a l r e c a l l . 
However, a p o s t hoc a n a l y s i s u s i n g t h e same c a l c u l a t i o n as Derry & 
K u i p e r r e v e a l e d s i m i l a r f i n d i n g s namely t h a t p a t i e n t s r e c a l l more 
s e l f - r a t e d " b o t h " c o n t e n t a d j e c t i v e s than non-"both" c o n t e n t and 
a d j e c t i v e s . 
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The mean a d j u s t e d r e c a l l scores f o r " b o t h " c o n t e n t a d j e c t i v e s and 
non-"both" c o n t e n t a d j e c t i v e s are r e s p e c t i v e l y 0.23 and 0.11, Derry & 
Kuiper's were : 0.41 and 0.16 f o r depressed c o n t e n t a d j e c t i v e s and non 
depressed c o n t e n t a d j e c t i v e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h is i s a lower p r o p o r t i o n 
t han Derry & Ku i p e r ' s p a t i e n t s remembered. Since t h e r e were o n l y 
t w e l v e p a t i e n t s used i n t h i s experiment and twenty i n Derry & Kuiper's 
t h i s c o u l d be due t o a d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e two group's c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 
I n f a c t , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o a s c e r t a i n t h a t t h e two groups are d i f f e r e n t 
w i t h r e s p e c t t o age and gender c o m p o s i t i o n : the p a t i e n t s ' average age 
i n t h i s e x p e r i ment was 40.8 years compared w i t h 32 years i n Derry & 
Kui p e r ' s group, and t h e p a t i e n t s group was h a l f males and h a l f females 
compared w i t h a l l females i n Derry & Kuiper's group. The debate about 
p o s s i b l e sex-based d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e q u a l i t y o f emotional d i s o r d e r 
a r i s e s from t h e f a c t t h a t r o u g h l y t w i c e as many women as men seek 
t r e a t m e n t f o r e m o t i o n a l d i s o r d e r s (Amenson and Lewinsohn, 1981). 
However, t h e debate c o n t i n u e s and f o r t h e purposes o f t h i s experiment 
i t i s assumed t h a t whatever t h e p o s s i b l e d i f f e r e n c e s i n o r i g i n s o f male 
and female d e p r e s s i o n , t h e u n d e r l y i n g c o g n i t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n i s not 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t . But these f a c t o r s are o n l y w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g 
i f one i s assuming t h a t t h e d e p r e s s i o n self-schema operates i n the same 
way and t o t h e same e x t e n t as t h e a n x i e t y - d e p r e s s i o n self-schema which 
i s b e i n g proposed. 
The p a t i e n t s ' performance on t h e a n x i e t y l i s t i n d i c a t e s t h a t i f 
th e y a r e o r g a n i s i n g t h e i r r e c a l l on t h e basis o f an u n d e r l y i n g 
s e l f - s c h e m a , t h e n t h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e i s n o t c o n s i s t e n t l y 
evoked, thus l e a d i n g t o t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t o v e r a l l a much weaker ( i n 
terms o f c o n s i s t e n c y ) self-schema e x i s t s f o r anxious-depressed 
p a t i e n t s . 
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The c o n t r o l s came up w i t h a s u r p r i s i n g r e s u l t on the a n x i e t y l i s t 
(see Table 52 and F i g . 1 8 ) . T h i s was t h e l i s t on which they r e c a l l e d -
n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y though - much more ex p e r i m e n t a l a d j e c t i v e s than 
n e u t r a l a d j e c t i v e s . T h i s i s p o s s i b l y r e l a t e d t o c l u s t e r i n g (see Table 
30 and F i g . 9) s i n c e t h e c l u s t e r i n g i s g r e a t e r f o r anxious a d j e c t i v e s . 
But t h i s r e s u l t i s p e c u l i a r because o v e r a l l f o r c o n t r o l s u b j e c t s , a low 
p r o p o r t i o n o f c l u s t e r i n g was found on t h e a n x i e t y l i s t whereas a h i g h 
o v e r a l l t o t a l r e c a l l was a l s o found f o r the a n x i e t y l i s t . What t h i s 
would appear t o mean i s t h a t t he a b s o l u t e amount o f c l u s t e r i n g has n o t 
i n c r e a s e d compared t o the o t h e r two l i s t s (because the c l u s t e r i n g 
p r o p o r t i o n score i s c a l c u l a t e d so t h a t i t i s i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e 
t o t a l r e c a l l score - see R e s u l t s under 'measures t a k e n ' ) . I f i t had 
i n c r e a s e d , t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f c l u s t e r i n g would have remained the same. 
So much l e s s o f t h i s e f f e c t can be a s c r i b e d t o s u b j e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n 
i . e . i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t c o n t r o l s were u s i n g s u b j e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n t o 
r e c a l l some o f t h e a d j e c t i v e s but n o t a t a l l c l e a r why they managed t o 
r e c a l l so many o f t h e o t h e r s , a p p a r e n t l y w i t h o u t t h e a i d o f s u b j e c t i v e 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . However, t h e answer t o t h i s may l i e i n the f a c t t h a t 
o v e r a l l , c o n t r o l s r e c a l l e d a g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n o f s e l f - r a t e d anxious 
c o n t e n t a d j e c t i v e s than n e u t r a l c o n t e n t a d j e c t i v e s f o r the a n x i e t y 
l i s t . 
Thus c o n t r o l s may have been d i s p l a y i n g s u p e r i o r r e c a l l f o r some 
anxious c o n t e n t a d j e c t i v e s because t h e y were s e l f - r e f e r e n t . So i t 
seems t h a t c o n t r o l s u b j e c t s were d i s p l a y i n g s u p e r i o r r e c a l l f o r anxious 
c o n t e n t per se and because o f t h e i r g r e a t e r s e l f - r e f e r e n c e . This 
suggests an a n x i e t y self-schema, but t h e f e a t u r e o f t h i s schema i s t h a t 
i t does n o t l e a d t o h i g h l y o r g a n i s e d r e c a l l , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t the 
u n d e r l y i n g schema i s n o t h i g h l y o r g a n i s e d o r t h a t i t leads t o 
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d i s o r g a n i s e d r e c a l l . T h i s i s a s i m i l a r f i n d i n g t o Nunn e t a l (1984) 
where s e l e c t i v e memory e f f e c t s w i t h o u t c o r r e s p o n d i n g c l u s t e r i n g were 
found. I t may be t h a t when the schema i s a c t i v a t e d t h i s induces a 
s l i g h t l y anxious mood o r response and t h i s leads t o the 
d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n . There i s a q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e here between the 
c o n t r o l s and t h e p a t i e n t s . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t f o r the p a t i e n t s on the 
second t r i a l , t h e a n x i e t y schema had become so s t r o n g l y a c t i v a t e d t h a t 
t h e d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n o f r e c a l l was combined w i t h suppression o f anxious 
a d j e c t i v e s t o a v o i d f u r t h e r a c t i v a t i o n o f t h e a n x i e t y schema and 
f u r t h e r mood i n d u c t i o n . 
Thus, t h i s i s t h e i r coping s t r a t e g y , compared w i t h t he c o n t r o l 
s u b j e c t s ' which was t o d i l u t e t h e anxious a d j e c t i v e s r e c a l l e d by 
i n t e r s p e r s i n g them w i t h n e u t r a l a d j e c t i v e s . 
Now, t h e d e p r e s s i o n l i s t i s d i s c u s s e d . Since the depression 
component o f t h e p a t i e n t s ' e m otional d i s o r d e r was not p a r t i c u l a r l y 
l a r g e , s t r i k i n g e f f e c t s o f s e l e c t i v e memory f o r depressed c o n t e n t 
a d j e c t i v e s a t t h e expense o f n e u t r a l a d j e c t i v e s , s u b j e c t i v e 
o r g a n i s a t i o n ( c l u s t e r i n g ) on t h e b a s i s o f depression and a high 
p r o p o r t i o n o f s e l f - r a t e d r e c a l l were n o t expected and nor were they 
f o u n d . 
F i n a l l y , t h e c o r r e l a t i o n s are di s c u s s e d . The n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n 
between t h e d e p r e s s i o n q u e s t i o n n a i r e score and the number o f 
e x p e r i m e n t a l a d j e c t i v e s r e c a l l e d from t he " b o t h " l i s t seems t o suggest 
one o f two t h i n g s . E i t h e r t he more depressed a person i s the les s 
l i k e l y t h e y are t o r e c a l l e x p e r i m e n t a l a d j e c t i v e s from t he "both" l i s t 
( w h i c h i m p l i e s t h a t t h e y are suppr e s s i n g them or n o t a t t e n d i n g t o them 
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a t some stage i n c o g n i t i v e o p e r a t i o n s ) , or t h a t t he more experimental 
a d j e c t i v e s t h e y r e c a l l from t h e " b o t h " l i s t t h e l e s s l i k e l y t h e y are t o 
be depressed. Since the c o n t r o l s were l e s s depressed than the 
p a t i e n t s , what t h i s amounts t o i s the f a c t t h a t c o n t r o l s r e c a l l e d more 
o f t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l " b o t h " words than t h e p a t i e n t s . Thus i t i s unwise 
t o jump t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t p a t i e n t s were suppressing "both" 
a d j e c t i v e s when t h i s e f f e c t can be e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f d i f f e r i n g 
group c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i e t h e p a t i e n t s ' d e f i c i t was due t o a general 
d e f i c i t on memory. 
However, such s t r o n g n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n s were not found f o r the 
o t h e r two l i s t s , so i t would appear t h a t e i t h e r suppression on the p a r t 
o f t h e p a t i e n t s o r enhanced r e c a l l on t h e p a r t o f t h e c o n t r o l s i s s t i l l 
a p o s s i b i l i t y which needs t o be t e s t e d u s i n g s u b j e c t groups matched f o r 
academic a b i l i t y (and by i n f e r e n c e , memory c a p a c i t y ) . S i m i l a r l y , t h e r e 
i s a n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between dep r e s s i o n score and the p r o p o r t i o n 
o f c l u s t e r i n g on t h e a n x i e t y l i s t . Here t h e two s u b j e c t groups are i n 
f a c t matched - over t h e two t r i a l s each s u b j e c t ' s mean c l u s t e r i n g 
p r o p o r t i o n i s almost e x a c t l y t h e same. So, t h e more depressed a person 
i s , t h e l e s s l i k e l y t h e y are t o o r g a n i s e a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f anxious 
c o n t e n t words i n t h e i r r e c a l l . Why t h i s s h o u l d o n l y happen t o a 
s i g n i f i c a n t e x t e n t on the a n x i e t y l i s t i s u n c l e a r . Since those 
p a t i e n t s w i t h t h e h i g h e s t d e p r e s s i o n scores a l s o have some o f t h e 
h i g h e s t a n x i e t y s c o r e s , i t m i g h t be p o s s i b l e t o say t h a t t h i s i s due t o 
th e a n x i e t y self-schema being invoked and p r o d u c i n g , d i s o r g a n i s i n g and 
su p p r e s s i o n e f f e c t s were i t n o t f o r the f a c t t h e r e i s no s i g n i f i c a n t 
n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between a n x i e t y scores and t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f 
e x p e r i m e n t a l a d j e c t i v e s c l u s t e r e d a t l e a s t f o r two out o f the t h r e e 
l i s t s . 
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So t h e r e i s something about t h e anxious a d j e c t i v e s o r something 
about d e p r e s s i o n which means t h a t t he anxious a d j e c t i v e s do not get 
c l u s t e r e d . I t seems l i k e l i e s t t h a t i t i s something t o do w i t h both. 
To summarise, p a t i e n t s ' enhanced memory f o r a n x i e t y / d e p r e s s i o n 
("both") c o n t e n t a d j e c t i v e s was shown t o be r e l a t e d t o the degree o f 
s e l f - r e f e r e n c e o f t h e s e a d j e c t i v e s and a l s o a n x i e t y q u e s t i o n n a i r e 
s c o r e s , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t p a t i e n t s had a weak self-schema c o n t a i n i n g 
aspects o f both a n x i e t y and d e p r e s s i o n , but w i t h a n x i e t y dominant. 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s weak schema produces suppression o f 
anxious - c o n t e n t a d j e c t i v e s when invoked over a p e r i o d o f time ( i e two 
t r i a l s ) . S e l e c t i v e memory e f f e c t s were a l s o observed f o r c o n t r o l s 
e s p e c i a l l y on t h e a n x i e t y l i s t , these were accompanied by r e l a t i v e l y 
low p r o p o r t i o n s o f s u b j e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n and h i g h e r p r o p o r t i o n s o f 
th e anxious a d j e c t i v e s r e c a l l e d were s e l f - r e f e r e n c e than t he n e u t r a l 
a d j e c t i v e s . T h i s l e d t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a f a i r l y weak a n x i e t y 
self-schema was being invoked which l e d t o the s e l e c t i v e memory. I t 
was p o s t u l a t e d t h a t t h e l a c k o f o r g a n i s a t i o n was a coping mechanism 
which meant t h a t anxious a d j e c t i v e s were 'watered down' by being 
i n t e r s p e r s e d w i t h n e u t r a l a d j e c t i v e s . I t was thou g h t t h i s was so t h a t 
a nxious mood would be avoided being induced. 
F u r t h e r m o r e , C. S t a v r a k a k i ' s and B. Vargo's (1986) o p i n i o n i s 
borne o u t by t h e r e s u l t s , i . e . t h a t a n x i e t y i s h i g h l y r e l a t e d t o 
de p r e s s i o n i n t h a t a n x i e t y u s u a l l y accompanies dep r e s s i o n and v i c e 
v e r s a . The model t h a t has come out from t h e r e s u l t s o f these 
experiments focuses on a n x i e t y and dep r e s s i o n as v a r i a n t s o f the same 
d i s o r d e r d i f f e r i n g q u a n t i t a t i v e l y ( u n i t a r y model). 
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I t seems also possible that the f indings of - especially - the 
f i r s t experiment do not provide support for MacLeod et a l ' s (1986) 
proposal that people who suf fer from emotional disorders or so called 
neurotics show the tendency to attend (and remember and use) more to 
those words that are more closed to the i r feelings or to aspects of 
the i r disorders. That means, for instance, that anxiety subjects are 
not ob l i ga to r i l y biased to remember more anxiety words than other words 
and also they do not show s ign i f i can t differences in recal l ing the 
anxiety words compared with the i r contro ls. 
However, i t seems that agoraphobic patients show superior recal l 
fo r phobic-related material re la t i ve to neutral mater ia l , comparing 
with anxious patients who would show less dif ference of recal l for 
anxious-related material re la t i ve to neutral mater ia l . This las t 
f ind ing provides support for Nunn et a l ' s (1984) proposal that phobics 
have a cognit ive organisation of s i tuat ions label led as dangerous. 
In add i t ion , MacLeod et a l ' s (1986) study is also under 
discussion, since i t is demonstrated that whereas in the anxious 
subjects they operate in a manner that f a c i l i t a t e s the encoding of 
threatening s t i m u l i , in the case of non-anxious subjects, they act ively 
i n h i b i t such encoding and th is is a bias re fer r ing to selective 
a t ten t ion . The f indings of our two experiments do not provide evidence 
that a s imi la r thing is happening in reca l l ing emotional and neutral 
words, since the differences between patients and controls were not 
high and s i gn i f i can t to support a hypothesis l i ke MacLeod's. 
Also, according to Byrne et a l ' s (1986) experiment, depressed 
patients performed more poorly only on the effort-demanding cognitive 
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task. Thus, depressed patients are impaired on a speci f ic type of 
cognit ive operat ion, one that requires e f f o r t and presumably involves 
d i f f e ren t mechanisms than those used for automatic and more superf ic ia l 
information processing. 
The f indings of our experiments do provide support for Byrne et 
a l ' s proposal, since depressives had in general lower recal l scores 
than the other groups both for experimental and neutral words and since 
the word-recall task can be c lass i f ied as an e f f o r t f u l cognitive task. 
Furthermore, comparing the f indings of our two experiments with 
Martin Seligman's (1974) learned-helplessness theory of depression, 
f i r s t l y i t can be seen that they provide support for Seligman's 
proposal about the closed re la t ion between anxiety and depression, 
since Seligman suggests that although anxiety is the i n i t i a l response 
to a s t ressfu l s i t ua t i on , i t is replaced by depression i f the person 
comes to believe that control is unattainable. 
Secondly, the fact that in our f i r s t experiment, depressives had 
often the lowest scores in to ta l r e c a l l , may mirror an aspect of 
Seligman's theory, according to which depressives exhib i t cognitive 
deta i ls besides motivation and emotional de f i c i t s and lowered 
self-esteem. According to Seligman's view, cognit ive de f i c i t s involve 
d i f f i c u l t i e s in learning new response-outcome contingencies, which of 
course has some ef fects on memory, in that i f learning is depressed 
then so too is memory. 
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However, Seligman, Abramson and Teasdale's (1978) proposal for 
depressives that in uncontrol lable s i tuat ions making a stable, global 
and external a t t r i bu t i on for f a i l u re f a c i l i t a t e s generalized (including 
cogn i t i ve ) , chronic self-esteem de f i c i t s is not borne out by the 
f indings of the two experiments, since no clear cut de f i c i t s in 
depressives were found across both experiments. This was par t icu lar ly 
true for experiment one. This suggests that Seligman, Abramson and 
Teasdale (1978) were e i ther incorrect in the i r proposal that depression 
imposes s t a b i l i t y , g loba l i t y and i n te rna l i t y in f a i l u re ' s a t t r i bu t i on , 
or that day pat ient depressive subjects are qua l i ta t i ve ly d i f fe ren t to 
the i r c l i n i c a l l y severely affected counterparts. 
Furthermore, Watts' and Cooper's (1987) study of depressed 
pat ien t 's memory fo r stor ies indicated that while normal subjects 
showed par t i cu la r l y good recal l for units central to the structure of 
the s tory , th is did not hold for depressed pat ients. S imi la r ly , in 
accordance with Watts and Cooper's proposal, there is a re l iab le 
evidence based on experiments using word l i s t s , that depressed patients 
show less c luster ing at recal l than controls (Koh et a l , 1973; Russell 
and Beckhuis, 1976; Weingartner et a l , 1981; Calev and Erwin, 1985). 
This suggests that depressed patients encode words in clusters less 
than controls do. 
The f indings of our experiments provide evidence and support for 
th is proposal since there were s ign i f i can t differences in cluster ing 
scores between depressives and contro ls , though those differences were 
not high. This las t factor (the low differences observed) can be 
explained by the fact that the subjects were day patients and not 
mostly hospital ised depressives, as in previous s imi lar experiments. 
175 
So, i t seems, as l og i ca l l y expected, the more depressed the persons, 
the more memory de f i c i t s they show and consequently the lower the i r 
c luster ing scores. 
Addi t iona l ly according to Watts and Cooper, the hypothesis that 
the memory performance of depressed patients shows a deficiency in the 
s t ructur ing of material is not novel and has already been moderately 
well established on word- l i s t data, at least of c luster ing at recal l is 
taken as an index of s t ructur ing at the encoding stage. By analogy, 
th is proposal is also borne out by the f indings of our f i r s t 
experiment, although the subjects in our experiment were less 
depressed. 
Watts and Cooper also suggest that the structur ing deficiency is 
not confined to word l i s t s but is also demonstratable with prose. 
Thus, from Watts et a l ' s (1987) point of view, there is previous 
research indicat ing that depressed patients have poor memory for 
neutral material (see McAl l is ter , 1981). This is probably another 
reason which par t ly explains why depressive subjects have higher scores 
on the experimental words than on neutral words in our f i r s t experiment 
although th is reason is not enough since, as seen before, there are 
also other factors that influence the differences in recal l between 
experimental and neutral words; on the other hand depressive subjects 
in our f i r s t experiment also show lower scores than other groups in 
experimental words with the exception perhaps of the depression l i s t 
words which are considered as words which express the i r depressive 
mood. 
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Another factor which affected the pat ients ' general recal l of both 
experimental and neutral words was the auditory presentation that was 
used only in our second experiment when in the f i r s t experiment a 
visual presentation was used. In accordance with Watts et a l ' s 
proposal auditory presentation is known to improve free recal l (Murray, 
1965). 
Furthermore, there is also the poss ib i l i t y that depressives' 
memory d e f i c i t can be accounted for by conservative response biases, 
i . e . depressed people under-perform, not because memories are less 
accessible, but because they lack confidence in them (Watts et a l , 
1987). In Watts et a l ' s opinion the experimental method that is 
relevant to exploring th is question is a forced recal l task. Using 
t h i s , Leight and E l l i s (1981) were able to demonstrate a decrement in 
recal l in normal subjects who had been given a depressive mood 
induction procedure and excluded an explanation in terms of wil l ingness 
to respond (Watts et a l , 1987). 
The question about depressives' confidence is also closely 
connected with the " fa lse alarms" i . e . with the hypothesis that 
depressives show more " fa lse alarms" than other groups because of lack 
of confidence. However th is is not c lear , since Silberman et al (1983) 
reported that fa lse alarms were not affected by depression whereas 
M i l l e r and Lewis (1977) and Dunbar and Lishman (1984) found that false 
alarms were reduced; also generalising from other works' results ( i . e . 
Dunbar and Lishman (1984) and Zuroff et a l l (1983)), one might suggest 
that depressives show more false alarms than controls where procedures 
are used that require addit ional processing, but that in other 
conditions they show fewer fa lse alarms. 
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Furthermore, there is another poss ib i l i t y that depressives' memory 
d e f i c i t can be accounted for by concentration problems, i . e . depressed 
people under-perform not because memories are less accesible, but 
because they lack concentration in them. F i r s t l y among the cognitive 
symptoms of depression described by Beck et al (1979) are d i f f i c u l t i e s 
in concentration and memory (Watts et a l , 1987). Those d i f f i c u l t i e s 
are found especial ly in the a c t i v i t i e s of (a) watching te lev is ion , (b) 
reading and (c) working/doing household jobs (Watts et a l , 1987). 
As can be seen in the "Method" part , in our f i r s t experiment 
subjects should read each word of the memory tes t , as i t appeared in 
the computer screen. S im i la r l y , in our second experiment subjects were 
required to l i s t en to each word l i s t care fu l l y . So, one poss ib i l i t y is 
that depressives' d e f i c i t to remember as many words as the other groups 
did is caused by substantial concentration problems about what they 
read and to what they l i s t e n . On the other hand, many cl inicans 
assume, and probably cor rec t l y , that the memory problems of which 
depressed patients often complain are secondary to the i r concentration 
problems; also concentration problems have an adverse e f fec t on mood 
and mood has an adverse e f fec t on concentration (Watts et a l , 1987). 
Meanwhile the re la t i ve lack of semantic c luster ing in the free recal l 
of depressed patients (e .g . Weingartner et a l , 1981) are also 
consistent with the hypothesis that the i r semantic processing is poor 
(Watts et a l , 1987). In Watts et a l ' s (1987) point of view, most 
laboratory research has been done on word l i s t s , though there is 
evidence of the i r app l i cab i l i t y to prose (e.g. Sha l le r t , 1976); also 
most laboratory research has examined the ef fects of processing 
strategies on incidental recal l rather than intent ional learning (Watts 
et a l , 1987). 
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I t seems l i k e l y that day pat ient depressives in our experiments do 
not show the same memory and concentration de f i c i t s as the depressives 
in Watts et a l ' s experiment (these depressives were hospital ised and 
some of them endogenous); th is fact may answer the question why our 
experiments' depressives' scores were not much d i f fe ren t from the 
scores of the other subject groups and especial ly from the controls. 
Another poss ib i l i t y is t ha t , depressives in our experiments, since they 
were not severely a f fec ted, were able to use a kind of imagery 
formation technique (Watts et a l , 1987) and that can be another cause 
of increasing the i r scores in our memory tes ts . 
This can be based on Watts et a l ' s f indings that imagery formation 
substant ia l ly improved object ive memory for a passage of prose, 
especial ly in non-endogenous depressives and also that visual isers 
would benef i t most from the imagery formation (Watts et a l , 1987). 
However a mu l t id isc ip l inary approach can and should be extended in 
research as well as i t is in theory, to give evidence to the hypothesis 
i f Watts et a l ' s proposals are as va l id fo r word l i s t as for a passage 
of prose. Every re la t i ve approach in the future could be used to 
assess the ef fects of treatment, the degree of neurotic cognit ion, 
strength and qual i ty of memory-imagery and so on. 
The approach could be adapted for use with other c l i n i ca l 
disorders, as well as dist inguishing between them, in order to 
elucidate the in teract ion of these d i f f e ren t schema. For instance, 
depressive patients might rate depressive words highly on an imagery 
value scale, and the same might be true for a prose or for s i tuat ions. 
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F ina l l y , the approach should increase our understanding of the 
nature of in teract ion of major variables in c l i n i ca l disorders, and 
also to compare patients more with controls of a 'normal' nature to 
uncover where these two boundaries merge. 
The present study also found differences in memory for anxious and 
agoraphobic pat ients , but these results were not as clear cut as those 
for depressed pat ients. However, given the re la t i ve lack of th is kind 
of work with neurotic groups other than depressives, the present 
resul ts suggest that here too th is general approach could further our 
understanding of anxious and agoraphobic patients and not j us t 
depressives. 
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Appendix A : Test for Agoraphobia 
NAME: DATE: 
Please indicate the degree to which you avoid the fol lowing places or 
s i tuat ions because of discomfort or anxiety. Rate your amount of 
avoidance when you are with a trusted companion and when you are alone. 
Do th is by using the fol lowing scale. 
1 - Never avoid 
2 - Rarely avoid 
3 - Avoid about hal f the time 
4 - Avoid most of the time 
5 - Always avoid 
(You may use numbers half-way between those l i s t ed when you think i t is 
appropriate. For example. Si or 41). 
Write your score in the blanks for each s i tuat ion or place under both 
condit ions: when accompanies, and, when alone. Leave blank those 
s i tuat ions that do not apply to you. 
when when 
Places accompanied alone 
Theatres 
Supermarkets 
Classrooms 
Department Stores 
Restaurants 
Museums 
L i f t s 
Auditoriums or stadiums 
Parking garages 
High Places 
Enclosed spaces (e .g . tunnels) 
Open spaces 
(A) Outside (e .g . f i e l d s , wide s t ree ts , 
courtyards) 
(B) Inside (e .g . large rooms, lobbies) 
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Riding i n : 
when 
accompanied 
when 
alone 
Buses 
Trains 
Tube t ra ins (Metro e tc . ) 
Aeroplanes 
Boats 
Driving or r id ing in car 
(A) at any time 
(B) on motorways 
Situat ions 
when 
accompanied 
when 
alone 
Standing in queues 
Crossing bridges 
Parties or social gatherings 
Walking on the st reet 
Staying at home alone 
Being fa r away from home 
Other (specify) 
We define a panic attack as: 
(1) a high level of anxiety accompanied by 
(2) strong body reactions (heart pa lp i ta t ions, sweating, muscle 
tremors, dizziness, nausea) with 
(3) the temporary loss of the a b i l i t y to plan, think or reason 
and 
(4) the intense desire to escape or f lee the s i tua t ion . (Note, 
th is is d i f f e ren t from high anxiety or fear alone). 
Please indicate the to ta l number of panic attacks you have had in the 
las t seven days 
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Appendix B : The Anxiety and Depression Scale 
Please answer a l l questions as correct ly as you can. Please answer 
each question by putt ing a c i r c l e around the 'YES' or 'NO' fol lowing 
the question. 
NAME: 
DATE: 
1. Are you often a moody person? YES NO 
2. Do you often feel sad for no apparent reason? YES NO 
3. I f you feel sad, can people cheer you up? YES NO 
4. I f you are to ld a funny joke, would you be able to 
laugh? YES NO 
5. Do you feel depressed? YES NO 
I f 'YES' 
(Are you most depressed in the evening? YES NO 
a 
(Are you most depressed in the morning? YES NO 
(Are you j us t a b i t depressed? YES NO 
b 
(Are you fee l ing very depressed? YES NO 
6. Are you normally a worrier? YES NO 
7. Are you normally easi ly hurt? YES NO 
8. Do you feel f u l l of suffering? YES NO 
9. Do you normally f i nd respons ib i l i t y a problem? YES NO 
10. Would you say that you normally needed a l o t of 
af fect ion? YES NO 
11. Do you often do things that you la te r regret? YES NO 
12. Do you feel hopeful about the future? YES NO 
13. Do you feel you often can' t get your breath? YES NO 
14. Have you los t a l o t of confidence? YES NO 
15. Do you feel drained of energy? YES NO 
16. Do you cry a lo t? YES NO 
17. Do you feel that l i f e is meaningless? YES NO 
/Over 
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18. Do you feel so depressed that you can' t cry? YES NO 
19. Do you often feel your pulse racing? YES NO 
20. Do you often have palpi tat ions? YES NO 
21. Do you often nervously perspire or sweat? YES NO 
22. Do you feel rest less and unable to relax? YES NO 
23. Do you feel l i ke hiding away from everyone? YES NO 
24. Do you often get lonely? YES NO 
25. Are you now managing better than before? YES NO 
26. Do you feel absolutely useless? YES NO 
27. Do you feel you've changed for the worse? YES NO 
28. Do you have qua l i t i es that others l i ke in you? YES NO 
29. Do you feel panicky in a crowd? YES NO 
30. Do you deserve to be punished? YES NO 
31. Can you plan ahead? YES NO 
32. Do you have to be pushed into doing something because 
you haven't got the w i l l to do i t on your own? YES NO 
33. Do you prefer to be on your own? YES NO 
34. Do you feel you can' t care less whether you l ived or 
died? YES NO 
35. Do you feel that you can cope with everyday work? YES NO 
36. Do you feel a f r iend to your friends? YES NO 
37. Are you disappointed in the person you are? YES NO 
38. Are you often troubled by constipation or diarrhoea? . . YES NO 
39. Do you feel people despise and hate you? YES NO 
40. Have you los t a l l your interests? YES NO 
41. Do you feel everything is a great burden to you? YES NO 
42. Do you hate yourself? YES NO 
43. Are you tor tured by feel ings of gu i l t? YES NO 
44. Do you l i ke to be happy? YES NO 
/Over 
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45. Do you have d i f f i c u l t y in sleeping? YES NO 
I f 'YES' a) Do you have d i f f i c u l t y gett ing to sleep? . . YES NO 
b) Do you wake up soon a f te r gett ing to sleep? YES NO 
c) Do you wake up ea r l i e r than usual and 
then can ' t get back to sleep? YES NO 
46. Do you feel abandoned, completely unwanted? YES NO 
47. Have you recently los t your appetite? YES NO 
48. Have you, over the las t few months los t about one 
stone or more in weight? YES NO 
49. Is your mind normally crowded with thoughts when you 
go to bed? YES NO 
50. Do you feel r iddled with sin? YES NO 
51 . Do you have someone to turn to when you need help? YES NO 
52. Are you normally troubled by thoughts you can' t get 
out of your head? YES NO 
53. Do you often feel nervous and shaky? YES NO 
54. Have you been shy and reserved for many years? YES NO 
55. Do you get a l o t of headaches? YES NO 
56. Does you mouth often feel dry? YES NO 
57. I f things go wrong, do you usually lose your temper? . . YES NO 
58. Do people say that you are often too emotional? YES NO 
59. Do you hear bad things said about you when no-one is 
there? YES NO 
60. Do you normally worry about your health? YES NO 
61 . Do you feel you are a weakling, to be despised? YES NO 
62. Do you often feel giddy or fa in t? YES NO 
63. Do you have d i f f i c u l t y concentrating? YES NO 
64. Are you, or would you, be fr ightened of t rave l l i ng on 
a bus? YES NO 
65. Do you feel that your thoughts are so slowed down you 
can ' t think? YES NO 
/Over 
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66. I f you c r i t i c i s e someone for a good reason do you 
worry a l o t about i t afterwards? YES NO 
67. Do you feel a burden to your fr iends and relat ives? . . . YES NO 
68. Do you think you w i l l get well? YES NO 
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Appendix C : E.P.Q. (Adult) 
Occupation 
Age Sex 
INSTRUCTIONS Please answer each question by putt ing a c i r c le around 
the "YES" or the "NO" fol lowing the question. There are no r ight or 
wrong answers, and no t r i c k questions. Work quickly and do not think 
too long about the exact meaning of the questions. 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO ANSWER EACH QUESTION 
1. Do you have many d i f f e ren t hobbies? YES NO 
2. Do you stop to think things over before doing anything? YES NO 
3. Does your mood often go up and down? YES NO 
4. Have you every taken the praise for something you knew 
someone else had rea l l y done? YES NO 
5. Are you a ta lka t i ve person? YES NO 
6. Would being in debt worry you? YES NO 
7. Do you ever feel " j us t miserable" for no reason? YES NO 
8. Were you ever greedy by helping yourself to more than 
your share of anything? YES NO 
9. Do you lock up your house care fu l ly at night? YES NO 
10. Are you rather l i ve ly? YES NO 
11. Would i t upset you a l o t to see a ch i ld or an animal 
suffer? YES NO 
12. Do you often worry about things you should not have 
done or said? YES NO 
13. I f you say you w i l l do something, do you always keep 
your promise no matter how inconvenient i t might be? . . YES NO 
14. Can you usually l e t yoursel f go and enjoy yourself at 
a l i v e l y party? YES NO 
15. Are you an i r r i t a b l e person? YES NO 
16. Have you ever blamed someone for doing something you 
knew was rea l l y your fau l t? YES NO 
17. Do you enjoy meeting new people? YES NO 
18. Do you believe insurance schemes are a good idea? YES NO 
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19. Are your feel ings easi ly hurt? YES NO 
20. Are a l l your habits good and desirable ones? YES NO 
21. Do you tend to keep in the background on social 
occasions? YES NO 
22. Would you take drugs which may have strange or 
dangerous effects? YES NO 
23. Do you often feel "fed-up"? YES NO 
24. Have you ever taken anything (even a pin or button) 
that belonged to someone else? YES NO 
25. Do you l i k e going out a lot? YES NO 
26. Do you enjoy hurt ing people you love? YES NO 
27. Are you often troubled about feelings of gu i l t? YES NO 
28. Do you sometimes ta lk about things you know nothing 
about? YES NO 
29. Do you prefer reading to meeting people? YES NO 
30. Do you have enemies who want to harm you? YES NO 
31 . Would you ca l l yoursel f a nervous person? YES NO 
32. Do you have many friends? YES NO 
33. Do you enjoy pract ica l jokes that can sometimes rea l l y 
hurt people? YES NO 
34. Are you a worrier? YES NO 
35. As a ch i ld did you do as you were to ld immediately and 
without grumbling? YES NO 
36. Would you ca l l yoursel f happy-go-lucky? YES NO 
37. Do good manners and cleanliness matter much to you? . . . YES NO 
38. Do you worry about awful things that might happen? YES NO 
39. Have you ever broken or los t something belonging to 
someone else? YES NO 
40. Do you usually take the i n i t i a t i v e in making new 
fr iends? YES NO 
41 . Would you ca l l yoursel f tense or "highly-strung"? YES NO 
42. Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people? . . YES NO 
43. Do you think marriage is old-fashioned and should be 
done away with? YES NO 
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44. Do you sometimes boast a l i t t l e ? YES NO 
45. Can you e a s i l y get some l i f e i n t o a rat h e r d u l l 
party? YES NO 
46. Do people who d r i v e c a r e f u l l y annoy you? YES NO 
47. Do you worry about your health? YES NO 
48. Have you ever said anything bad or nasty about anyone? YES NO 
49. Do you l i k e t e l l i n g jokes and funny s t o r i e s to your 
friends? YES NO 
50. Do most things t a s t e the same to you? YES NO 
51. As a c h i l d were you ever cheeky to your parents? YES NO 
52. Do you l i k e mixing w i t h people? YES NO 
53. Does i t worry you i f know there are mistakes i n your 
work? YES NO 
54. Do you s u f f e r from sleeplessness? YES NO 
55. Do you always wash before a meal? YES NO 
56. Do you nearly always have a "ready answer" when people 
t a l k t o you? YES NO 
57. Do you l i k e t o a r r i v e at appointments i n plenty of 
time? YES NO 
58. Have you of t e n f e l t l i s t l e s s and t i r e d f o r no reason? . YES NO 
59. Have you ever cheated at a game? YES NO 
60. Do you l i k e doing things i n which you have to act 
quickly? YES NO 
61. Is (or was) your mother a good woman? YES NO 
62. Do you of t e n f e l l l i f e i s very d u l l ? YES NO 
63. Have you ever taken advantage o f someone? YES NO 
64. Do you of t e n take on more a c t i v i t i e s than you have 
time f o r ? YES NO 
65. Are there several people who keep t r y i n g to avoid you? YES NO 
66. Do you worry a l o t about your looks? YES NO 
67. Do you t h i n k people spend too much time safeguarding 
t h e i r f u t u r e w i t h savings and insurances? YES NO 
68. Have you ever wished t h a t you were dead? YES NO 
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69. Would you dodge paying taxes i f you were sure you 
could never be found out? YES NO 
70. Can you get a party going? YES NO 
71. Do you t r y not to be rude to people? YES NO 
72. Do you worry too long a f t e r an embarrassing 
experience? YES NO 
73. Have you ever i n s i s t e d on having your own way? YES NO 
74. When you catch a t r a i n do you often a r r i v e a t the 
l a s t minute? YES NO 
75. Do you s u f f e r from "nerves"? YES NO 
76. Do your f r i e n d s h i p s break up e a s i l y without i t being 
your f a u l t ? YES NO 
77. Do you of t e n f e e l lonely? YES NO 
78. Do you always p r a c t i c e what you preach? YES NO 
79. Do you sometimes l i k e teasing animals? YES NO 
80. Are you e a s i l y h u r t when people f i n d f a u l t w i t h you or 
the work you do? YES NO 
81. Have you ever been l a t e f o r an appointment or work? ... YES NO 
82. Do you l i k e p l e n t y o f bu s t l e and excitement around 
you? YES NO 
83. Would you l i k e other people to be a f r a i d of you? YES NO 
84. Are you sometimes bubbling over w i t h energy and 
sometimes very sluggish? YES NO 
85. Do you sometimes put o f f u n t i l tomorrow what you ought 
to do today? YES NO 
86. Do other people t h i n k of you as being very l i v e l y ? YES NO 
87. Do people t e l l you a l o t of l i e s ? YES NO 
88. Are you touchy about some things? YES NO 
89. Are you always w i l l i n g to admit i t when you have made 
a mistake? YES NO 
90. Would you f e e l very sorry f o r an animal caught i n a 
trap? YES NO PLEASE CHECK TO SEE THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS. 
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Appendix D : Overall Scores on the c l i n i c a l t e s t s 
Agoraphobics 
E.P.Q. Test f o r Agoraphobia Anxiety and Depression Scale 
N Total An GD PD *ADS 
14 8.36 8 11 5 3 
6 9.41 8 5 3 3 
20 11.27 16 33 14 6 
21 7.13 11 20 10 5 
23 6.46 11 24 12 4 
21 8.85 14 29 13 4 
21 6.42 12 21 14 3 
20 6.41 16 13 12 6 
17 6.22 1 1 7 0 
20 12.90 14 42 10 5 
22 13.84 16 31 19 6 
10 12.06 8 6 5 2 
Anxious 
N Total An 6D PD *ADS 
21 7.10 8 21 15 1 
13 2.55 14 16 4 4 
18 5.51 3 14 8 1 
13 4.68 12 19 9 3 
19 6.46 11 19 12 3 
20 5.99 7 9 10 1 
10 56.90 0 18 2 6 
11 4.41 8 6 5 3 
18 2.93 5 12 10 1 
19 9.92 12 27 14 3 
15 2.07 6 10 8 1 
15 9.00 14 18 5 (3) 
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Depressives 
N. Total AN GD PD *ADS 
17 7.31 9 26 12 2 
22 7.27 10 29 11 3 
21 3.63 5 20 15 1 
22 6.83 7 33 14 0 
17 3.07 • 9 22 8 2 
20 9.99 15 35 16 6 
22 7.70 13 36 14 3 
23 5.78 16 32 12 5-
22 5.98 14 26 14 5 
23 11.71 , 15 30 16 4 
23 9.25 12 35 14 4 
21 6.04 12 26 14 3 
Controls 
N. Total AN GD .^D *ADS 
14 3.96 4 3 5 1 
13 3.03 4 4 3 0 
3 2.04 3 3 3 0 
6 2.44 1 1 4 0 
8 2.30 0 0 0 0 
14 4.99 3 4 10 0 
4 3.58 2 2 6 1 
19 6.94 10 14 10 4 
9 3.04 2 0 7 0 
17 6.79 0 0 0 3 
*ADS 
N 
Total 
An 
GD 
PD 
i s the Total score from 6 items on the Anxiety and Depression 
Scale which best p r e d i c t s anxiety (items 13, 19, 20, 29, 62, 64) 
Neuroticism scores 
Total agoraphobic scores 
Anxiety scores 
General Depression scores 
Pre d i s p o s i t i o n scores 
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Appendix E : Total Recall Scores 
(Experiment 1) 
Agoraphobics 
Depression L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
5 4 5 7 8 7 7 8 
2 6 5 6 4 9 7 8 
5 3 5 4 6 5 5 7 
3 1 5 2 3 3 3 5 
3 2 5 2 5 2 7 4 
5 1 4 5 8 6 7 6 
3 2 5 3 6 1 2 5 
6 5 4 5 3 7 5 7 
6 6 6 6 6 7 5 7 
5 2 6 4 5 5 7 5 
2 2 5 2 6 2 9 3 
3 2 5 7 3 9 6 6 
Anxiety L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
6 2 6 6 10 3 8 7 
5 2 3 4 5 4 5 6 
6 1 4 3 8 5 8 5 
6 2 4 4 3 2 6 2 
4 1 4 3 5 4 6 5 
8 0 6 4 7 6 7 9 
6 3 7 1 6 6 1 3 
5 3 7 6 7 7 7 8 
5 1 9 5 6 8 7 7 
9 2 8 7 7 5 6 7 
4 1 8 3 8 3 9 3 
7 3 8 4 10 6 7 6 
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Phobic L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
6 5 10 4 12 7 10 6 
5 3 7 9 8 7 9 8 
3 2 6 2 7 6 7 3 
4 1 3 6 4 2 4 0 
4 1 5 4 6 5 6 8 
4 3 7 6 7 6 10 5 
6 1 4 4 6 6 3 3 
6 4 6 7 7 8 9 7 
5 5 8 9 10 10 9 10 
7 1 11 6 14 6 14 8 
3 1 7 3 6 6 10 4 
6 4 6 8 6 10 6 9 
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Anxious 
Depression L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
2 4 5 8 8 7 5 10 
3 2 5 5 8 8 7 8 
5 1 3 4 8 4 7 5 
5 6 8 9 9 11 9 9 
3 1 0 3 2 4 5 2 
6 1 4 4 7 4 7 4 
2 2 3 1 5 1 4 2 
0 6 5 6 5 8 4 5 
3 2 3 5 3 7 6 2 
6 2 6 3 6 8 7 8 
2 2 2 5 5 5 7 5 
2 2 5 4 8 5 5 5 
Anxiety L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
1 2 4 5 5 4 5 4 
6 1 6 5 7 7 10 5 
6 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 
8 3 7 10 10 8 10 8 
5 1 6 3 7 1 3 3 
5 3 6 4 5 5 9 4 
5 0 2 3 4 3 4 3 
7 2 3 5 7 4 10 3 
4 3 6 3 6 3 8 4 
8 2 7 5 9 8 8 8 
4 2 5 4 6 4 6 6 
7 3 7 4 6 6 7 6 
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Phobic L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
7 1 7 6 8 6 10 8 
6 4 5 7 7 8 6 7 
4 2 8 5 7 7 6 8 
7 5 7 11 9 12 11 10 
2 2 4 2 5 4 5 2 
7 3 ^ 7 7 7 5 7 7 
2 2 3 1 5 7 6 5 
6 1 7 8 7 7 5 11 
3 3 i 5 4 8 3 9 4 
6 2 8 9 7 10 9 10 
3 3 : 3 5 8 4 9 6 
8 3 8 8 10 4 10 9 
Tl T2 
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Depressives 
Depression L i s t 
T3 
T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words 
1 
Words Words Words Words Words 
4 2 6 3 5 5 9 6 
5 7 4 4 5 6 9 6 
4 3 8 4 7 8 8 9 
3 1 3 2 2 4 2 5 
3 5 5 5 5 6 5 6 
4 3 7 3 10 7 8 7 
4 1 6 5 6 5 9 3 
5 3 5 6 8 5 8 8 
4 2 4 5 7 4 5 6 
5 1 14 1 9 3 10 3 
6 3 i 7 5 5 4 6 8 
4 2 ! 7 3 8 6 9 6 
Anxiety L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
5 1 \ 6 4 9 7 7 5 
6 2 6 4 7 5 13 3 
6 4 7 4 9 8 8 6 
3 2 3 2 3 2 4 2 
5 0 5 3 6 5 5 5 
5 2 5 6 7 5 7 6 
4 2 5 2 4 2 5 3 
4 1 6 3 8 4 6 5 
8 2 8 2 8 5 9 6 
8 1 12 6 6 9 9 8 
7 4 6 4 4 5 8 4 
8 2 8 5 7 8 9 5 
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Phobic L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
3 2 8 2 7 4 10 6 
5 2 3 6 6 7 4 8 
4 2 7 6 7 6 5 9 
1 2 2 4 4 1 2 3 
6 4 4 7 8 7 8 6 
3 3 8 8 8 6 8 8 
5 2 7 4 4 6 6 2 
3 4 i 8 6 6 6 6 6 
3 3 ' 6 5 8 6 8 5 
8 0 5 7 5 12 8 7 
9 3 6 4 8 6 7 8 
5 3 7 4 8 6 6 9 
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Controls 
Depression L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
8 4 7 5 10 6 7 9 
4 3 7 2 4 3 5 4 
2 1 4 4 6 5 7 7 
4 2 6 7 10 7 8 7 
2 2 4 5 7 7 5 5 
6 2 5 4 6 4 7 7 
5 4 3 3 6 6 2 7 
5 3 5 5 4 6 5 7 
6 4 6 4 7 7 8 7 
4 1 3 2 4 3 5 6 
Anxiety L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
7 4 7 6 7 11 10 10 
5 1 4 1 8 2 6 1 
4 2 5 4 4 6 5 6 
8 3 9 7 7 11 8 7 
4 6 8 3 9 3 6 5 
4 1 3 5 4 6 7 3 
3 1 3 5 8 5 5 4 
5 2 5 3 4 5 4 5 
5 3 6 5 7 3 9 4 
6 3 6 5 6 4 7 3 
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Phobic L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
8 6 5 9 7 9 8 10 
3 2 6 6 9 6 8 7 
2 3 4 5 6 4 8 5 
8 5 7 7 9 7 9 9 
8 1 6 5 9 8 13 4 
7 1 4 6 2 6 5 7 
6 3 6 9 10 9 7 6 
4 2 4 5 6 5 6 7 
5 8 7 8 11 9 10 8 
5 0 7 3 7 3 8 5 
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Appendix F : Clustering Scores (RR) 
(Experiment 1) 
Agoraphobics 
Depression L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
.75 .67 .75 .67 .43 .67 .83 .71 
1 .8 0 .4 .33 .75 .83 .71 
.75 0 .75 .67 1 .75 .75 .83 
.5 1 .75 0 1 .5 1 1 
1 1 .5 0 1 1 .67 .33 
.75 1 .67 .5 .57 .4 .17 0 
1 1 .5 0 1 1 1 .75 
.4 .25 .33 .5 .5 .83 .75 .83 
.8 .6 .6 .4 .6 .67 .75 .67 
.75 0 .6 .33 .5 .75 1 1 
1 1 1 1 .6 0 .75 .5 
1 1 .5 .5 .5 .75 .6 .6 
Anxiety L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
1 1 .8 .6 .89 .5 .86 .83 
.75 1 1 1 1 1 .75 .6 
.8 1 1 .5 .57 .25 .71 .5 
.8 1 1 .67 .5 0 .8 1 
.67 1 .67 .5 .5 .67 .4 .5 
1 0 .8 .33 .5 .4 .83 .75 
.4 0 .83 1 .6 .6 1 1 
.75 .5 .83 .8 .83 .67 .83 .86 
.75 1 .63 .25 .8 .71 .83 .83 
.88 0 .71 .5 .5 .25 .8 .67 
1 1 1 1 .86 .5 .75 .5 
0.5 0 .71 .67 .89 .8 .5 .4 
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Phobic L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. 
Words 
Neutral 
Words 
Exp. 
Words 
Neutral 
Words 
Exp. 
Words 
Neutral 
Words 
Exp. 
Words 
Neutral 
Words 
.8 .5 0.78 .67 .82 .67 .56 .4 
.5 0 0.67 .63 .43 .33 .75 .71 
1 1 .8 0 .67 0.4 .83 1 
.67 1 .5 .6 .67 1 1 0 
.67 1 1 .67 .4 .25 .6 .57 
.67 .5 .33 .2 .33 .4 .78 .5 
.8 1 .33 .33 .4 .6 .5 .5 
.6 .67 .4 .5 .17 .43 .88 .83 
.75 .75 .57 .63 .56 .56 .75 .89 
.83 1 .7 .6 .69 .2 .69 .43 
.5 1 .67 0 .8 .6 .78 .33 
.8 .67 .6 .71 .4 .67 .4 .63 
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Anxious 
Depression L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
1 1 .75 .71 .86 .83 .75 .78 
.5 0 .25 .25 .57 .57 .33 .43 
1 1 .5 .67 .71 .33 .67 .5 
.25 .4 .86 .88 .38 .5 .63 .63 
1 1 0 1 0 0.67 .75 0 
1 1 .67 .67 .5 .33 .83 1 
0 0 1 1 .75 1 .33 0 
0 1 .25 .4 .25 .57 .33 .25 
.5 0 1 .75 .5 0 .8 1 
.6 0 .6 0 .6 .57 .17 .43 
1 0 1 .75 .5 .5 .5 .25 
1 1 .75 .67 .71 .75 .5 .75 
Anxiety L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
1 1 .67 .5 .75 .33 .75 .67 
1 1 .8 .75 .83 .67 .78 .5 
.8 .5 .33 .25 .4 .33 .71 .71 
.71 .5 1 .89 .89 .71 .78 .71 
1 0 .8 .5 1 1 .5 0 
.5 .5 .8 .67 1 .75 .75 .33 
1 0 1 .5 1 .5 .33 .5 
.83 0 .5 .5 .67 .33 .78 0 
. 5 1 .8 .5 .8 1 .71 0 
.71 0 .83 .75 .63 .57 1 1 
.33 0 .5 .67 .8 .67 .4 .6 
.83 1 .67 .67 .8 .8 .67 .8 
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Phobic L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. 
Words 
Neutral 
Words 
Exp. 
Words 
Neutral 
Words 
Exp. 
Words 
Neutral 
Words 
Exp. 
Words 
Neutral 
Words 
.83 1 .67 .6 .57 .2 .56 .29 
.2 0 .75 .67 .33 .29 .4 .67 
0.67 0 .57 .25 .67 .4 .6 .71 
.67 .5 .5 .6 .5 .55 .7 .56 
0 0 1 1 .75 .33 1 1 
.67 .5 .83 .67 .17 0 .67 .5 
0 0 .5 1 .5 .67 .6 .25 
.8 1 .67 .86 .5 .67 .25 .8 
.5 .5 .75 .33 .85 1 .5 0 
.6 0 .71 .63 .67 .67 .63 .56 
.5 .5 .5 .5 .71 .67 .75 .8 
.71 .5 .71 .57 .67 .33 .67 .63 
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Depressives 
Depression L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. 
Words 
Neutral 
Words 
Exp. 
Words 
Neutral 
Words 
Exp. 
Words 
Neutral 
Words 
Exp. 
Words 
Neutral 
Words 
1 1 1 1 .75 .75 .75 .6 
.75 .67 .67 .33 1 .8 .63 .6 
.67 .86 .67 .67 .57 .57 .63 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 .5 .5 .5 .5 .6 .25 .4 
.67 .5 .67 .5 .67 .5 .57 .5 
1 1 .6 .5 .2 .25 .75 .5 
.75 .5 .75 .8 .71 .5 .71 .57 
1 1 .33 .5 .67 .67 .75 .8 
.71 .25 .85 0 .75 .5 .89 1 
.8 .5 .67 .5 .25 .33 .6 .71 
.67 .67 .5 .57 .4 .63 .6 
Anxiety L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
1 1 .8 .33 .75 .67 .83 .75 
.6 0 .6 .33 .83 .75 .75 0 
.6 .33 .67 .33 .75 .71 .86 1 
1 1 .5 0 .5 0 .67 0 
1 0 .75 .5 .6 .5 .5 .5 
.75 0 1 .8 .5 .25 .67 .4 
.67 1 .75 0 .67 0 1 1 
1 1 .8 .5 .71 .33 .8 .5 
.86 0 .71 0 .86 .75 .63 .4 
.86 1 .82 .6 .4 .38 .63 .71 
.33 0 .6 .33 .67 .75 .85 .67 
.86 0 .43 .25 .5 .43 .63 .5 
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Phobic L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
.5 0 .86 0 .83 .67 .56 .4 
.5 0 .5 .8 .6 .67 .33 .57 
.67 0 .67 .4 .33 .4 .75 .63 
1 1 0 .67 1 1 0 0 
.6 .33 .67 .67 .71 .5 .57 .2 
1 .5 .43 .57 .43 .2 .71 .57 
.5 0 .83 .67 .67 .8 .6 0 
.5 .67 .57 .2 .6 .6 .6 .8 
1 1 .8 .5 .57 .6 .71 .25 
1 0 .5 .67 .75 .82 .71 .67 
.75 .5 .6 .67 .57 .4 .5 .57 
.5 0 .5 .33 .57 .6 .0 .38 
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Controls 
Depression L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp, Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
.43 0 .83 .75 .78 .8 .33 .5 
1 1 .83 0 .67 0 1 .67 
1 1 .33 0 .4 .5 .33 .33 
1 1 .6 .5 .67 .5 .71 .5 
0 0 .33 .25 .5 .67 .5 .5 
.8 1 .75 .67 .8 .33 .83 .67 
.75 .33 1 1 .6 .4 0 .67 
.5 .5 .75 .5 .67 .8 .25 .67 
.6 .67 .6 .33 .67 .67 .57 .33 
.67 1 .5 0 .67 .5 .75 .8 
Anxiety L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
.67 .33 .67 .6 .5 .7 .67 .67 
.75 0 .67 0 1 1 .8 0 
.67 0 .75 1 .67 .8 .5 .6 
.86 .5 .75 .67 .67 .7 .86 .67 
.67 .8 .71 0 .63 0 .8 .5 
.67 1 0 .5 .67 .6 .67 .5 
.5 1 .5 .5 .86 .5 .75 .67 
.75 0 .75 1 1 .75 .33 .5 
.5 .5 .4 .25 .83 .5 1 .67 
.6 .5 .8 .75 1 1 .67 .5 
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Phobic L i s t 
Tl T2 T3 T4 
Exp. Neutral Exp, Neutral Exp. Neutral Exp. Neutral 
Words Words Words Words Words Words Words Words 
.57 .6 .25 .63 .5 .63 .57 .56 
1 1 .4 .4 .5 .4 .43 .33 
0 .5 .33 .5 .6 .67 .71 .5 
.71 .5 .67 .67 .63 .67 .5 .63 
.86 1 .8 .75 .75 .57 .83 .33 
1 1 1 .8 0 .8 .25 .5 
.6 .5 .6 .75 .44 .25 .67 .6 
1 1 .67 .5 .8 .75 .8 .67 
.5 .71 .5 .71 .5 .38 .44 .43 
1 0 .83 .5 .5 0 .86 .75 
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Appendix G : 
HOW MANY TIMES EACH WORD WAS RECALLED OVERALL FOR EACH TRIAL BY. EACH 
GROUP OF SUBJECTS 
Agoraphobics 
T r i a l s T r i a l s 
Words 1 2 3 4 Words 1 2 3 4 
Depr. Fa i l u r e 3 0 7 8 Panic 7 3 7 10 
l i s t G u i l t 2 5' 3 3 Shaking 7 6 8 5 
Disgust 6 4 2 1 Dizzy 5 7 8 6 
Misery 5 4 7 8 Anger 2 7 8 6 
Exper. Suicide 9 10 10 9 Breathless 9 7 6 5 
Words Ugly 6 8 6 8 Trembling 4 7 5 8 
E f f o r t 3 2 2 1 Heartbeat 9 8 6 8 
Sadness 3 7 6 9 Nervous 8 6 5 7 
Wa keful 3 6 5 4 Worry 5 4 6 3 
Crying 5 8 8 9 Tension 9 9 9 8 
London 10 10 11 9 Autumn 3 6 7 8 
Branch 3 3 6 4 Purple 5 8 9 7 
Bargain 6 4 7 5 Curly 1 8 5 7 
Neut. No v e l i s t 2 6 6 8 Request 0 3 6 6 
Words S c i e n t i s t 6 6 7 7 F e r t i l e 3 2 3 4 
Hungry 0 2 5 3 Pointing 0 2 6 8 
Ideas 1 3 5 6 Airmail 2 5 9 6 
Gallon 3 3 2 4 Charming 0 4 2 5 
Foggy 4 4 6 6 Welfare 1 4 4 4 
Bathing 1 7 4 9 Budget 5 5 4 5 
Anx. 
l i s t 
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T r i a l s 
Phobia Words 1 2 3 4 
l i s t Shopping \ 7 6 5 5 
Train 7 7 6 7 
Aeroplane 7 9 6 11 
Crowds 6 8 9 10 
Exper. L i f t s 5 8 8 8 
Words Church 4 7 8 8 
People 5 7 8 10 
Party 3 8 11 10 
S.Markets 11 8 8 11 
H.dresser 3 8 10 6 
Mi r r o r 1 3 7 7 6 
Drink 3 4 7 7 
Calendars 0 4 6 5 
Floors 3 9 9 10 
Neut. Heels 2 6 7 6 
Words Book 1 7 3 2 
Baby 7 11 12 8 
Music 1 0 3 6 6 
Adverts 6 7 9 8 
B.casters 5 6 10 6 
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Depressives 
T r i a l s T r i a l s 
Words 1 2 3 4 Words 1 2 3 4 
Depr. Fa i l u r e 7 5 3 5 Panic 9 8 7 9 
l i s t G u i l t 5 6 5 8 Shaking 6 8 9 10 
Disgust 5 6 5 2 Dizzy 2 7 6 6 
Misery 3 7 7 7 Anger 5 6 4 6 
Exper. Suicide 10 10 n 10 Breathless 6 5 5 6 
Words Ugly 7 6 7 10 Trembling 6 5 7 11 
E f f o r t 5 4 2 7 Heartbeat 5 3 5 6 
Sadness 3 5 6 5 Nervous 9 9 9 7 
Wakeful 1 6 7 7 Worry 7 7 9 6 
Crying 4 7 8 10 Tension 7 7 7 4 
London 7 8 10 12 Autumn 3 7 9 7 
Branch 4 2 6 6 Purple 5 7 8 9 
Bargain 1 4 5 4 Curly 1 7 5 7 
Noveli s t 4 8 6 8 Request 0 3 8 4 
Neut. S c i e n t i s t 5 8 5 7 F e r t i l e 4 2 4 5 
Words Hungry 0 2 6 3 Pointing 1 3 6 3 
Ideas 5 2 4 8 Airmail 6 6 5 6 
Gallon 0 2 4 4 Charming 1 1 4 10 
Foggy 3 6 8 10 Welfare 1 3 6 3 
Bathing 4 3 4 4 Budget 1 2 3 4 
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Phobia Words 1 2 3 4 
l i s t Shopping 3 8 6 6 
Train 8 5 8 6 
Aeroplane 7 6 6 8 
Crowds 1 . 6 8 9 
Exper. L i f t s 4 6 6 6 
Words Church 5 5 7 9 
People 3 6 8 8 
Party 7 7 5 9 
S. markets 9 9 n 9 
H.dresser 3 7 9 4 
M i r r o r 1 5 7 7 
Drink 2 6 5 7 
Calendars 1 4 2 2 
Floors 1 6 7 7 
Neut. Heels 0 4 8 8 
Words Book 3 6 6 8 
Baby 7 9 10 10 
Music 4 4 2 6 
Adverts 9 8 9 8 
B. casters 3 7 10 6 
Anxious 
212 
T r i a l s T r i a l s 
Words 1 2 3 4 Words 1 2 3 4 
Depr F a i l u r e 5 3 6 6 Panic 4 5 8 6 
l i s t G u i l t 3 5 5 10 Shaking 8 5 8 10 
Disgust 5 3 6 3 Dizzy 5 7 7 6 
Misery 0 5 7 7 Anger 1 4 3 8 
Exper.Suicide 7 7 8 12 Breathless 4 6 8 6 
Words Ugly 5 5 7 9 Trembling 7 7 7 8 
E f f o r t 3 2 4 4 Heartbeat 8 7 10 11 
Sadness 1 3 6 3 Nervous 9 9 8 9 
Wakeful .2 5 7 5 Worry 2 5 6 7 
Crying 3 7 10 8 Tension 7 6 6 8 
London 7 11 10 11 Autumn 4 10 7 8 
Branch 3 6 7 7 Purple 3 9 6 9 
Bargain 1 4 5 4 Curly 3 6 7 4 
No v e l i s t 2 5 9 5 Request 2 7 9 4 
Neut. S c i e n t i s t 1 9 10 8 F e r t i l e 5 3 5 8 
Words Hungry 3 4 5 3 Pointing 0 3 6 6 
Ideas 2 4 5 5 Airma i l 5 4 7 10 
Gallon 1 2 3 7 Charming 1 3 5 8 
Foggy 4 6 4 8 Wei fare 0 2 4 1 
Bathing 4 5 6 5 Budget 1 3 2 4 
Anx 
l i s t 
213 
Phobia Words 1 2 3 4 
l i s t Shopping 5 7 8 8 
Train 9 8 10 10 
Aeroplane 7 8 8 11 
Crowds 3 5 10 10 
Exper. L i f t s 4- 5 8 8 
Words Church 8 7 10 9 
People 5 7 6 8 
Party 4 4 6 6 
S.markets 8 9 9 8 
H.dresser 4 6 5 9 
M i r r o r 0 7 10 10 
Drink 2 5 5 6 
Calendars 2 7 4 7 
Floors 2 6 9 11 
Neut. Heels 2 7 6 9 
Words Book 3 9 6 7 
Baby 6 8 11 10 
Music 3 2 8 7 
Adverts 5 8 8 5 
B.casters 4 7 6 9 
Controls 
214 
T r i a l s T r i a l s 
Words 1 2 3 4 Words 1 2 3 4 
Depr F a i l u r e 2 6 5 4 Panic 4 3 7 8 
l i s t G u i l t 4 5 5 5 Shaking 3 8 8 8 
Disgust 6 4 3 3 Dizzy 4 2 5 5 
Misery 3 5 7 4 Anger 4 6 6 6 
Exper. Suicide 8 
1 
7 • 8 9 Breathless 6 6 6 4 
Words Ugly 6 3 6 8 Trembling 2 4 4 8 
E f f o r t 5 4 4 3 Heartbeat 5 3 2 4 
Sadness 4 3 8 4 Nervous 6 • 6 6 4 
Wakeful 4 6 6 5 Worry 6 7 7 8 
Crying 2 7 6 9 Tension 6 7 7 8 
London 4 7 6 10 Autumn 2 3 7 6 
Branch 4 3 4 5 Purple 2 4 7 8 
Bargain 1 2 4 4 Curly. 4 4 6 5 
Nov e l i s t 3 5 6 6 Request 0 5 6 2 
Neut. S c i e n t i s t 3 7 5 9 F e r t i l e 3 5 2 2 
Words Hungry 1 4 3 5 Pointing 2 3 4 5 
Ideas 0 1 5 7 Air m a i l 2 9 4 7 
Gallon 1 1 3 3 Charming 5 5 5 4 
Foggy 3 2 7 7 Welfare 1 3 4 5 
Bathing 4 6 6 5 Budget 4 3 4 4 
Anx 
l i s t 
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Phobia Words 1 2 3 4 
l i s t Shopping 9 5 7 5 
Train 4 5 8 7 
Aeroplane 4 7 9 9 
Crowds 5 8 9 7 
Exper. L i f t s 4 5 6 7 
Words Church 4 4 6 7 
People 5 5 7 9 
Party 2 3 5 6 
S.markets 8 8 8 10 
H.dresser 6 6 8 7 
M i r r o r 2 5 5 6 
Drink 1 5 5 5 
Calendars 1 5 5 7 
Floors 2 8 6 7 
Neut. Heels 2 6 7 7 
Words Book 3 4 5 4 
Baby 6 9 9 9 
Music 4 5 3 8 
Adverts 6 8 7 7 
B.casters 3 5 8 7 
Depr. l i s t = Depression L i s t 
Anx. l i s t = Anxiety L i s t 
Exper. Words = Experimental Words 
Neut. Words = Neutral Words 
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Appendix L : The Leeds Self-Assessment Scale 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Please read the sentences below and indicate how much they apply 
to you r i gh t now or wi th in the las t day or two, by c i r c l i ng one of the 
four a l te rnat ives . There are no r i gh t or wrong answers. Please work 
quickly and do not think too long about any of the statements. 
I feel miserable and sad. Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
I f i nd i t easy to do the 
things I used t o . 
I get very fr ightened or 
panic feel ings fo r no 
reason at a l 1 . 
I have weeping spe l Is , 
or feel l i k e i t . 
I s t i l l enjoy the things 
I used t o . 
I am rest less and can ' t 
keep s t i l l . 
I can get o f f to sleep 
easi ly and without 
sleeping tab le ts . 
I feel anxious when I go 
out of the house on my 
own. 
I have los t in teres t in 
th ings. 
I get t i r e d for no 
reason. 
I am more i r r i t a b l e 
than usual. 
I wake early and then 
sleep badly fo r the rest 
of the n ight . 
I have a good appet i te. 
I feel in some way to 
blame for the way I am. 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
De f in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
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I get bad headaches. 
I feel l i f e is not 
worth l i v i n g . 
I get pa lp i ta t ions , or 
a sensation of 
' b u t t e r f l i e s ' in my 
stomach or chest. 
I often think I have 
done wrong. 
I feel sleepy during 
the day. 
I get dizzy attacks or 
feel unsteady. 
I feel scared or 
f r ightened. 
I feel tense or wound 
up. 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
Def in i te ly Sometimes Not much Not at a l l 
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Appendix M : Depression Descriptiveness Scale 
1. Describes a person who is very happy. 
2. Describes a person who is happy. 
3. Describes a person who is moderately happy. 
4. Describes a person who is s i i g h t l y happy. 
5. Describes a person who is neither depressed nor happy. 
6. Describes a person who is s i i g h t l y depressed. 
7. Describes a person who is moderately depressed. 
8. Describes a person who is depressed. 
9. Describes a person who is very depressed. 
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Appendix N : Anxiety Descriptiveness Scale 
1 . Describes a person who is very relaxed. 
2. Describes a person who is relaxed. 
3. Describes a person who is moderately relaxed. 
4. Describes a person who is s i i g h t l y relaxed. 
5. Describes a person who is neither anxious nor relaxed. 
6. Describes a person who is s l i g h t l y anxious. 
7. Describes a person who is moderately anxious. 
8. Describes a person who is anxious. 
9. Describes a person who is very anxious. 
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Appendix 0 : Imagery Ratings - instruct ions 
Adjectives d i f f e r in the i r capacity to arouse mental images of 
th ings, events or s i tuat ions they describe. Some words arouse a 
sensory experience, such as a mental picture or sound very quickly and 
easi ly whereas others may do so only with d i f f i c u l t y ( ie a f ter a long 
delay) or not at a l l . The purpose of th is experiment is to rate a l i s t 
of words as to the ease or d i f f i c u l t y with which they arouse mental 
images. Any word which in your estimation arouses a mental image ( ie a 
mental p ic ture , or sound or other sensory experience) very quickly and 
easi ly should be given a high imagery ra t i ng ; any word that arouses a 
mental image with d i f f i c u l t y or not at a l l should be given a low 
imagery ra t i ng . Think of the words " f i e r y " and "ingenious". Fiery 
would probably arouse an image re la t i ve l y easi ly and would be rated as 
high imagery; ingenious would probably do so with d i f f i c u l t y and would 
be rated as low imagery. 
Your rat ings w i l l be made on a seven-point scale, where one is the 
low imagery end of the scale and seven is the high imagery end of the 
scale. Choose your ra t ing by saying the number from 1 to 7 that best 
indicates your judgement of the ease of d i f f i c u l t y with which the word 
arouses imagery. The words that arouse mental images most readi ly for 
you should be given a rat ing of 7, words that arouse images with the 
greatest d i f f i c u l t y or not at a l l should be rated 1 ; words that are 
intermediate in ease or d i f f i c u l t y of imagery, of course, should be 
rated appropriately between the two extremes. Feel free to use the 
ent i re range of numbers, from 1 to 7; at the same time, do not be 
concerned about how often you use a par t icu lar number as long as i t is 
your true judgement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
LOW IMAGERY HIGH IMAGERY 
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Appendix P : Ratings - results of words selected 
for the Experiment 
ANXIETY WORDS NEUTRAL WORDS 
D A I G D A I G 
UNCOMFORTABLE 5.75 7.75 5.25 18 SOLITARY 6.25 5.00 5.75 18 
UNEASY 6.25 7.75 2.00 12 EXCESSIVE 3.50 4.25 2.75 12 
UNCERTAIN 6.00 7.25 3.00 20 PRIMITIVE 4.75 5.00 5.75 20 
FURIOUS 5.00 8.75 7.00 27 HORRIBLE 5.50 5.00 2.25 27 
FRANTIC 6.75 9.00 7.00 12 GREEDY 5.00 5.50 6.00 11 
WATCHFUL 5.75 8.75 2.50 13 UNJUST 5.25 5.50 1.50 13 
TIMID 5.75 7.75 3,25 15 AWKWARD 5.50 5.75 3.52 14 
INTENSE 5.50 7.25 4.00 15 HASTY 5.00 5.75 1.00 15 
STORMY 5.00 8.00 5.50 21 CROOKED 4.50 4.75 5.00 18 
SAVAGE 5.00 7.75 6.50 40 WICKED 4.75 4.50 6.50 36 
BOTH (ANXIETY & DEPRESSION) NEUTRAL WORDS 
D A I G D A I G 
DESOLATE 9.00 7.25 3.00 16 OBSCURE 5.50 4.75 1.75 16 
INFERIOR 7.50 7.25 4.25 17 DIZZY 2.25 4.00 6.50 10 
DESPERATE 8.75 9.00 6.25 35 HIDEOUS 5.25 6.00 7.00 11 
UNHAPPY 7.75 8.00 5.25 39 CONTRARY 4.75 2.75 5.50 46 
DISMAL 8.75 7.25 5.25 13 CORRUPT 5.50 5,00 5.50 12 
WORTHLESS 8.75 7.25 2.75 15 STUBBORN 5.00 4.50 3.00 14 
HOPELESS 8.25 7.00 3.25 17 FRIGHTFUL 5.25 5.50 4.50 10 
WRETCHED 9.00 9.00 4.75 21 STUPID 3.75 3.75 6.00 24 
SHAK Y 6.75 8.75 5.00 25 DIRTY 5.75 , 5,00 7.00 31 
ASHAMED 7.25 7.75 6.00 45 DREADFUL 6.00 5.00 5.50 43 
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DEPRESSION WORDS NEUTRAL WORDS 
D A I G D A I G 
PITIFUL 7.50 5.25 5.00 10 TREACHEROUS 5.00 6.50 5.50 11 
LIMITED 6.50 5.00 2.25 18 CRITICAL 5.75 4.50 2.25 16 
SULLEN 7.50 6.25 4.25 13 CHILDISH 4.50 3.75 4.75 13 
DREARY 6.00 4.50 5.00 14 BREATHLESS 4.00 6.50 3.50 13 
TRAGIC 8.75 6.50 5.50 16 HURRIED 5.00 6.75 3.00 16 
GLOOMY 8.25 5.75 6.25 19 CLUMSY 5.00 5.75 5.75 10 
BEATEN 7.75 6.50 2.25 28 VULGAR 5.00 4.50 2.75 11 
HELPLESS 7.00 6.25 3.75 28 RECKLESS 4.75 3.75 4.75 33 
LONELY 7.25 5.75 3.50 35 FOOLISH 4.25 3.50 5.50 36 
GRIM 7.50 6.25 3.75 22 COARSE 5.00 3.75 3.50 28 
D = Mean depression rat ing on a 9-point scale where 1 was "very happy" 
and 9 was "very depressed". 
A = Mean anxiety ra t ing on a s imi lar 9-point scale. 
I = Mean imagery ra t ing on a 7-point scale where 1 was "low imagery" 
and 7 was "high imagery". 
G = Thorn-dike-Lorge frequency count. 
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Appendix Q : Practise L is t Words 
Prayer Window 
Daytime Coalmine 
Bashful Haystack 
Paradise Snow 
Bedroom Bookcase 
Aunt Confident 
Refusal Clever 
Enjoyment Loud 
Grateful Dignity 
Doorbel1 Weekend 
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Appendix R : Consent Form 
This is a study to invest igate the way people remember information. 
You w i l l be given some l i s t s of words which you w i l l be asked to 
remember, followed by some br ie f questionnaires. This is not part of 
your treatment. I t is part of a study being conducted in association 
with Durham Univers i ty. The information we obtain w i l l be confidential 
and w i l l not be included in your medical records. You are not obliged 
to take part in the study. I f you do not wish to take part , please do 
not hesitate to say so. 
I f you do wish to take par t , please sign the declaration below: 
I have read the above descript ion and f u l l y understand what I have 
to do. I consent to take part in the study. 
Signed 
Witness 
Investigator 
Date 
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Appendix S : Subject Detai ls and Self-Ratings Sheet 
Name Sex 
Age Occupation 
Age l e f t school 
Type of school 
ADJECTIVES 
Comprehensive Secondary Modern 
Grammar Other (please specify) 
Crooked Wretched Hurried Desolate 
Shaky Clumsy Fr ight fu l Greedy 
Reckless Beaten Coarse Awkward 
Uncertain Uncomfortable Breathless Stupid 
Stubborn Timid Contrary Dismal 
Treacherous Unjust Frantic Obscure 
Furious Watchful Grim Lonely 
So l i ta ry Intense Hideous Dreadful 
Dizzy Tragic Vulgar Hasty 
Dreary Chi ldish Foolish Savage 
Hopeless Uneasy Sullen P i t i f u l 
Pr imi t ive Unhappy In fe r i o r Excessive 
Ashamed Limited Desperate Wicked 
Di r ty Helpless Corrupt Gloomy 
Horr ible Stormy C r i t i ca l Worthless 
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Appendix T : Individual Questionnaire Scores 
Subject Group 
Leeds Self-Assessment Scores 
Anxiety Depression 
E.P.Q. 
Neuroticism 
5 7 11 
3 3 20 
7 6 23 
3 1 9 
7 1 10 
1 1 0 
3 0 3 
5 0 12 
12 0 20 
5 6 14 
13 9 21 
8 3 15 
14 7 21 
13 8 15 
10 17 23 
10 6 22 
3 2 17 
15 9 23 
CONTROLS 
PATIENTS 
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Appendix V : Total Recall Scores 
Subject 
Group 
CONTROLS 
PATIENTS 
i ) Word L i s t i i ) Word Category 
i ) Both 
i i ) Neut Exper 
Anxiety 
Neut Exper 
i i i ) Tr ia l 
Depression 
Neut Exper 
) Tl T2 Tl T2 Tl T2 Tl T2 Tl T2 Tl T2 
3 5 4 3 2 4 2 3 3 1 2 3 
6 9 6 8 5 9 5 10 6 8 6 8 
3 3 5 7 2 4 6 5 2 4 5 5 
5 6 1 3 5 7 3 8 4 6 5 7 
4 8 3 6 3 4 4 9 4 6 4 3 
1 5 7 9 5 6 5 10 8 10 6 9 
3 3 4 6 1 7 5 3 3 4 5 3 
3 1 3 5 2 3 3 7 1 3 2 4 
3 4 3 7 0 4 4 2 1 3 3 3 
5 3 3 3 3 4 2 4 2 1 3 3 
0 3 1 2 1 6 2 3 1 1 1 2 
6 3 0 1 2 5 1 4 3 3 4 5 
2 3 2 4 2 1 2 3 3 4 1 3 
2 1 2 4 2 5 2 1 1 5 3 3 
2 2 2 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 2 1 
2 2 2 4 3 5 0 1 3 4 3 4 
2 1 2 4 5 4 2 5 4 4 0 3 
3 3 6 7 4 2 1 7 2 4 6 4 
7 7 5 9 5 7 5 7 4 8 6 9 
4 3 0 3 2 2 4 4 1 4 2 0 
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Appendix V : Clustering Scores (RR) 
Subject i ) Word L i s t i i ) Word Category i i i ) Tr ia ls 
Group i ) Both Anxiety Depression 
i i ) Neutral Exper Neutral Exper Neutral Exper 
i i i ) Tl T2 Tl T2 Tl T2 Tl T2 Tl T2 Tl T2 
0.00 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
0.20 0.57 0.40 0.57 0.50 0.37 0.33 0.66 0.40 0.42 0.60 0.57 
0.50 0.00 0.50 0.66 0.00 0.33 0.60 0.50 1 .000.670.751.00 
CONTROLS 0.75 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.25 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.50 0.50 
0.30 0.85 0.50 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.60 0.67 0.50 
0.00 0.25 1.00 0.57 0.50 0.40 0.50 0.77 0.71 0.77 0.60 0.75 
0.50 0.50 0.30 0.60 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50 
0.50 0.00 0.50 0.60 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.30 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 
0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 1 .000 .501 .000 .67 0 .000 .000 .500 .50 
0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
PATIENTS 0.80 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.33 0.75 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 1 .000 .001 .000 .50 1 .000 .670 .000 .00 
0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 
0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.00 0.75 1 .001 .000 .000 .50 
1.00 0.00 0.40 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.33 0.75 0.00 
0.50 0.50 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.75 0.16 0.33 0.28 0.40 0.50 
1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.66 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.00 
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Appendix W : Proportion of se l f - ra ted adjectives recalled 
Subject i ) Word L i s t i i ) Word Category 
Group i ) Both Anxiety Depression 
i i ) Neutral Exper Neutral Exper Neutral Exper 
0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 
0.21 0.00 0.20 0.40 o .n 0.08 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,13 0.00 
CONTROLS 0.08 0.17 0.27 0.54 0.08 0.31 
0.00 0.08 0.17 0.49 0.13 0.17 
0.50 0.11 0.65 0.60 0.71 0.00 
0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.67 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.63 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.17 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.21 0.42 1.00 0.00 
PATIENTS 0.00 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.70 
0.00 0.63 0.00 0.17 0.13 0.33 
1.00 0.50 0,00 0.50 0.00 0.33 
0.00 1 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 
0.25 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.30 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.50 0.75 0.30 0.33 0.00 
0.00 - - 0.30 0.25 0.00 
0.00 0.33 0.50 0.30 0.50 0.50 
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